Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court declining to pierce Sebastian Holdings, Inc.'s (SHI) corporate veil and to hold Alexander Vik, SHI's sole shareholder and director, jointly and severally liable with SHI for an approximately $243 million foreign judgment against Vik, holding that the trial court did not err.After SHI failed to pay the English judgment Deutsche Bank commenced this action against Defendants alleging that Vik caused SHI to breach its contractual obligations to Deutsche Bank and to fraudulently convey funds to third parties in order to defraud Deutsche Bank out of money owed. Count two sought a declaratory judgment piercing SHI's corporate veil and holding Vik jointly and severally liable for the English judgment. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Deutsche Bank could not prevail on its claim that the results of the trial would have been different if the court had applied Connecticut law or if it had correctly applied the laws of Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Defendant's motion to open the judgment and vacated the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of Plaintiff, The Bank of New York Mellon, holding that the appellate court erred.The trial court concluded that Defendant's motion to open constituted a collateral attack on an earlier judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue foreclosure, and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that Defendant's motion to open constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the foreclosure judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the appellate court (1) erroneously concluded that Defendant's motion to open was a collateral attack because, at the time Defendant filed his motion to open, the trial court had jurisdiction to open the judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-212a; and (2) this Court rejects the alternative ground that the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to open in which he claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Banking revoking Plaintiff's license to serve as a mortgage lender in the state, holding that the Commissioner had the legal authority to suspend and revoke Plaintiff's mortgage lender license.Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal from the Commissioner's decision to revoke Plaintiff's mortgage lender license, arguing that the governing statutory scheme precluded the Department of Banking from suspending its license. The trial court affirmed the Commissioner's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly affirmed the Commissioner's decision. View "1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Department of Banking" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court sustaining Plaintiffs' administrative appeal and remanding this case to the Commissioner of Banking for further proceedings as to Plaintiffs' entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in part.At issue was whether a business entity shared sovereign immunity with Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, a federally-recognized tribe. On appeal, Plaintiffs - Clear Creek Lending, Great Plains Lending, LLC, and John Shotton, chairman of the Tribe - claimed that the trial court improperly allocated the burden of proving entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs, improperly required proof of a functioning relationship between the entities and the tribe, and improperly failed to find Shotton immune in further administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the entity claiming arm of the tribe status bears the burden of proving its entitlement to that status; (2) Great Plains was an arm of the tribe and Shotton was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity but not injunctive relief; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that Clear Creek was an arm of the tribe as a matter of law. View "Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Department of Banking" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as it upheld the trial court's order directing Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for property taxes and insurance premiums, holding that the ordered relief was inconsistent with the remedial scheme available to a mortgagee in a strict foreclosure.At issue was whether a trial court may order a mortgagor to reimburse a mortgagee for the mortgagee's advancements of property taxes and insurance premiums during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure. The trial court ordered Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for such property tax and insurance premium payments, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in directing Defendants to make monetary payments to Plaintiff outside of a deficiency judgment; and (2) the Appellate Court's judgment is affirmed in all other respects. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. Essaghof" on Justia Law

In this writ of error the Supreme Court held that state courts lack jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provision of the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1), to motions proceedings against nondebtor plaintiffs in foreclosure actions and overruled Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 93 A.3d 1167 (Conn. 2014), on that ground. U.S. Bank National Association brought a foreclosure action against Jacquelyn Crawford. The trial court ordered a foreclosure by sale and appointed Douglas Evans as the committee for sale. Before the sale could be completed Crawford declared bankruptcy and the foreclosure action was stayed. Evans then filed a motion seeking to recover from the bank fees and expenses he incurred in preparing for the sale. Relying exclusively on Shivers, which ruled that courts have authority to extend the application for the automatic stay to nondebtors in unusual circumstances, the trial court concluded that Evans's motion for fees and expenses was stayed. Evans then filed this writ of error. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) state courts do not have jurisdiction to change the status quo by modifying the reach of the automatic stay provision; and (2) Shivers must be overruled. View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Court held that Defendants John Sanzo and Maria Sanzo were not entitled to the homestead exemption, which is available when a creditor forecloses on a judgment lien but not on a consensual lien. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-352(b).Plaintiff, Rockstone Capital, LLC held judgment liens against Defendants. The parties agreed to a consensual lien in the form of a mortgage to secure the debt. Defendants defaulted on the mortgage payments, and Plaintiff sought to foreclose on the mortgage. Defendants invoked the homestead exemption. The trial court decided that the exemption should apply and rendered judgment for Plaintiff on the judgment liens, subject to the homestead exemption. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the homestead exemption did not apply to a consensual lien such as a mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly found that the appeal was taken from a final judgment and the mortgage was a consensual lien. View "Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Sanzo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court insofar as it rendered judgment in Defendant's favor on counts alleging fraudulent transfer under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-552a through 52-552l, and unjust enrichment, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Plaintiff's CUFTA claim but did not err in rejecting Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.Defendant Stephen McGee used a power of attorney granted to him by his elderly mother, Helen McGee, to transfer to himself funds from Helen's checking account. As a consequence of the transfers, Helen had insufficient assets to pay her debt to Plaintiff Geriatrics, Inc. Plaintiff brought this action, and the trial court rendered judgment in Defendant's favor on Plaintiff's CUFTA and unjust enrichment claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in rejecting the CUFTA claim the trial court improperly failed to consider and apply agency principles; and (2) in light of the unrequited evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. View "Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court in this interlocutory appeal regarding what preclusive effective to give in this action to the findings and judgment rendered by an English court in a prior action brought by Plaintiff against the named defendant, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that none of the parties was entitled to the claimed preclusive effect.The English action resulted in a $243,023,089 judgment, plus interest, against the named defendant, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. Plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, later commenced the instant action against Sebastian and Alexander Vik, the sole shareholder and sole director of Sebastian. Plaintiff sought to pierce Sebastian's corporate veil and hold Vik personally liable for his corporation's judgment debt. All parties claimed, unsuccessfully, an entitlement to a preclusive effect as a result of the final judgment rendered in the prior English action. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that the parties were not entitled to have this action decided in their respective favor on the basis of the alleged preclusive effect of the English judgment. The Supreme Court adopted the Appellate Court's opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues and affirmed. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, under Connecticut law, after a judgment debtor’s wages have been garnished, the remaining wages are exempt from execution, and whether the transfer of those wages to a third party constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to two state court judgments, The Cadle Company was Terry Fletcher’s judgment creditor, Fletcher owing the company more than $3 million. Since at least 2005, Terry has transferred more than $300,000 of his residual wages to the bank account of his wife, Marguerite Fletcher. The Cadle Company sued the Fletchers in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the transfer violated the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA). The district court granted the Fletchers’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted The Cadle Company’s motion for partial summary judgment, and ultimately rendered judgment for The Cadle Company in the amount of $401,426 on its CUFTA claim. The Fletchers appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit subsequently certified a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The Supreme Court answered that Terry’s residual wages would not have been exempt from execution if he had retained possession of them, and therefore, they were subject to execution after Terry transferred them to his wife’s account. View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law