Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child in 2012 and sentenced to fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after five years, followed by twenty-five years of probation. As a condition of his probation, the court prohibited him from contacting the victim. In 2021, the state sought a standing criminal protective order against the defendant, which the trial court granted, requiring the defendant to have no contact with the victim and to remain at least 100 yards away from her, among other conditions. The order was set to remain in effect for forty years.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the protective order without evidence of a change in circumstances since his sentencing. The Appellate Court majority upheld the trial court’s decision, concluding that the defendant did not challenge the imposition of the order on the ground that the court failed to abide by the statutory standard. The dissenting judge disagreed, interpreting the defendant’s argument as asserting that the statute required evidence of a change in circumstances.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the defendant adequately briefed his claim that additional requirements apply when a standing criminal protective order is issued postsentencing. The court held that, in addition to the express requirements of § 53a-40e (a), the issuing court must find that additional evidence, not presented at sentencing, indicates that the order will best serve the interests of the victim and the public. The trial court failed to apply this standard, as it did not find that the defendant had been convicted of a qualifying offense or that additional evidence supported the issuance of the order. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to vacate the trial court’s order. View "State v. Mieles" on Justia Law

The defendant was on probation after being convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. His probation was revoked based on allegations that he participated in a home invasion, left the state without permission, and failed to submit to substance abuse evaluations and counseling. The defendant contested the revocation, particularly challenging the admission of an out-of-court identification by a witness, Rainey, who was unavailable for cross-examination.The trial court admitted Rainey’s identification without applying the balancing test required by State v. Crespo, which weighs the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against the state’s reasons for not producing the witness and the reliability of the evidence. The court found the defendant violated his probation and imposed a thirteen-year sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not applying the Crespo balancing test.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the defendant had abandoned his request for the Crespo balancing test during the probation revocation hearing. The defendant then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the defendant did not abandon his Crespo claim. The court noted that the defendant consistently argued for the application of the Crespo balancing test and that the trial court should have engaged in this balancing before admitting Rainey’s identification. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for a new probation revocation hearing limited to determining whether the defendant was involved in the home invasion. The findings that the defendant violated other conditions of his probation were upheld and not to be relitigated. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought to foreclose two municipal tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 on real property owned by the defendant. The city of Bridgeport had purportedly assigned the tax liens to the plaintiff’s predecessor, which then allegedly assigned its interest to the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer and several special defenses, including a claim that the Bridgeport City Council had not validly assigned the liens. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof that the city council had made a resolution to assign the tax liens to the plaintiff.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had met its burden of establishing the validity of the assignments. The court found that the plaintiff submitted certified copies of the city council’s meeting agendas and minutes, which showed that the council had authorized the assignments. The court also noted that the defendant failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. The court clarified that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving standing and had satisfied this burden, while the defendant’s mere assertions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court also addressed procedural irregularities but concluded that the defendant had waived any related claims by not objecting. View "Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc." on Justia Law

A national consumer advocate law firm (C Co.) and its affiliate (S Co.) providing administrative support services sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the Department of Banking. The Department had initiated an administrative enforcement action against S Co. for allegedly engaging in unlicensed debt negotiation activities. The plaintiffs argued that S Co. was exempt from licensing requirements under a presumption established in a prior case (Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner), which holds that attorneys providing debt negotiation services as part of their legal practice fall under the exclusive regulation of the Judicial Branch.The trial court denied the Department's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention on whether the Persels presumption applied to S Co. The Department appealed, arguing that the Commissioner of Banking should first determine whether the presumption applied.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reasoned that the Commissioner of Banking lacks the expertise to determine whether the Persels presumption applies, as this involves assessing whether the activities in question constitute the practice of law, which falls under the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch. The court emphasized that allowing the commissioner to make this determination would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Therefore, the plaintiffs could seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the trial court without waiting for the commissioner to resolve the issue. View "Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC v. Dept. of Banking" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order. During the trial, the defendant elected to represent himself. However, the trial court reappointed his former standby counsel to represent him due to the defendant's conduct, including his conscious decision not to appear in court on a particular occasion.The trial court found that the defendant's conduct, which included refusing court-ordered transportation, failing to appear at scheduled hearings, and threatening to leave trial proceedings, constituted a forfeiture of his right to self-representation. The trial court noted that the defendant's behavior was dilatory, disruptive, and manipulative. The trial court reappointed standby counsel to regain control of the courtroom and the trial schedule.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to self-representation. The court found that the defendant's conduct, including his refusal to return to court after a lunch break, was sufficiently disruptive and obstructionist to warrant a forfeiture of his right to self-representation. The court emphasized that the trial court had warned the defendant about the consequences of his actions and had given him multiple opportunities to conform to the rules before making the forfeiture finding. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to reappoint counsel to ensure a fair trial. View "State v. Petteway" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, sustained a work-related injury to her left wrist in April 2016. After undergoing two surgeries and being diagnosed with posttraumatic chronic synovitis, she was determined to have reached maximum medical improvement in March 2020. The defendant sought to convert her temporary partial incapacity benefits to permanent partial disability benefits based on this determination.An administrative law judge approved the defendant's request to convert the benefits, concluding that he lacked the authority to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits once the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement. The plaintiff appealed to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the administrative law judge's decision, agreeing that ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits are unavailable after reaching maximum medical improvement.The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, which also affirmed the board's decision. The Appellate Court concluded that an administrative law judge does not have the discretion to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under General Statutes § 31-308 (a) once a claimant reaches maximum medical improvement and becomes eligible for permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b).The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the clear and unambiguous language of § 31-308 (b) gives an administrative law judge the discretion to award a claimant ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under § 31-308 (a) in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b) after reaching maximum medical improvement, up to the statutory maximum of 520 weeks. The case was remanded to the administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and making a false statement in connection with the shooting death of his wife. He allegedly staged the crime scene to resemble a home invasion. The defendant appealed, claiming multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of a fair trial.In the lower court, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude certain evidence and denied in part his motion to suppress certain statements. The trial court also admitted data from the victim’s Fitbit after a Porter hearing, finding the evidence scientifically reliable. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-five years of imprisonment.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found four instances of prosecutorial impropriety: (1) the prosecutor’s failure to rephrase a question about a "mini Cheshire scene," (2) asking the defendant if he planned to kill the victim during a trip to Vermont, (3) stating that the defendant was counting on the jury to be gullible, lazy, and unintelligent, and (4) failing to disclose an expert witness’s anticipated testimony. However, the court concluded that these improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, either individually or collectively.The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Fitbit data, as the evidence was scientifically reliable. Additionally, the court found that the defendant was not in custody during his hospital interview for purposes of Miranda, and thus, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress his statement.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Dabate" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, two grandchildren and a friend of the decedent, Wisniewski, filed a lawsuit against the defendant attorney, alleging professional negligence and breach of contract in the preparation of Wisniewski's will. They claimed that Wisniewski intended for his TD Ameritrade account to be distributed equally among five individuals, including the plaintiffs, but due to the defendant's failure to ensure the account's beneficiary designation was changed, the entire account was distributed to Wisniewski's daughter, the sole designated beneficiary.The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claim, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because Connecticut law only allows third-party beneficiaries to sue attorneys for errors in drafting or executing a will, not for failing to change a beneficiary designation. The court later dismissed the breach of contract claim, finding it functionally identical to the dismissed negligence claim.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs did not allege a drafting error in the will. However, it concluded that public policy supports holding attorneys liable for failing to advise clients about the need to change beneficiary designations to effectuate their estate plans. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for professional negligence based on the defendant's failure to advise Wisniewski about the implications of the beneficiary designation on his estate plan. The court did not recognize a duty for attorneys to ensure that clients actually change beneficiary designations.The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, agreeing that the allegations did not sound in breach of contract but were essentially the same as the dismissed negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the professional negligence claim related to the failure to advise. View "Wisniewski v. Palermino" on Justia Law