Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The victims, D and T, were sexually abused by the defendant, who was in a relationship with their mother, Q, and lived with them for several years. The abuse began when the victims were five years old and continued until they were eleven. The victims disclosed the abuse to their mother years later, which led to the defendant's arrest and trial.In the trial court, the defendant was found guilty on five counts of sexual assault in the first degree and eight counts of risk of injury to a child. The trial court instructed the jury, based on the precedent set in State v. Daniel W. E., that the victims' delay in reporting the abuse should not be considered when evaluating their credibility. The defendant appealed, arguing that this instruction violated his due process rights and that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing certain testimony from D.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and overruled the portion of Daniel W. E. that modified the constancy of accusation doctrine. The court returned to the standard set in State v. Troupe, which allows constancy evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony but not for substantive purposes, and permits the jury to consider the victim's delay in reporting when evaluating credibility. The court concluded that the trial court's instruction was erroneous but harmless, as it was not reasonably probable that the instruction misled the jury.Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing D to testify that the defendant told her he played the same sexual "games" with his daughter, as this testimony was probative of the defendant's grooming behavior. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "State v. Adam P." on Justia Law

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover damages from the defendant, a former client, for breach of contract in federal court. The defendant had engaged the plaintiff to represent it in a litigation matter but failed to pay the agreed-upon legal fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious, and sought common-law punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut partially granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, awarding compensatory damages. However, the court found genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and the defendant's counterclaims, including legal malpractice. The jury later found in favor of the plaintiff on all claims and counterclaims, determining that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious. The District Court then certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the recoverability of common-law punitive damages for wilful and malicious breach of contract.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for a client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. The court noted that Connecticut appellate courts generally do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract claims, except in certain contexts like insurance and surety. The court emphasized the different purposes of compensatory damages in contract law and punitive damages in tort law, and declined to adopt a broader rule permitting punitive damages for wilful, malicious, or reckless breaches of contract. The court's decision aligns with the majority rule in other jurisdictions and the Restatements of Contracts and Torts. View "McCarter & English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in Danbury, Connecticut, challenged the tax assessments on their properties, each valued at over one million dollars, by appealing to the Superior Court. They were required by statute to file appraisals of their properties within 120 days of filing their appeals. The plaintiffs requested extensions to this deadline, which the court granted. However, they failed to file the appraisals with the court by the extended deadlines, although they did provide the appraisals to the defendant's counsel.The trial court initially dismissed five of the six tax appeals for failure to meet the filing deadline, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court later granted the plaintiffs' motions to open the judgments of dismissal and for reargument, citing similar cases where the court had not dismissed appeals under similar circumstances. The court denied the defendant's corrected motion to dismiss the sixth appeal, finding no prejudice to the defendant from the late filing.The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' failure to timely file the appraisals. The plaintiffs contended that the appeal was moot because they had filed new tax appeals under a recent statutory amendment allowing for such actions if previous appeals were dismissed under certain conditions.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot, as the underlying appeals were not "dismissed" for purposes of the new statutory provision, given that the judgments of dismissal had been opened. The court further held that the appraisal filing requirement in § 12-117a (a) (2) is not subject matter jurisdictional. The requirement is mandatory but arises after the commencement of a tax appeal, and the time period for filing the appraisal can be extended by the court for good cause. The judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and arson in the second degree. The case arose from an incident where the defendant sedated E with a substantial amount of diphenhydramine, set two fires in their home, and was found unconscious alongside E, who was later pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined E's cause of death to be homicidal asphyxia, with diphenhydramine intoxication as a contributing factor. The defendant's social media posts prior to the incident indicated distress and potential premeditation.The trial court, after a competency hearing, found the defendant competent to stand trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The defendant appealed, claiming her amnesia deprived her of a fair trial, the trial court improperly admitted social media posts, and the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the defendant's claim of amnesia affecting her right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of State v. Golding because she did not request a posttrial determination regarding the fairness of the trial, making the record inadequate for review. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media posts, as they were properly authenticated through testimony.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder. The jury could reasonably find that the defendant caused E's death with intent, based on the cumulative evidence, including the circumstances of the fire, the sedative found in E's system, and the defendant's behavior and social media posts. The evidence was also sufficient to support the arson conviction, as the jury could reasonably find that the defendant set the fires with the intent to damage the home and conceal the murder. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Ziolkowski" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography in the first degree, which requires proof of possessing fifty or more images of child pornography. The New Britain Police Department obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which revealed images of suspected child pornography. The state introduced fifty-seven images at trial, and the defendant was found guilty by a jury.The defendant appealed, arguing that thirteen of the images did not constitute child pornography as they depicted mere nudity, which is protected under the First Amendment. He also contended that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the Dost factors, which are used to determine whether an image depicts a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. The trial court had instructed the jury that it could consider these factors but was not obligated to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that at least eleven of the thirteen challenged images depicted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, thus constituting child pornography. The court also determined that the first five Dost factors are helpful in assessing whether a depiction is lascivious but should not be used to define the term. The sixth Dost factor, which considers whether the image is intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, should not be used in possession cases as it introduces a subjective element.The court found that the trial court’s instruction on the Dost factors, including the sixth factor, did not mislead the jury. The court also held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required, as the different images and categories of sexually explicit conduct are merely means of proving the elements of the offense. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit exhibits showing file names of deleted images associated with the defendant’s email address, as they were probative of the defendant’s knowledge and possession of child pornography. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Inzitari" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, discovered through genetic testing that they are half-siblings and that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, a reproductive endocrinologist. They allege that the defendant used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures without their parents' consent, causing them mental anguish, physical injury, and compromised familial relations. Kayla Suprynowicz also claimed that the defendant's sperm carried a genetic trait causing her to contract a cerebral condition and mast cell activation disorder, reducing her earning capacity.The trial court, Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' amended complaint, determining that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which is not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims presented the paradox of alleging harm that could only have been avoided if they had never been born, a hallmark of wrongful life claims.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful life claims and could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's deception was directly responsible for their injuries and losses, and they sought compensation for these injuries rather than being restored to a state of nonbeing. The court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to strike as to those claims and for further proceedings. View "Suprynowicz v. Tohan" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the first degree, among other crimes, related to a shooting incident involving multiple victims. The defendant claimed self-defense and defense of others, arguing that he shot one of the victims, Wooten, because Wooten was an active shooter. The defendant also sought to admit evidence of another victim, Taylor's, prior arson conviction to demonstrate Taylor's violent character.At trial, the defendant testified that he shot Taylor and Wooten in self-defense and defense of others. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his justification defenses. The trial court excluded evidence of Taylor's arson conviction, ruling that the defendant did not have a certified copy of the conviction.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to defeat the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of others regarding Wooten's murder. The court noted that the shootings of Taylor, Smith, and Wooten were part of a single, continuous episode. The jury could reasonably have found that Wooten was acting defensively to protect Smith from the defendant's unprovoked attack. The court also held that any error in excluding evidence of Taylor's arson conviction was harmless. The arson conviction did not necessarily involve a risk of harm to a person or violent physical conduct, and there was no evidence that Taylor was armed or the aggressor in the shootings. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, who is a partner at a large law firm. The plaintiff sought joint custody, child support, alimony, and an equitable division of property. The trial court found that the defendant's interest in potential retirement payments from her law firm was too speculative to be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution. The court awarded the plaintiff alimony contingent on the defendant's employment status at her firm.The trial court determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments was a mere expectancy, as the firm could unilaterally reduce or eliminate these payments at any time. The court found that the defendant's interest involved too many variables and risks to be considered property. The court awarded the plaintiff $35,000 per month in alimony for the first twelve months, and $30,000 per month thereafter, contingent on the defendant's employment at the firm. If the defendant retired and received retirement payments, the alimony would be 25% of her net after-tax income from those payments.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the retirement payments were too speculative to be considered property and that the alimony award was within the trial court's discretion. The court noted that the trial court had considered all relevant factors, including the plaintiff's earning capacity and the defendant's financial situation, in crafting the alimony order.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments was too speculative to constitute property for equitable distribution. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony contingent on the defendant's employment at her firm, as the order was intended to provide the plaintiff with financial support while incentivizing him to seek employment. View "D. S. v. D. S." on Justia Law