Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff sought to foreclose two municipal tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 on real property owned by the defendant. The city of Bridgeport had purportedly assigned the tax liens to the plaintiff’s predecessor, which then allegedly assigned its interest to the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer and several special defenses, including a claim that the Bridgeport City Council had not validly assigned the liens. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof that the city council had made a resolution to assign the tax liens to the plaintiff.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had met its burden of establishing the validity of the assignments. The court found that the plaintiff submitted certified copies of the city council’s meeting agendas and minutes, which showed that the council had authorized the assignments. The court also noted that the defendant failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. The court clarified that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving standing and had satisfied this burden, while the defendant’s mere assertions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court also addressed procedural irregularities but concluded that the defendant had waived any related claims by not objecting. View "Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc." on Justia Law

A national consumer advocate law firm (C Co.) and its affiliate (S Co.) providing administrative support services sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the Department of Banking. The Department had initiated an administrative enforcement action against S Co. for allegedly engaging in unlicensed debt negotiation activities. The plaintiffs argued that S Co. was exempt from licensing requirements under a presumption established in a prior case (Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner), which holds that attorneys providing debt negotiation services as part of their legal practice fall under the exclusive regulation of the Judicial Branch.The trial court denied the Department's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention on whether the Persels presumption applied to S Co. The Department appealed, arguing that the Commissioner of Banking should first determine whether the presumption applied.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reasoned that the Commissioner of Banking lacks the expertise to determine whether the Persels presumption applies, as this involves assessing whether the activities in question constitute the practice of law, which falls under the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch. The court emphasized that allowing the commissioner to make this determination would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Therefore, the plaintiffs could seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the trial court without waiting for the commissioner to resolve the issue. View "Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC v. Dept. of Banking" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order. During the trial, the defendant elected to represent himself. However, the trial court reappointed his former standby counsel to represent him due to the defendant's conduct, including his conscious decision not to appear in court on a particular occasion.The trial court found that the defendant's conduct, which included refusing court-ordered transportation, failing to appear at scheduled hearings, and threatening to leave trial proceedings, constituted a forfeiture of his right to self-representation. The trial court noted that the defendant's behavior was dilatory, disruptive, and manipulative. The trial court reappointed standby counsel to regain control of the courtroom and the trial schedule.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to self-representation. The court found that the defendant's conduct, including his refusal to return to court after a lunch break, was sufficiently disruptive and obstructionist to warrant a forfeiture of his right to self-representation. The court emphasized that the trial court had warned the defendant about the consequences of his actions and had given him multiple opportunities to conform to the rules before making the forfeiture finding. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to reappoint counsel to ensure a fair trial. View "State v. Petteway" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, sustained a work-related injury to her left wrist in April 2016. After undergoing two surgeries and being diagnosed with posttraumatic chronic synovitis, she was determined to have reached maximum medical improvement in March 2020. The defendant sought to convert her temporary partial incapacity benefits to permanent partial disability benefits based on this determination.An administrative law judge approved the defendant's request to convert the benefits, concluding that he lacked the authority to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits once the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement. The plaintiff appealed to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the administrative law judge's decision, agreeing that ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits are unavailable after reaching maximum medical improvement.The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, which also affirmed the board's decision. The Appellate Court concluded that an administrative law judge does not have the discretion to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under General Statutes § 31-308 (a) once a claimant reaches maximum medical improvement and becomes eligible for permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b).The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the clear and unambiguous language of § 31-308 (b) gives an administrative law judge the discretion to award a claimant ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under § 31-308 (a) in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b) after reaching maximum medical improvement, up to the statutory maximum of 520 weeks. The case was remanded to the administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and making a false statement in connection with the shooting death of his wife. He allegedly staged the crime scene to resemble a home invasion. The defendant appealed, claiming multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of a fair trial.In the lower court, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude certain evidence and denied in part his motion to suppress certain statements. The trial court also admitted data from the victim’s Fitbit after a Porter hearing, finding the evidence scientifically reliable. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-five years of imprisonment.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found four instances of prosecutorial impropriety: (1) the prosecutor’s failure to rephrase a question about a "mini Cheshire scene," (2) asking the defendant if he planned to kill the victim during a trip to Vermont, (3) stating that the defendant was counting on the jury to be gullible, lazy, and unintelligent, and (4) failing to disclose an expert witness’s anticipated testimony. However, the court concluded that these improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, either individually or collectively.The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Fitbit data, as the evidence was scientifically reliable. Additionally, the court found that the defendant was not in custody during his hospital interview for purposes of Miranda, and thus, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress his statement.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Dabate" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, two grandchildren and a friend of the decedent, Wisniewski, filed a lawsuit against the defendant attorney, alleging professional negligence and breach of contract in the preparation of Wisniewski's will. They claimed that Wisniewski intended for his TD Ameritrade account to be distributed equally among five individuals, including the plaintiffs, but due to the defendant's failure to ensure the account's beneficiary designation was changed, the entire account was distributed to Wisniewski's daughter, the sole designated beneficiary.The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claim, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because Connecticut law only allows third-party beneficiaries to sue attorneys for errors in drafting or executing a will, not for failing to change a beneficiary designation. The court later dismissed the breach of contract claim, finding it functionally identical to the dismissed negligence claim.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs did not allege a drafting error in the will. However, it concluded that public policy supports holding attorneys liable for failing to advise clients about the need to change beneficiary designations to effectuate their estate plans. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for professional negligence based on the defendant's failure to advise Wisniewski about the implications of the beneficiary designation on his estate plan. The court did not recognize a duty for attorneys to ensure that clients actually change beneficiary designations.The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, agreeing that the allegations did not sound in breach of contract but were essentially the same as the dismissed negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the professional negligence claim related to the failure to advise. View "Wisniewski v. Palermino" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree for stabbing the victim. The key facts of the case include the defendant and the victim having a history of domestic violence, with the defendant previously assaulting the victim. On the day of the incident, the victim was stabbed multiple times while entering her home. The victim identified the defendant as her attacker, and the police arrested him based on this identification and other circumstantial evidence.The trial court admitted evidence of two prior incidents where the defendant had physically assaulted the victim to establish his specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, arguing that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The trial court allowed the evidence, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to the defendant's intent and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court also found that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless given the strength of the state's case and the limiting instructions provided to the jury.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence. The court found that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect, as the key issue at trial was the identity of the attacker, not the intent. The court also determined that the admission of the prior misconduct evidence was harmful because it presupposed the defendant's identity as the attacker and the remaining evidence was equivocal. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Marcello E." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim. The victim was shot while talking to her boyfriend outside her apartment building. The defendant, along with two other individuals, fired several shots toward the victim’s residence, and one bullet struck the victim in the head, causing her death. The initial investigation did not result in charges, but years later, new information from witnesses led to the defendant’s arrest.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford tried the case, and the jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his alleged gang affiliation and his actions after law enforcement attempted to arrest him. The trial court had allowed the gang affiliation evidence to establish a motive for the shooting and admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct as indicative of his consciousness of guilt.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang affiliation evidence, as it was relevant to establishing a motive for the shooting and its probative value outweighed any unfair prejudicial impact. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct after law enforcement attempted to arrest him, as it was probative of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law