The trial court entered judgment dissolving the marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant. During the pendency of the divorce action, Plaintiff sold shares of stock and exercised certain stock options without first receiving permission from Defendant or the trial court. The trial court found that Plaintiff’s transactions violated orders automatically entered under Practice Book 25-5 but that the violations were not willful. Because the transactions caused a significant loss to the marital estate, the trial court awarded a greater than even distribution of the marital property to Defendant. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s financial orders, concluding that, in an absence of a finding of contempt, the trial court lacked the authority to afford Defendant a remedy for Plaintiff’s violations of the automatic orders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in considering Plaintiff’s violations of the automatic orders in its division of the marital assets. View "O'Brien v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

There was sufficient evidence in the State’s case-in-chief to support the conviction of Defendant of forgery in the second degree in connection with a document created to facilitate the purchase of a vehicle on behalf of a corporation. On appeal from his conviction, Defendant asked the Supreme Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the administration of justice to hold the waiver rule in applicable to court trials, to consider his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and alternatively, that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. The Supreme Court did not reach Defendant’s claim regarding the waiver rule because it concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "State v. Seeley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a developer, appealed a decision of Defendant, a planning and zoning commission, denied Plaintiff’s application for an affordable housing subdivision pursuant to the Affordable Housing Appeals Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-30g. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission was required to grant Plaintiff’s application for subdivision approval despite the application’s lack of compliance with a municipal road ordinance; and (2) the trial court properly ordered the commission to approve Plaintiff’s application “as is” rather than for consideration of conditions of approval. View "Brenmor Properties, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Lisbon" on Justia Law

The Town of Middlebury and sixteen residents and entities situated in Middlebury and nearby towns (collectively, Plaintiffs), appealed the dismissal of their appeal from the decision of the Connecticut Siting Council granting CPV Towantic, LLC’s petition to open and modify a certificate for an electric generating facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that the council had adequately considered neighborhood concerns in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 16-50p(c)(1) where Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the council acted contrary to law and ignored the neighborhood concerns that were presented to it. View "Town of Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with larceny in the third degree as an accessory and conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the basis of the State’s prior entry of a nolle prosequi on the same charges. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the entry of a nolle on those charges and nolles on charges in three other cases was part of an agreement between the State and Defendant contemplating a global disposition supported by consideration. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that Defendant’s prosecution in the present proceeding was barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was ambiguous as to the parties’ intent and therefore must be construed in Defendant’s favor as a global disposition. View "State v. Kallberg" on Justia Law

The trial court properly denied Mother’s motion for visitation with the minor child on the ground that North Carolina was the more appropriate forum to decide the issues raised in the motion. Mother filed a motion to modify the trial court’s orders of visitation after a neglect proceeding. The trial court ruled that a coordinate court in North Carolina was as capable of deciding the nature and extent of Mother’s contact with the child where the state of North Carolina had exercised jurisdiction in this matter and both Father and the child resided in North Carolina. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined that it did not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over Mother’s motion for visitation; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that North Carolina was a more convenient forum for addressing Mother’s motion for visitation; and (3) Mother did not preserve her claim that the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before declining to exercise jurisdiction over her motion, and Mother was not entitled to review of her constitutional claim under State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). View "In re Natalie S." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Families was not required to continue providing reunification efforts to Mother in this case despite the trial court’s grant of custody and guardianship to Father. The trial court adjudicated the minor child neglected and granted temporary custody and guardianship to Father. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not err in failing to order the department to make additional reunification efforts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that continuing reunification efforts for Mother were not required because temporary custody and guardianship had been placed with Father. View "In re Natalie S." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of arson in the second degree, two counts of conspiracy to commit criminal mischief in the first degree, and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant waived his unpreserved claim of instructional error under the rule in State v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942 (2011); (2) the prosecutor’s remarks informing certain prospective jurors that reasonable doubt is something less than 100 percent certainty did not adversely affect the fairness of Defendant’s trial; and (3) Defendant’s assertion that the trial court improperly prevented defense counsel from cross-examining key state witnesses about certain topics was unfounded. View "State v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The court of appeals improperly concluded that a thirty-two delay in the execution of an arrest warrant, where the warrant was executed after the expiration of the limitation period, was reasonable as a matter of law such that the state was under no obligation to present evidence demonstrating that the delay was excusable. Defendant was arrested thirty-two days after the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and thirteen days after the expiration of the applicable five-year statute of limitations for his offense. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations because the delay in the execution of the warrant was unreasonable. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to State v. Crawford, A.2d 1034 (1987). View "State v. Swebilius" on Justia Law

The statutory aggrievement principles of Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-8 do not extend to appeals from the decisions of historic district commissions brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-147i. Plaintiffs appealed from two decisions of the Historic District Commission of the Town of Groton with respect to alterations to a barn located on property owned by Steven and Caroline Young. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) statutory aggrievement under section 8-8 does not extend to historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to section 7-147i, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were classically aggrieved with respect to each of the Commission’s two decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs were not statutorily aggrieved under section 7-147i and section 8-8(a)(1); and (2) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs did not establish classical aggrievement in either appeal. View "Mayer v. Historic District Commission of Town of Groton" on Justia Law