Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involved the fatal shooting of a victim in Stamford, Connecticut. Following the incident, police investigation placed the defendant near the crime scene through surveillance footage. A search of the defendant’s home yielded clothing matching what he was seen wearing on the night of the murder. Although no firearm was recovered, the state tested the clothing for primer gunshot residue (pGSR). At trial, a forensic science examiner testified that particles “commonly associated with” pGSR were found on the clothing, and her report was admitted into evidence. Other evidence included cell phone records and witness testimony placing the defendant near the scene but did not directly tie him to possessing a firearm.Prior to trial in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, the defendant moved to preclude the pGSR evidence and requested a hearing under State v. Porter to determine the reliability of the scientific methodology behind the pGSR analysis. The trial court denied the request, ruling that pGSR analysis was a well-established area of forensic science and therefore did not require a Porter hearing. The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, and he appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct a Porter hearing solely because it viewed pGSR analysis as well established, without considering new evidence and advancements in the field that could affect its reliability. The Court emphasized that trial judges must exercise their gatekeeping function by considering whether new scientific developments cast doubt on previously accepted methodologies. Finding that this error was harmful—since the pGSR evidence was central to the state’s case and could have influenced the verdict—the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. View "State v. Sellers" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder following a retrial in 1981 and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, with a mandatory minimum of 25 years. The underlying facts involved the killing of a friend’s mother during a burglary and a subsequent fatal car crash. The defendant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and collateral review. While incarcerated, the defendant applied for parole in 2013 and 2019, and for a commutation of his sentence in 2021; all applications were denied. He then filed a motion for sentence modification, citing his intellectual disability, youth at the time of the offense, remorse, age, physical incapacity, and low risk of recidivism as grounds for good cause. The trial court denied the motion, finding the defendant had not established good cause.On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that it was proper to consider the Board of Pardons and Paroles’ prior denials of parole and commutation as part of the sentence modification inquiry. The Appellate Court also noted that the trial court had considered other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offense, the impact on the victims, and the defendant’s disciplinary record while incarcerated.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case on certification. It held that a trial court may consider prior decisions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles in ruling on a motion for sentence modification, as such information falls within the broad scope of relevant sentencing information. The Court found no abuse of discretion or due process violation, as the trial court’s reliance on the board’s denials was not impermissibly speculative and was only one factor among several considered. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "State v. Toste" on Justia Law

The property at issue has a long history of agricultural use, initially for tobacco farming and processing. This activity predates the Town of Suffield’s zoning regulations, making it a legal nonconforming use. In 2019, the plaintiff obtained state approval to cultivate and process hemp at the property, which was determined by local officials to fall within the scope of the existing nonconforming tobacco use. Following Connecticut’s legalization of recreational cannabis in 2021, the plaintiff sought a zoning determination that cannabis cultivation and processing would also be a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use. The zoning enforcement officer denied this request, citing distinct licensing and regulatory requirements for hemp and cannabis.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield upheld the zoning officer’s decision, relying primarily on the legal and regulatory distinctions between hemp and cannabis. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. The trial court applied the factors from Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals to assess whether the proposed cannabis use impermissibly expanded the scope of the nonconforming use. The court found that the regulatory differences were relevant but not dispositive and concluded that cannabis cultivation and processing were sufficiently similar to the existing hemp operation to constitute a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. The trial court reversed the board’s decision.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. It held that a difference in state licensing or regulatory schemes is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether a proposed use constitutes an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. Instead, courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, considering the nature, purpose, character, and effects of the use. Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence that cannabis cultivation and processing would materially change the property’s use or impact the neighborhood. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment, allowing the cannabis operation as a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. View "Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

A property owner of a rental income-producing property in Greenwich, Connecticut, failed to timely submit a required income and expense form to the municipal assessor. The assessor had mailed both a demand for information and the prescribed form in April 2020 to the last known address on record, which was the property manager’s former address. The property owner did not receive this mailing because it had changed addresses in 2016 but had not directly informed the assessor. Later, when a forwarded tax bill prompted the owner to update its address, a reminder notice was sent to the correct address, but it arrived after the filing deadline. The owner ultimately submitted the form late, and the assessor imposed a statutory penalty increasing the property’s assessed value by 10 percent.The property owner appealed the penalty to the town’s board of assessment appeals, which upheld the penalty. The owner then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing it should not be penalized because it had not actually received the form before the deadline. The Superior Court found for the town, reasoning that timely mailing to the last known address satisfied the statutory requirement and that the owner bore responsibility for ensuring its address was up to date.The owner appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The owner then sought further review from the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement for the assessor to provide the form is satisfied by mailing it to the property owner’s last known address, regardless of actual receipt. The Court found that the statute does not require assessors to ensure actual receipt and that fundamental fairness is met by using the last known address. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Greenwich" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of murder after a jury trial in which a key witness, who had been involved in the crime and was separately charged, testified for the state. Before trial, the petitioner’s counsel inquired whether any deal or understanding of leniency existed between the state and the witness, but the prosecutor denied there were any assurances. During cross-examination, the witness denied having been promised any benefit in exchange for his testimony but indicated he was hoping his cooperation would help him at sentencing. Shortly after the petitioner’s conviction, the witness received a notably lenient sentence in his own criminal case, pursuant to a plea agreement.The petitioner subsequently filed for habeas corpus, alleging that the state had failed to disclose an informal cooperation agreement with the witness and had allowed the witness to deny such an agreement under oath, thus violating his due process rights under Napue v. Illinois. At the habeas trial in the Connecticut Superior Court, the witness, his defense counsel, and three prosecutors all testified that there was no cooperation agreement. The habeas court found no such agreement existed and denied the petition. The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed this judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut clarified that prosecutors have a duty to correct false or substantially misleading testimony about both formal and informal cooperation agreements, including those that are implied, unwritten, or tacit. The court held that, while lenient treatment alone does not prove an agreement, courts must consider whether prosecutors’ conduct created an expectation of leniency and whether the witness acted on that expectation. Because the record was insufficient to determine whether all parties understood what constitutes an informal agreement in this context, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the habeas court for further factual findings, while retaining jurisdiction for a final decision on the appeal. View "Moore v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of felony murder, first-degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery following an incident in Hartford where the victim was robbed of jewelry and fatally shot. The State’s case included testimony from two eyewitnesses and a police sergeant who presented cell site location information (CSLI) derived from the petitioner’s cell phone records. This data was used to create a time-lapse video that depicted a human silhouette purportedly tracing the movements of the petitioner’s phone between the crime scene, a pawn shop, and other relevant locations. The video and supporting testimony were admitted without objection, and the prosecution relied heavily on them during closing arguments.On direct appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that trial counsel’s failure to object to the CSLI evidence or request a Porter hearing was a strategic decision, and the petitioner’s unpreserved evidentiary claims were unreviewable. The Connecticut Supreme Court later affirmed that decision. While the appeal was pending, the petitioner filed for habeas relief in the Superior Court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to challenge the admissibility or accuracy of the CSLI evidence and the time-lapse video.The Connecticut Supreme Court, reviewing the habeas court’s judgment, held that trial counsel performed deficiently by not challenging the misleading GeoTime video, which misrepresented the capabilities of CSLI technology by depicting precise movements unsupported by the underlying data. The Court found that this failure prejudiced the petitioner, as the State’s case was not strong absent the contested evidence, and the misleading video was the prosecution’s most persuasive link to the crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court’s decision vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial. View "Turner v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Underwood Towers Limited Partnership leased land from the city of Hartford to build apartment buildings and financed the project with a mortgage loan. After defaulting, Underwood executed additional notes and a second mortgage in favor of HUD. Following further defaults and transfers, LPP Mortgage Inc. acquired the second mortgage and notes but did not receive the original of one note—only a lost note affidavit. LPP Mortgage then brought a foreclosure action, seeking not only to foreclose the mortgage but also damages against Underwood and its management agent, CDC Management Corporation.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, denied Underwood and CDC’s motion to dismiss, ruling that LPP Mortgage had standing to foreclose as the owner of the debt, even without possession of the lost note, relying on New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp. Judgment of strict foreclosure and damages was entered. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that LPP Mortgage had standing to pursue foreclosure as the debt owner, despite not being able to enforce the note under the UCC. The case was remanded for setting new law days. After remand, Underwood and CDC again moved to dismiss, arguing that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s later decision in Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope changed the law, requiring possession of the note to foreclose.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case after transfer from the Appellate Court. The Court held that res judicata barred Underwood and CDC from relitigating LPP Mortgage’s standing, as the issue had already been fully litigated and decided by the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court further held that Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope did not overrule Bedford Realty Corp., and thus the law had not changed. The trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Underwood Towers Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

The case centers on the tragic death of a young woman who was murdered by her former romantic partner shortly after he was discharged from a psychiatric hospital. The partner had previously expressed homicidal ideations toward her, both to medical staff and law enforcement, and was involuntarily committed under Connecticut law for psychiatric disabilities and being a danger to others. After a brief stay, he was discharged from the psychiatric facility with no further supervision or warning provided to either the victim or law enforcement. The plaintiff, administratrix of the victim’s estate, sued the mental health care provider, alleging both ordinary negligence and medical malpractice for failing to protect the victim from a known risk.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford granted the provider’s motion to strike, finding that all claims sounded in medical malpractice since the alleged negligence involved medical judgment relating to diagnosis and treatment. Relying on Jarmie v. Troncale, the court concluded that, under Connecticut law, medical malpractice actions can only be brought by patients, and since the victim was not a patient, the claims were barred. The court also determined that Connecticut does not recognize gross negligence as a separate cause of action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that some allegations did implicate medical malpractice and were barred, but others, liberally construed, sounded in ordinary negligence. These included claims that the provider actually knew of a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party and failed to take reasonable steps to protect or warn her. The Court, for the first time, recognized a limited duty: a mental health care provider who knows a patient poses a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party must take reasonable steps to protect that party, which may include warning or controlling the patient. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on the ordinary negligence claims. View "Ashworth v. Branford" on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal shooting that took place during a nighttime street vigil in Hartford, where the defendant was identified as the shooter through surveillance video footage and subsequent police investigation. The police obtained and compiled footage from multiple street cameras using a software program called Milestone, which synchronized the various video feeds. During a police interview, the defendant identified himself in the video footage and admitted to being in the vicinity of the shooting. At trial, both the video compilation and the recording of the defendant’s interview were admitted into evidence.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. During the trial, the defense did not object to the admission of either the video compilation or the recorded police interview and related waiver forms. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the defendant to fifty-five years of imprisonment.On appeal, the defendant argued before the Connecticut Supreme Court that his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the video compilation, claiming he was entitled to cross-examine the developer of the Milestone software. He also contended that his right to counsel was violated during the police interview. The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s confrontation clause claim was affirmatively waived because his counsel expressly stated “[n]o objection” to the admission of the evidence at trial. The court further found the record inadequate to review the confrontation claim and determined that the right-to-counsel claim was unreviewable under established standards due to waiver. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to adopt new rules or reverse the conviction. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Keaton" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal prosecution in which the defendant, a man in his late fifties, was convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and assault of an elderly person in the third degree against a coworker. The incident occurred when the victim, a sixty-year-old woman, invited the defendant to her condominium to assess window repairs. During the visit, the defendant assaulted her physically and sexually. The victim reported the incident to her employer and later to the police. Physical evidence, including DNA found on the victim’s clothing, corroborated her account. The defendant initially denied being at the victim’s residence in a workplace interview but later admitted his presence, offering an alternative, exculpatory explanation at trial.After the charges were filed, the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury conducted a jury trial. The court gave a consciousness of guilt instruction, over the defendant’s objection, based on his inconsistent statements regarding his presence at the victim’s home. The jury found him guilty of two charges but acquitted him on others. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended after twenty-seven months, with probation. The defendant appealed, arguing that the consciousness of guilt instruction was improper and that such instructions should be categorically abolished.The Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the trial court abused its discretion by delivering the consciousness of guilt instruction, as the evidence of inconsistent statements was ambiguous and its probative value was minimal. Nevertheless, the Court held the error was harmless, given the strong independent evidence of guilt and the jury’s mixed verdict. The Supreme Court declined to abolish consciousness of guilt instructions but used its supervisory authority to clarify the narrow circumstances in which such instructions are appropriate and provided guidance on their proper, neutral formulation. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Kim" on Justia Law