Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over a foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, had a loan secured by a mortgage on her property. The defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., acquired the loan and later counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the setting of new law days. On remand, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion to reset the law days, arguing that the judgment of strict foreclosure did not account for the substantial increase in property values that had occurred during the appeal. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to revisit the merits of the strict foreclosure judgment, as it was bound by the Appellate Court’s rescript order requiring the setting of new law days. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal with the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from entertaining the plaintiff’s request to modify the judgment of strict foreclosure and order a foreclosure by sale. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked authority to entertain the plaintiff’s request. The court further held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was required to file a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to present evidence that the value of the subject property had substantially increased since the date of the original judgment before the trial court could exercise that authority. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tyhitt Bember, was convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in connection with the shooting death of a victim. The defendant, armed with a revolver, had instructed a companion to follow the victim in a car. After confronting the victim on foot, the defendant decided to rob him. When the victim resisted, the defendant shot him five times. The state's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of two witnesses who were facing charges for their involvement in another homicide and had entered into cooperation agreements with the state. The defendant had allegedly confessed his involvement in the victim’s murder to one of these witnesses.The defense moved to preclude the state from introducing the cooperation agreements during its direct examination of the witnesses. The trial court granted the motion but ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to use leading questions to flesh out the terms of the agreements. The defense also moved for a pretrial hearing regarding the reliability of the witnesses’ proposed trial testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the witnesses’ proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to question the witnesses during direct examination regarding the specific terms of their cooperation agreements with the state. The defendant also claimed that the prosecutor had impermissibly vouched for the witnesses’ credibility by introducing the truthfulness provisions of their cooperation agreements, eliciting testimony from the witnesses that their attorneys were present in the courtroom, and referencing their prior testimony in other criminal cases on behalf of the state. The defendant further claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that the witnesses’ testimony was reliable and admissible.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the defendant had waived his claim regarding the prosecutor's questioning of the witnesses about their cooperation agreements. The court also held that the prosecutor's introduction of the truthfulness provisions of the witnesses' cooperation agreements did not constitute improper vouching. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the witnesses' proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. View "State v. Bember" on Justia Law

A man convicted of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child appealed his conviction, arguing that he was entitled to access the content of handwritten journals authored by the complainant. The complainant had revealed the existence of these journals during the trial, stating that they were created as part of her therapy following the abuse and contained details about her relationship with the defendant and the abuse he had inflicted. The defendant claimed that these journals constituted a "statement" under relevant rules of practice and that his rights were violated as the prosecutors did not personally review the journals for exculpatory information.The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant had waived his claim to the journals and that the prosecutors were not constitutionally required to personally review the journals. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which agreed with the state's alternative argument that the journals were not subject to disclosure because they did not constitute a statement that was adopted or approved by the complainant. The court also concluded that the Brady review of the journals by a nonlawyer member of the state’s attorney’s office was constitutionally adequate. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "State v. C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, sought to recover damages from the defendants, Alexander Vik and his daughter, Caroline Vik, for their alleged interference with a business expectancy. The plaintiff was attempting to collect an approximately $243 million foreign judgment from a company, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), which the plaintiff claimed was controlled by Alexander. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had attempted to interfere with a Norwegian court’s order requiring the sale of SHI’s shares in a Norwegian software company, Confirmit, to partially satisfy the foreign judgment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege because they were based on communications made and actions taken in prior judicial proceedings. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded with direction to affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held that the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the plaintiff’s appeal was rendered moot by virtue of the court’s decision in a previous case. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants were barred by the litigation privilege. The court concluded that many of the tactics Alexander allegedly used to disrupt, delay, and otherwise interfere with the sale of Confirmit, including stacking Confirmit’s board of directors with family members and associates, submitting a disingenuous bid to acquire Confirmit, coordinating with his father to have the plaintiff’s execution lien deregistered, and forging and backdating the document purporting to grant Caroline a right of first refusal, occurred outside of the context of any judicial proceeding and, therefore, were not covered by the litigation privilege. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik" on Justia Law

In this case, two candidates for state legislative offices in the 2014 general election, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, were fined by the State Elections Enforcement Commission for violating state statutes and regulations governing campaign financing. The candidates' campaign committees had received public funding grants and published communications that criticized the then-governor, who was running for reelection. The commission found that the candidates had violated the applicable statutes and regulations by using their campaign funds to pay for communications that criticized the governor while promoting their opposition to his policies.The candidates appealed to the trial court, arguing that the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to speak about other, non-opposing candidates. The trial court upheld the commission's decision, agreeing that the candidates had violated the statutes and regulations and concluding that the restrictions did not infringe on the candidates' First Amendment rights.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the candidates argued that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights. The court held that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations imposed an unconstitutional condition in violation of the First Amendment. The court found that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations penalized the candidates for mentioning the governor's name in a manner that was not the functional equivalent of speech squarely directed at his reelection campaign. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to sustain the candidates' administrative appeal. View "Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Northland Investment Corporation (N Co.), a landlord of multiunit residential buildings, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). N Co. sought a declaratory ruling from PURA that it could use ratio utility billing (RUB) to recoup utility costs from tenants in buildings without individual meters. Under RUB, N Co. would bill tenants for their proportionate share of utility usage, calculated based on factors like unit square footage and number of occupants. PURA concluded that RUB violated the statute because it prohibited charging a tenant for utilities they did not exclusively use. However, PURA suggested N Co. could use the "building in" methodology, incorporating estimated utility costs into fixed rent.PURA's decision was appealed to the trial court, which remanded the case back to PURA for further consideration of whether its decision on RUB conflicted with its conclusion on the "building in" approach. PURA reaffirmed its prior ruling, and N Co. appealed again to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. N Co. then appealed from the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing with PURA's determination that the statute prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building-wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated proportionate share of the total cost. The court concluded that the "building in" approach was acceptable as it allowed for consistent and predictable payments each month and placed the risk of higher-than-anticipated utility usage on the landlord. View "Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law