Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The complainant, John Ward, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) alleging that the City of Stamford discriminated against him based on his veteran status and disability. The CHRO found reasonable cause and certified the complaint to the Office of Public Hearings (OPH). During the public hearing, Ward moved to amend his complaint to include a claim for denial of reasonable accommodations. The human rights referee granted the motion over the city's objection.The city filed an interlocutory administrative appeal with the Superior Court, arguing that the CHRO lacked jurisdiction to hear the amended complaint without a reasonable cause finding. The CHRO and Ward moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that interlocutory rulings are not appealable under General Statutes § 46a-94a (a) and that the statutory requirements for an interlocutory appeal under § 4-183 (b) were not met. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that the referee's ruling was a final decision under § 4-183 (a).The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the referee's ruling was not a final decision under § 4-183 (a) because it did not terminate any aspect of the case or determine any rights or obligations. The court also determined that § 46a-94a (a) allows for interlocutory appeals under § 4-183 (b), but the city's appeal did not meet the criteria for such an appeal because postponement would not result in an inadequate remedy. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with direction to grant the motions to dismiss the city's appeal. View "Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights& Opportunities" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, parents of minor children, challenged a public act that eliminated the religious exemption from vaccination requirements for school enrollment. They argued that the act violated their constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and a free public education, as well as their statutory rights under Connecticut law. The defendants, state and municipal officials, moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity.The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims satisfied the substantial claim exception to sovereign immunity, and their statutory claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception. The defendants appealed this decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court must assess the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations to determine whether they have asserted a substantial claim of a constitutional violation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed as a matter of law. The act was deemed a neutral law of general applicability, rationally related to the state's interest in protecting public health. The court also found that the act did not violate the plaintiffs' right to a free public education, as it imposed a reasonable vaccination requirement.However, the court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs' statutory free exercise claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception to sovereign immunity. The court found that the scope of the waiver extended to free exercise challenges to the enforcement of legislation and that applying the statute to the public act did not violate any constitutional principles.The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing the dismissal of the constitutional claims, but affirmed the decision regarding the statutory claim, allowing it to proceed. View "Spillane v. Lamont" on Justia Law

In 1990, the petitioner was convicted of murder, largely based on two cross-racial eyewitness identifications. Both witnesses initially identified another person as the shooter but later identified the petitioner, who was the only Black man at the defense table during a probable cause hearing. The petitioner challenged the identification procedures and jury instructions on appeal, but the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld his conviction.The petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2016, claiming that the admission of unduly suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification evidence violated his due process rights. He also argued that advances in the science of eyewitness identification since his conviction called into question the validity of his conviction. The habeas court dismissed these claims, concluding they were barred by res judicata and that the decisions in State v. Guilbert and State v. Dickson did not apply retroactively. The court also dismissed and denied other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the principles set forth in Dickson, which addressed the suggestiveness of first-time, in-court identifications, must apply retroactively on collateral review. The court reasoned that the rule in Dickson was a result of scientific developments that significantly improve the accuracy of convictions and that the petitioner had raised similar claims in his direct appeal. The court reversed the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a trial on the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims, directing the lower court to apply the holding of Dickson retroactively. View "Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a motor vehicle.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) any claimed error on the part of the trial court in violating Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment by allowing the chief medical examiner to testify about the results of the victim's autopsy, which the chief medical examiner had not performed himself, was harmless; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a vehicle in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-38(a). View "State v. Robles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain testimony pursuant to the constancy of accusation doctrine; (2) the trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence of pending criminal charges against the State's key witness; and (3) the first degree of sexual assault charge was not ambiguous and therefore did not violate Defendant's right to jury unanimity under the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Velasquez-Mattos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dissolving Plaintiff's marriage to Defendant, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.At issue in this case was the extent to which a Connecticut court may enforce the terms of a "ketubah," a contract governing marriage under Jewish law. The trial court in this case denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the terms of the parties' ketubah as a prenuptial agreement on the ground that doing so would be a violation of the First Amendment to the United States constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the ketubah; and (2) the trial court's alimony order, considered in light of Plaintiff's net earning capacity, was not an abuse of discretion. View "Tilsen v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court erred when it determined that trial counsel for Petitioner rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-years' imprisonment. Petitioner later brought his habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court determined that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that Petitioner accept the court's pretrial offer of a forty-five-year sentence of incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel's representation of Petitioner did not amount to ineffective representation. View "Maia v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation, to present a defense, and to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution were not violated during the underlying proceedings; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim on the ground that the proffered line of questioning was speculative, Defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving harm. View "State v. Lanier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that a trial court can properly consider conduct related to a charge of which a criminal defendant was acquitted when the court sentences the defendant on other charges of which the defendant was convicted but that courts should be extremely cautious in relying on such conduct in sentencing.Defendant was convicted and sentenced for robbery in the first degree and other offenses. Defendant later filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing that the sentencing court violated his constitutional rights by considering conduct underlying a charge for which he was acquitted - assault. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a sentencing judge may consider a broad range of conduct so long as the sentence falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as grounds to enhance the sentence; and (2) the sentencing court in this case did not violate Defendant's right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment or his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by considering the conduct underlying his assault charge. View "State v. Langston" on Justia Law