Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this summary process action, the trial court relied on the “spirit” of certain federal disability laws in support of an equitable defense to the eviction of Defendant, a tenant who kept an “emotional support dog” in her federally subsidized rental apartment despite a clause restricting pets that was included in her lease. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this appeal was not rendered moot when Plaintiff commenced an ancillary summary process action against Defendant, the filing of which had the effect of affirmatively reinstating Defendant’s tenancy; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the spirit of the federal regulations and by applying the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture to support its equitable decision in favor of Defendant. View "Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to committing a robbery and assault at a grocery store in a signed, sworn statement he made to the police. Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of multiple counts relating to the robbery of the grocery store. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the detectives failed to provide him with Miranda warnings while he was in custody and prior to asking him about the robbery. Defendant claimed that the initial questioning and the subsequent questioning after he was provided with a Miranda warning was a single, continuous interrogation that rendered the Miranda warning ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because, under the facts of this case, there was a sufficient separation between the initial questioning and the subsequent interrogation to render the Miranda warnings effective. View "State v. Donald" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of the sale of narcotics by a person who is drug dependent, racketeering, and other drug-related offenses. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the jury trial, concluding (1) Defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal with respect to the racketeering conviction because the two predicate acts of racketeering identified by the jury did not constitute sufficient evidence of an enterprise; and (2) the trial court’s denial of a continuance effectively deprived Defendant of his right to self representation, and therefore, a new trial was required for the remaining offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Appellate Court properly determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the racketeering conviction; but (2) with respect to the other convictions, the Appellate Court erred in determining that the denial of a continuance effectively deprived Defendant of his right to self representation. Remanded. View "State v. Bush" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The jury rendered verdicts of guilty on both charges. Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, arguing that the verdicts were legally inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) Defendant had waived the claim by failing to request a jury instruction that he could not be convicted of both charges; but (2) the verdict of guilty on the manslaughter charge must be vacated pursuant to case law because when a defendant is convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense, the property remedy is to vacate the conviction on the lesser included offense. The Supreme Court vacated both guilty verdicts, holding (1) legally inconsistent verdicts involve jury error that may be raised for the first time after the verdicts have been returned or on appeal, and therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Defendant had waived his claims that the guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent; and (2) the verdicts were legally inconsistent, and neither verdict can stand. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Chyung" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, Defendant’s principal claim was that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by refusing either to issue a summons to secure the attendance of a material witness in support of a theory of third-party culpability or to allow Defendant to introduce that witness’ statement to the police in lieu of her live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) regarding Defendant’s argument regarding the issuance of a summons for the witness, defense counsel’s failure to locate the out-of-state witness with any reasonable degree of certainty precludes relief; and (2) none of Defendant’s remaining claims warrant reversal. View "State v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to four count of criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered following the execution of a search warrant at his house because the warrant was issued without a showing of probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, on he basis of the Court’s review of the search warrant affidavit in its entirety, the trial court properly found that the facts submitted were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. View "State v. Holley" on Justia Law

After he was terminated, Employee sued Employer, alleging, inter alia, disability discrimination. After a trial, the jury trial returned a verdict in favor of Employee and awarded him, inter alia, $500,000 in statutory punitive damages. Employer moved to set aside the award of punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion, determining that Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-104 does not provide for an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46a-104 does not authorize punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. View "Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, under Connecticut law, after a judgment debtor’s wages have been garnished, the remaining wages are exempt from execution, and whether the transfer of those wages to a third party constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to two state court judgments, The Cadle Company was Terry Fletcher’s judgment creditor, Fletcher owing the company more than $3 million. Since at least 2005, Terry has transferred more than $300,000 of his residual wages to the bank account of his wife, Marguerite Fletcher. The Cadle Company sued the Fletchers in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the transfer violated the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA). The district court granted the Fletchers’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted The Cadle Company’s motion for partial summary judgment, and ultimately rendered judgment for The Cadle Company in the amount of $401,426 on its CUFTA claim. The Fletchers appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit subsequently certified a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The Supreme Court answered that Terry’s residual wages would not have been exempt from execution if he had retained possession of them, and therefore, they were subject to execution after Terry transferred them to his wife’s account. View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and other offenses. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the State deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent when the prosecutor noted twice during closing arguments that Defendant had not testified in his own defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s two statements clearly violated Defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of proof that the prosecutor’s comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. A. M." on Justia Law

Defendant lived in a unit of a multiunit condominium complex. When the police department received an anonymous tip that Defendant was boasting about growing marijuana in his unit, the police entered the building with a drug dog and conducted a directed search in which the dog sniffed at the common floor hallways and at the bottom of the door to Defendant’s unit. The officers later returned with a search warrant, and Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with several drug offenses and illegal possession of an assault weapon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the canine sniff of the threshold of his unit for the purpose of investigating the unit’s contents constituted a search within the meaning of article first, section seven of the Connecticut Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the canine sniff constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, required a warrant predicated on probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a canine sniff directed toward a home is a search under article first, section seven of the Connecticut Constitution and, as such, requires a warrant issued upon a court’s finding of probable cause. View "State v. Kono" on Justia Law