Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted on a conditional plea of nolo contendere of possession of narcotics with intent to sell. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that the police discovered after stopping Defendant incident to the detention of another individual, who was wanted for a violation of probation, while Defendant and the individual were walking together on a sidewalk. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officers had seized him in violation of Terry v. Ohio because they lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that it is permissible for the police to briefly detain the companion of a suspect, incident to the lawful stop of the suspect, even though the police lack reasonable suspicion to believe the companion has engaged in or is engaging in criminal behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police were authorized to stop and briefly detain Defendant, as a reasonable safety measure, in connection with the lawful detention of the individual he was accompanying because the police reasonable believed that the other individual was armed and dangerous. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that he had been deprived of a fair trial because of improper statements made by the prosecutor during trial and in closing argument. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that only certain statements by the prosecutor were improper, and Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial as a result. Defendant and the State separately appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s appeal must be dismissed because the State was not aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court; and (2) Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. View "State v. Albino" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses in connection with the shooting of Johnnie Jones. On appeal, Defendant argued that the victim’s conduct in identifying Defendant as the perpetrator was unduly suggestive in violation of his due process rights. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the due process clauses of the Connecticut constitution provide protection against allegedly unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedures undertaken by a private actor, even in the absence of any improper state action. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) any eyewitness identifications that are not tainted by any unduly suggestive state action do not implicate due process principles unless the identification was so unreliable that its admission deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial; and (2) because Defendant’s claim in this case that the victim’s identification of him as the perpetrator should be suppressed on the ground that it was unduly suggestive did not implicate the state constitution, and because Defendant did not raise the claim at trial, it was not reviewable. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Under the apparent authority doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court, a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not have such authority. The trial court in this case denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement’s warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment based on the apparent authority doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. On appeal, Defendant contended that although the apparent authority doctrine is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement under the federal constitution, it is inconsistent with Conn. Const. art. I, 7. The Appellate Court concluded that application of the doctrine does not offend the right of Connecticut citizens to be free from unreasonable searches under article first, section 7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court’s opinion was a proper statement of the applicable law on this issue. View "State v. Buie" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested without a warrant and charged with several crimes. Defendant filed a motion to be released without bond because a probable cause finding had not been made within forty-eight hours of his arrest. The trial court denied Defendant's motion. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the specific facts of this case, any violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights was de minimis where (1) Defendant was present in the courthouse awaiting arraignment, at which point probable cause findings are typically made, prior to the expiration of the forty-eight hour period; and (2) the trial court found probable case for Defendant's arrest less than two hours after expiration of the forty-eight hour time period.View "State v. Heredia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of several offenses in connection with an incident involving Petitioner’s estranged girlfriend. Petitioner later filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that his counsel’s criminal prosecution shortly before Petitioner’s criminal trial constituted a conflict of interest. The habeas court denied Petitioner’s petition. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s claim failed on the merits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether there was a constitutionally impermissible risk that a jury would attribute the conduct of Petitioner’s trial counsel to Petitioner when his counsel had been acquitted of a dissimilar crime in the same judicial district in which Petitioner faced criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his trial counsel’s performance. View "Rodriguez v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with various criminal offenses in two informations. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree, assault in the second and third degrees, and risk of injury to a child. After the convictions were affirmed on appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court found Petitioner's pretrial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide Petitioner with adequate advice regarding a pretrial plea offer and ordered the trial court to resentence Petitioner in accordance with the sentence proposed in the plea offer. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the habeas court improperly circumvented the trial court's discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. Remanded.View "H.P.T. v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments and in connection with defense counsel's cross-examination of key state's witnesses, and the prosecutorial impropriety deprived Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; and (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule without first conducting a hearing. Remanded for a new trial.View "State v. Maguire" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by improperly precluding Defendant from introducing, on relevancy grounds, evidence of prior sexual conduct that was admissible under the rape shield statute, in violation of Defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation; and (2) the trial court’s preclusion of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Shaw" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that, during sentencing, the trial court deprived him of his due process rights by improperly considering that Defendant decided to proceed to trial rather than accept a plea bargain. The Appellate Court declined to review Defendant’s sentencing claim on the grounds that it was unpreserved and that Defendant had not properly made an “affirmative request” for review in his main brief under State v. Golding. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that a defendant must “affirmatively request” Golding review in his main brief in order to receive appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims is overruled, and therefore, the Appellate Court improperly declined to review Defendant’s constitutional claims on that ground; (2) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial; but (3) the use of the Court’s supervisory authority was warranted to prevent adverse effects on the public’s perception of the inherent fairness of the criminal justice system that may arise when a trial judge could appear to have considered a defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a trial during sentencing. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Elson" on Justia Law