Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an underlying employment dispute, Employee sued Employer for discrimination. After the jury issued a verdict in favor of Defendant, Plaintiff moved for a new trial, alleging that Defendant had engaged in discovery misconduct. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion. The appellate court affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a party seeking a new trial on the basis of alleged knowing and deliberate discovery misconduct must show that the result at a new trial would likely be different. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rule set forth in Varley v. Varley to determine whether a new trial should be granted on the basis of allegations that the judgment was obtained through fraud, as reframed in this decision, applies to motions for a new trial based on the discovery misconduct of the nonmoving party. View "Duart v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Darryl W. was convicted of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of violation of probation based on his conviction of the criminal offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his claims that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the elements of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm and regarding his affirmative defense to kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm; and (2) certain comments by the senior assistant state's attorney during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety. View "State v. Darryl W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Herman Apodaca was convicted of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial court properly dismissed a juror midtrial for cause; (2) the trial court properly instructed the juror on the felony murder count; (3) under the facts of the case, the court did not violate its obligations by declining to rephrase the entire conspiracy instruction in laypersons' terms after the jury requested further instructions; and (4) the trial court's instructions on conspiracy to commit robbery were not misleading, and therefore, Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the instructions. View "State v. Apodaca" on Justia Law

Defendant Alia Altajir pleaded nolo contendere to charges of misconduct with a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years' incarceration, suspended after one year, and five years of probation. Defendant later violated the special conditions of her probation. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the trial court admitted undated photographs gathered from Facebook, on which Defendant maintained a profile. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had violated her right to due process by admitting the photographs. The appellate court determined that this claim was unpreserved and did not merit review. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the photographs satisfied the minimum standard of reliability constitutionally required to admit evidence at the dispositional phase of a probation revocation hearing. View "State v. Altajir" on Justia Law

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, represented Plaintiff Robert Grimm in an action to dissolve Grimm's marriage. Plaintiff subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against Defendants. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for judgment because Plaintiff had not disclosed an expert when one was required and, therefore, could not establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice as to Defendants' breach of the standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) determining that the critical statements concerning Defendants made by the Court in its opinion affirming the underlying divorce action were not sufficient expert evidence of Defendants' malpractice; and (2) considering Defendants' motion for judgment the day after the motion was filed and the day before jury selection began in order to avoid the delay and expense of a trial in which Plaintiff could not present any evidence to support his claim. View "Grimm v. Fox" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. The trial court enhanced Defendant's sentence for being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-40. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that section 53a-40(h) was unconstitutional to the extent it required the trial court to make the requisite finding that Defendant's extended incarceration would best serve the public interest. On remand, the jury found that extended incarceration of Defendant would best serve the public interest, and the trial court again imposed an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 53a-40. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the information because the retroactive application to Defendant of section 53a-40(h), as modified by the constitutional gloss that the Court placed on it before remand, did not violate the ex post facto clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) construing the term "public interest," as used in section 53a-40(h), to exclude consideration of the costs of incarceration; (3) precluding Defendant from introducing expert testimony about his anticipated release date from a concurrent federal sentence; and (4) admitting evidence of the details of the victim's injuries. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to murder and capital felony and was sentenced to death. The case was remanded for a new penalty phase hearing, during which Defendant waived his right to have a jury determine his sentence. After the hearing, a three-judge panel again sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of a jury for the penalty phase hearing was constitutionally valid; (2) the presiding judge at the penalty phase hearing did not make comments that warranted recusal, and his involvement in earlier proceedings did not give rise to an improper appearance of impartiality; (3) Defendant failed to establish that the absence of a specific intent requirement in the aggravating factor found by the panel rendered his death sentence unconstitutional; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the panel's finding of an aggravating factor; (5) the panel properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors and determined that death was the appropriate punishment; (6) Defendant failed to establish that his sentence was the product of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors; and (7) the death penalty, as a general matter, does not violate the state constitution. View "State v. Rizzo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and sentenced to one-year incarceration, execution suspended, and three years probation. Defendant was later arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and, subsequently, with violation of probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of its finding that Defendant had committed the crime of risk of injury to a child, and committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for the unexecuted portion of his original one-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant violated his probation by committing the crime of risk of injury to a child when he failed to supervise a two-year-old who was in his care and able to exit the home. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant. View "State v. Maurice M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, while in the course of employment as a uniformed police officer of the City's police department, was involved in a shooting and was later criminally charged in connection with the shooting. The City suspended Plaintiff without pay pending the outcome of the criminal matter. After being acquitted of all charges, Plaintiff brought an action against the City seeking reimbursement for legal fees, lost wages and lost employment benefits. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $562,277, which included Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding of a contract between Plaintiff and his lawyer in which Plaintiff incurred legal fees beyond the retainer was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages to Plaintiff for attorney's fees, and the award was not excessive; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to damages for economic loss during his entire suspension, and the trial court's award of damages for economic loss in this case was proper. View "Murtha v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Gibson was convicted, after a jury trial, of failure to appear in the first degree. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that improper statements by the prosecutor during closing argument had deprived Defendant of his constitutional due process right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial prosecutor's two uses of the words 'I think' while marshaling the evidence during closing argument did not constitute an improper expression of personal opinion and therefore did not amount to prosecutorial impropriety. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of conviction on the charge of failure to appear. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law