Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and sentenced to one-year incarceration, execution suspended, and three years probation. Defendant was later arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and, subsequently, with violation of probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of its finding that Defendant had committed the crime of risk of injury to a child, and committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for the unexecuted portion of his original one-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant violated his probation by committing the crime of risk of injury to a child when he failed to supervise a two-year-old who was in his care and able to exit the home. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant. View "State v. Maurice M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, while in the course of employment as a uniformed police officer of the City's police department, was involved in a shooting and was later criminally charged in connection with the shooting. The City suspended Plaintiff without pay pending the outcome of the criminal matter. After being acquitted of all charges, Plaintiff brought an action against the City seeking reimbursement for legal fees, lost wages and lost employment benefits. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $562,277, which included Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding of a contract between Plaintiff and his lawyer in which Plaintiff incurred legal fees beyond the retainer was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages to Plaintiff for attorney's fees, and the award was not excessive; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to damages for economic loss during his entire suspension, and the trial court's award of damages for economic loss in this case was proper. View "Murtha v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Gibson was convicted, after a jury trial, of failure to appear in the first degree. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that improper statements by the prosecutor during closing argument had deprived Defendant of his constitutional due process right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial prosecutor's two uses of the words 'I think' while marshaling the evidence during closing argument did not constitute an improper expression of personal opinion and therefore did not amount to prosecutorial impropriety. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of conviction on the charge of failure to appear. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a vehicle Defendant Tricia Coccomo was driving collided with another vehicle, killing all three occupants, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle and misconduct with a motor vehicle, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value as proof of consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence that Defendant had transferred, after the collision, certain property for less than its fair value to her mother to prove consciousness of guilt; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test that, according to the Defendant, was performed on someone else's blood. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Coccomo" on Justia Law

After a criminal trial, a jury found Defendant William McElveen to be a persistent larceny offender. Defendant was sentenced accordingly. Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence and later appealed. The appellate court (1) determined that the trial court's grant of Defendant's motion and its vacation of Defendant's sentence enhancement for being a persistent larceny offender, while Defendant's appeal was pending, rendered the appeal moot; and (2) concluded that the jury's finding that Defendant was a persistent larceny offender was not a conviction but rather an enhanced sentence, and that vacating the sentence enhancement eliminated the only legal consequence of the larceny offender finding. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to decide whether the sole appropriate relief in the present case was the elimination of the sentence enhancement or whether, as Defendant argued, the case was not moot under the collateral consequences doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, determining that the certification was improvidently granted. View "State v. McElveen" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant John Papandrea was convicted of nine counts of larceny in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At trial, the state claimed that Defendant stole corporate funds from his employer in order to purchase artwork. Defendant conceded that he took the funds but asserted in his defense that he lacked the wrongful intent necessary for first degree larceny. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court properly concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to commit larceny. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Defendant had the necessary intent to commit larceny. View "State v. Papandrea" on Justia Law

Petitioners, George Gould and Ronald Taylor, were arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder, felony murder, and robbery in the first degree. The jury acquitted Petitioners of the murder charge but convicted them on all of the other counts. Subsequently, Petitioners filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. The habeas court granted the petitions and vacated the convictions, concluding that petitioners had established their entitlement to relief on the basis of actual innocence because two of the state's witnesses had recanted their testimony. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's judgments, holding that, under the test set forth in Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, actual innocence requires affirmative evidence that Petitioners did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted, not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. Remanded for a new trial under the proper standard. View "Gould v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of possession of narcotics, possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer, and tampering with physical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence taken from the motor vehicle that Defendant was operating at the time of his arrest; (2) concluding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction on the possessory charges; (3) admitting Defendant's unredacted medical records into evidence; and (4) instructing the jury as to the State's burden of proof. View "State v. Winfrey" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. At the hearing for resentencing upon the second remand, Defendant moved to withdraw his prior pleas, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed the trial court should have granted his motion pursuant to Practice Book 39-26 and 39-27(2) as well as due process protections because the Supreme Court previously determined that his plea agreement resulted in an unenforceable illegal sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, holding that Defendant's motion was beyond the scope of remand for resentencing and therefore should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Tabone" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography. As a condition of probation, Defendant was required to not possess or subscribe to any sexually stimulating material deemed inappropriate by probation officer. After finding Defendant violated his probation by visiting dating websites and possessing nude photographs, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the special condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim of unconstitutional overbreadth failed because because he did not allege a violation of his First Amendment rights; (2) there was no merit to Defendant's vagueness claim, and his as-applied vagueness claim failed under State v. Golding and the plain error doctrine; and (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding. View "State v. Stephens" on Justia Law