Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The sole issue in this certified appeal was whether a motorist, who was lawfully stopped in his own lane of travel while awaiting an opportunity to make a left turn, owes a legal duty to oncoming motorists to keep the wheels of his vehicle straight to ensure that he will not be propelled into the travel lane of oncoming traffic in the event that another motorist crashes into him from behind. Defendant appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly focused on whether Defendant had breached a general duty of reasonable care by turning his wheels while awaiting an opportunity to make his turn rather than whether he owed a duty to oncoming drivers to foresee and defend against the possibility that a third driver would crash into the rear of his stopped vehicle and thrust it into the path of oncoming traffic. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "Sic v. Nunan" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Plaintiffs, property owners, filed virtually identical complaints against the Town of Cheshire after a massive sinkhole developed on their properties. The complaints alleged the town failed to disclose information regarding the presence of a discontinued barite mine and a series of sinkholes caused by the mine beneath, and in the vicinity of, the properties prior to their purchase by Plaintiffs. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Town. In this consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgments of the trial court insofar as the trial court granted the Town's motions to strike count three of Plaintiffs' complaints alleging negligent inspection, and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Ugrin v. Cheshire" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to a variety of criminal charges on the advice of counsel. After he was sentenced, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel had failed to advise him adequately regarding the state's offer of a plea bargain and that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court rendered judgment granting the petition and ordered the trial court to vacate Petitioner's guilty plea and to allow Petitioner the opportunity to accept the original plea offer. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that although the appellate court properly affirmed the judgment, it did not properly affirm the habeas court's order for relief. Remanded to the habeas court so it may issue an order directing the trial court to determine whether Petitioner should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received, or something in between. View "Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty on various charges in two informations, both involving the physical assault of a female victim, which had been joined for trial pursuant to the state's motion. The first case regarded the victim Larrisha Washington (Washington case), and the second case regarded the victim Diana Hazard (Hazard case). Defendant appealed, claiming he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault in the first degree in the Hazard case and a new trial in the Washington case. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment in the Hazard case and remanded that case to the trial court with direction to render judgment of acquittal on all counts, holding (i) the trial court improperly instructed the jury in the Hazard case that "a fist can be a dangerous instrument" with regard to Defendant's conviction of assault in the first degree, and (ii) therefore, the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed assault in the first degree; and (2) affirmed the judgment of the Washington case but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, as the reversal of Defendant's convictions in the Hazard case affected the sentencing in the Washington case. View "State v. LaFleur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, both of which require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim, at the time of the offense, was physically helpless. After the state presented its case at trial, and again following the close of evidence Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming the state had failed to offer sufficient evidence that the victim was physically helpless. The trial court denied the motions. The appellate court reversed after considering the sole issue of whether the jury reasonably could have found that the state introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the victim was unable to communicate her lack of consent to Defendant's sexual advances and concluding that the state had failed to sustain its evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state failed to produce any credible evidence that the victim was either unconscious or so uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to Defendant her lack of consent to sexual intercourse the time of the alleged sexual assault. View "State v. Fourtin" on Justia Law

Defendant was under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board from 1985 for a period not to exceed twenty-five years, following his acquittal of several criminal counts. In 2009, approximately one year before the end of Defendant's twenty-five year term, the state petitioned for an order to continued commitment, arguing that Defendant remained mentally ill and that his discharge from the jurisdiction of the board would constitute a danger to himself or others. The trial court granted the state's petition and ordered that Defendant be committed to the jurisdiction of the board for an additional three years pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 17a-593 would withstand intermediate scrutiny if such scrutiny were warranted; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's claim that his original plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. View "State v. Dyous" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this certified appeal was whether Connecticut's Dram Shop Act requires a plaintiff to prove that a patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated when sold alcoholic liquor in order to prevail on a claim against the purveyor of alcoholic liquor for injuries sustained as a result of the patron's intoxication. Plaintiff in this case, administrator of the estate of Decedent, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff on the ground that the trial court improperly denied the motion of Defendants, the permittee of a restaurant and others doing business as the restaurant, for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that although the appellate court properly determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment in his favor without proving that the patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated at the time he was sold liquor, the court improperly concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "O'Dell v. Kozee" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. Petitioner later filed an amended three count petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and actual innocence with respect to his convictions. The habeas court granted in part Petitioner's amended petition on the ground that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing, inter alia, to present expert testimony to challenge the state's presentation of incriminatory expert evidence on medical issues relating to the child victim's symptomatology. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of trial counsel. Remanded. View "Michael T. v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

These appeals arose from the ruling of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), that defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act (act), to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center, which is maintained by the FBI. The commissioner and the intervenor, the United States, appealed from the commission's ruling, claiming that the commission improperly ordered disclosure of the document because, among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-210(a). The trial court dismissed in part and sustained in part the appeals and ordered that a redacted version of the document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the document fell within an exemption to the act set forth in section 1-210(a), and therefore, El Badrawi was not entitled to disclosure of the document. View "Comm'r of Corr. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n " on Justia Law

The sole issue in this certified appeal was whether Defendant's conviction of, and punishment for, both criminal possession of a firearm in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-223(a) violated his federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, Defendant contended that the appellate court improperly concluded that the legislature clearly intended to permit multiple punishments for the same offense and, therefore, that his two convictions were not a double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding section 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and 53a-223(A) are not the "same offense" under Blockburger v. United States, as applied by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in United States v. Dixon, and there is no evidence that the legislature clearly intended to preclude defendants from being convicted of, and punished for, committing both offenses. View "State v. Bernacki" on Justia Law