Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property. The town's zoning compliance officer issued a cease and desist order for violation of the town's zoning regulation. Plaintiff appealed to the town zoning board of appeals, seeking a variance. Subsequently, the compliance officer withdrew the order to allow Plaintiff to remedy the violation. Plaintiff then notified the board she was withdrawing her objection to the order. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in the trial requesting a judgment declaring she had the right to use her property for the interment of her and her husband's remains. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff had failed her exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's failure to pursue her appeal and, thereby, to exhaust her administrative remedies left the trial court without jurisdiction over her action for a declaratory judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff was actually challenging the proper interpretation of the town zoning regulations, which was a function of the board, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Piquet v. Chester" on Justia Law

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-lj(c), when a noncitizen defendant has not been properly advised about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea, the court is mandated to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea of the defendant files a motion not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea. At issue in this case was whether the trial court has jurisdiction under section 54-lj to vacate the judgment and permit withdrawal of the plea, as a matter of discretion, if the motion to vacate is filed more than three years after the court's acceptance of the plea. Defendant in this case appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and to withdraw his plea. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion but held that the present case was not one in which the court should exercise its discretion to vacate the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion to vacate because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Defendant's motion because the motion was filed outside the permit under section 54-lj(c). Remanded. View "State v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of failing to comply with the sex offender registry requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-251 stemming from his failure to notify the sex offender registry unit of his change of residence in accordance with the terms of that statute. In count one, the state charged that on December 31, 2007, Defendant failed to notify the appropriate authority of his change of residence. In count two, the state charged that on January 22, 2008, in another town, Defendant failed to notify the commissioner of public safety of his change of residence. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that there was sufficient evidence to prove he violated the statute. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant on either count of the information. View "State v. Drupals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought these premises liability actions on behalf of her minor daughter, alleging that her daughter had injured her ankle while playing soccer at Defendants' indoor soccer facility because Defendants negligently had installed a playing surface inherently dangerous for indoor soccer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate correctly concluded that Plaintiff had established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning Defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgment because Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of the hazardous condition. View "DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the probate court requiring her to provide an accounting of her actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined (1) the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to call Plaintiff to account for her actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother; (2) the defendant, who was named as the second successor attorney-in-fact, had standing to make an application to the probate court for an accounting of Plaintiff's actions in her role as attorney-in-fact; and (3) the probate court properly ordered Plaintiff to submit an accounting of her activities as attorney-in-fact for her mother in the absence of a showing of cause for the accounting. View "In re Bachand" on Justia Law

After a jury trial Defendant was convicted of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the third degree, and robbery in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At issue in this certified appeal was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the statutory exception to the duress defense set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-14, when the State claimed that Defendant had intentionally or recklessly placed herself in a situation in which it was probable that she would be subjected to duress by voluntarily resuming her relationship with an abusive boyfriend. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court on the ground that, even if the trial court's instruction on the statutory exception to the duress defense was improper, any impropriety was harmless. View "State v. Helmedach" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Weddle and the intervening Defendant, the conservation commission of the town of Fairfield, appealed from the trial court's decision granting the writ of quo warranto filed by Plaintiffs, certain concerned taxpayers of the town of Fairfield, and ordering Weddle's removal from the office of wetlands compliance officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural and substantive requirements for maintaining a quo warranto action. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding (1) plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient interest to establish standing to pursue the quo warranto action; and (2) the trial court properly granted Plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto on the basis that Weddle's appointment to the wetland compliance officer position violated the town charter by usurping the office of the conservation director. View "Bateson v. Weddle" on Justia Law

This case addressed whether, during proceedings to commit a minor child who has been adjudicated neglected to the custody of the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), a respondent parent is entitled to a competency evaluation on the basis of her counsel's stated belief that such an evaluation is warranted. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court committing Kaleb H., a minor child, to the custody of the commissioner, after concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request by counsel for Kaleb's mother, the respondent, that the mother's competency be evaluated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record in this case was insufficient to trigger the trial court's purported obligation to conduct a competency evaluation. View "In re Kaleb H." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of larceny in the first degree by false pretenses. The parties agreed that the appellate court properly concluded that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could aggregate the value of the property stolen in individual thefts only if it first concluded that the thefts were part of one scheme or course of conduct. Defendant, however, argued that the appellate court improperly concluded that the improper instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the error was harmless because Defendant did not contest the issue and the evidence so overwhelmingly supported the determination that the multiple thefts were part of a single scheme that no reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law