Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was summarily convicted of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to 120 days incarceration. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of error, claiming that, because the trial court did not inform him of the charge against him or afford him an opportunity to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence, his conviction and sentence violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding (1) Plaintiff's claim was subject to the Court's review; (2) Plaintiff's conviction was proper, as the trial court substantially complied with Practice Book 1-16; and (3) to the extent that the state and federal constitutions embrace a requirement that a defendant in a summary contempt proceeding be afforded notice and an opportunity to allocute, the trial court substantially complied with that requirement. View "Hardy v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether a nonparty attorney may bring a writ of error from a trial court's order requiring the attorney to comply with a clear and definite discovery request. The plaintiff in error, Finn, Dixon & Herling, LLP (Finn Dixon) brought this writ of error from an order of the trial court requiring it to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendants in error, Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, and Carolyn Cavolo (Defendants), who were also the defendants in the underlying case. Finn Dixon contended that the trial court improperly denied its motion to quash, in which it claimed that Defendants sought materials protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the trial court's order was an appealable final judgment; and (2) the trial court improperly denied Finn Dixon's motion to quash the subpoena. Remanded. View "Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-175, applies to the placement of children with an out-of-state noncustodial parent. Respondent father and his minor children appealed to the appellate court from the ruling of the trial court that the compact applied to the placement of the children with Respondent, even though he was the children's noncustodial parent. Thereafter, the trial court awarded physical custody of the children to Respondent. The appellate court concluded the appeals were moot and dismissed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly dismissed the appeal, as Respondent's appeal was moot but fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court further concluded that the appellate court improperly determined that section 17a-175 applies to out-of-state, noncustodial parents. View "In re Emoni W." on Justia Law

This appeal raised several issues regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of the department of environmental protection to regulate activity "in the tidal, coastal or navigable waters of the state waterward of the high tide line" under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-359. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his administrative appeal contesting the department's order directing Plaintiff to remove a seawall that he had constructed on his property along Long Island Sound without having obtained a permit in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-361. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence showed at least part of Plaintiff's seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, properly concluded that section 22a-359 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff's seawall, and properly denied Plaintiff's discovery request with respect to his claim of unconstitutional vagueness; but (2) in the absence of a finding by the department that the entire seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improperly determined that the department had jurisdiction under section 22a-361 to order removal of the entire seawall. View "Shanahan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The named plaintiff (Plaintiff) in this case, through her parents and next friends, filed a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, state-run health facilities (State). The claims commissioner granted Plaintiff permission to sue the State after vacating an earlier decision dismissing Plaintiff's claim, and the trial court granted Plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment rendered in favor of the State after the legislature amended Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-158 to authorize the commissioner to vacate a decision under certain conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and substantive authority to set aside its prior decision granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Nelson v. Dettmer" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of one count of risk of injury to a child and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court denied his constitutional rights to present a defense and to due process by improperly precluding him from eliciting testimony from a pediatrician who had examined the victim regarding a statement that the victim had made to her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant abandoned his claim, as (1) the record was unclear weather the court in fact precluded Defendant from eliciting testimony regarding this statement, and (2) Defendant neither sought a clarification of the court's ruling nor sought to elicit testimony from the pediatrician regarding the statement. View "State v. Ricardo R." on Justia Law

Defendant Miguel C. was convicted, after a jury trial, of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and three counts of risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was entitled to a new trial because the complainant improperly testified about an alleged confession by Defendant to his wife. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the contested portion of the complainant's testimony was improperly admitted, as its probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect; and (2) the verdict was substantially affected by that testimony, and therefore, the error was harmful. View "State v. Miguel C." on Justia Law

Respondents Mother and Father were the parents of two children. After finding that the children were neglected, the trial court rendered judgments terminating Respondents' parental rights with respect to both children. The appellate court reversed and remanded he cases for further proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. On remand, the trial court again found that both children were neglected under the doctrine of predictive neglect and committed them to the custody of the commission of children and families. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in predictive neglect proceedings, the trial court must find that it is more likely than not that, if the child remained in the current situation, the child would be denied proper care and attention or would be permitting to live under conditions injurious to the well-being of the child; (2) the petitioner is required to meet this standard with respect to each parent who has contested the neglect petition and who has expressed a desire to care for the child independently of the other parent; and (3) in this case, the trial court applied an improper standard of proof. Remanded for new neglect proceedings. View "In re Joseph W." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault of public safety personnel. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that the trial court had compelled Defendant to wear identifiable prison clothing at his jury trial in contravention of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court on the alternative ground that reversing Defendant's conviction was warranted in the exercise of the Court's inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice, holding (1) in the absence of a defendant's voluntary decision to stand trial before a jury in prison clothing, a court must ensure that the defendant has civilian clothing to wear at trial, and its failure to comply with this requirement will result in reversal of the defendant's conviction; and (2) the trial court in this case erred in compelling Defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing. View "State v. Rose" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this appeal was whether a trial court could modify unallocated alimony and child support payments following a change in the primary physical custody of the minor children from the party receiving the unallocated payments to the party making the payments, when the dissolution judgment incorporated a provision in the separation agreement providing that such payments were nonmodifiable. The trial court granted Defendant father's motion to modify the order that he make unallocated alimony and child support payments to Plaintiff mother following the parties' decision to transfer primary physical custody of the children to Defendant two years after the judgment dissolving their marriage was rendered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the particular circumstances of the present case, the trial court had the authority to modify Defendant's child support obligation. View "Tomlinson v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law