Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Victor Jordan was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant's request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal, and (2) Defendant's right to cross-examine a witness was not improperly restricted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant in this case clearly and unequivocally asserted his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and the trial court's denial of Defendant's request without canvassing him was a violation of that right; and (2) the trial court did not improperly restrict Defendant's cross-examination of the witness. Remanded for a new trial on the charge of reckless endangerment in the first degree. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Defendant Torrence Benton was convicted on charges of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search incident to his arrest. Specifically, Defendant contended that police seized him prior to his arrest without reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case furnished sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity to justify the police stopping him. View "State v. Benton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an LLC, owned and managed a commercial office building, and Defendant, an LLC, leased and occupied space in the building. A dispute arose between Plaintiff and Defendant over the scope of the lease and payment of rent. This dispute resulted in two people who had ownership interests in Plaintiff bringing the present action, in the name of Plaintiff, against Defendant to enforce the lease and to collect rent. Barbara Levine, who had fifty percent interest in Plaintiff and was the wife of a part owner of Defendant, disapproved of the lawsuit. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, since one of its member's votes should not have been excluded pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 34-187(b) on the ground that she had an interest in the outcome of the suit that was adverse to the interest of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff properly excluded Levine from voting her interest in determining whether to bring the present action because her interest in the outcome of the action was adverse to that of Plaintiff's in light of her husband's ownership interest in Defendant. View "418 Meadow St. Assocs., LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this case was a physician who was granted clinical privileges as a member of Defendant hospital's medical staff beginning in 1974. The hospital declined to renew Plaintiff's privileges for 1984. In response to the nonrenewal of privileges, Plaintiff brought an action against the hospital seeking damages and injunctive relief for his loss of gross income. The trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff nominal damages only. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief but reversed the part of the judgment awarding nominal damages, concluding that the trial court should have deemed Plaintiff a lost volume seller and awarded him damages equal to his lost profits in 1984 only. The Supreme Court determined that the appellate court had incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff was a lost volume seller and incorrectly determined that Plaintiff was entitled to damages for lost profits in 1984 only. On remand, the trial court found that Plaintiff was a lost volume seller and awarded him damages in the amount of $258,610. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp. " on Justia Law

This appeal and cross appeal concerned the authority of the named defendant, the city of Waterbury, under its city charter to offset the pension benefits of Plaintiffs, several individuals who had worked for the city, by the heart and hypertension benefits they received. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and directed judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims except Nicolas Russo's claim for breach of contract, and remanded the case for a new trial on that claim, holding (1) the trial court improperly concluded, with respect to all of Plaintiffs except Russo, their respective collective bargaining agreements conflicted with the Waterbury city charter, which allowed the city to offset Plaintiff's pension benefits based on their heart and hypertension benefits; and (2) although the trial court properly interpreted Russo's collective bargaining agreement to permit the city to offset his pension benefits by his heart and hypertension benefits, the court improperly failed to determine whether Russo's combined pension and heart and hypertension benefits exceeded the cap set forth in the agreement, thus permitting an offset. View "Russo v. Waterbury" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Luis Patino commenced this action against Defendant, his former employer, claiming that Defendant engaged in a discriminatory employment practice when it permitted his coworkers to harass him based on his sexual orientation over a period of many years. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-81c(1) provides for hostile work environment claims where employees are subject to sexual orientation discrimination; (2) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a hostile work environment; and (3) the award of damages was supported by the evidence. View "Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Erik and Carrie Pin, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, orthopedic surgeon David Kramer and Danbury Orthopedic Associates, seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages for Kramer's negligence in his surgical treatment of a spinal tumor suffered by Erik. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because the trial court had failed to grant Plaintiffs' request for a curative instruction following remarks by Defendants' expert witness, during his direct examination testimony, concerning increased health care costs caused by defensive medicine practices arising from the proliferation of medical malpractice claims in Connecticut. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court court did not err in its judgment. View "Pin v. Kramer" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether Plaintiff, the city of New Britain, agreed to arbitrate a dispute with certain city employees, classified as foremen, regarding an alleged violation of the city's civil service rules. The trial court denied Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award in favor of Defendant, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate the foremen's dispute in a settlement agreement between the parties. Because Plaintiff did not agree to arbitrate the dispute, it could not be compelled to submit to arbitration. Remanded with direction to grant Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award. View "City of New Britain v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186" on Justia Law

The named Plaintiff, Judy Rettig, commenced this action against Defendants, several towns and others, seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in the course of her employment as an animal control officer for the district animal control. The district animal control was established by Defendants pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-330, which permits two or more towns to form a district for the performance of any municipal function that the member towns may perform separately. The trial court granted summary judgment judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants were Plaintiff's employer and, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee of a municipal district established pursuant to section 7-330 is an employee of the towns comprising the district for purposes of the exclusivity provision of the Act, and therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. View "Rettig v. Town of Woodbridge" on Justia Law