Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act. View "Canty v. Otto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff G. Berry Schumann, a twelve year employee of Defendant, Dianon Systems, brought a complaint against Defendant alleging a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and common-law wrongful termination of employment for an adverse employment action Defendant took against Plaintiff in response to speech made during the course of Plaintiff's job duties. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether the rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which states that public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not insulated from employer discipline for First Amendment purposes, is applicable in an action brought against a private employer pursuant to section 31-51q. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the rule in Garcetti applies to claims under section 31-51q grounded in the First Amendment that are brought against private employers; and (2) Plaintiff's speech was in the course of his employment duties for Defendant and, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment protection under Garcetti. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant on the claim under section 31-51q and for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's common-law wrongful termination claim. View "Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants. View "Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was working as a police officer when he felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder after attempting to lift a heavy person. A physician determined that Plaintiff had a labral tear, and Plainiff later underwent shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's pain continued. In 2000, Plaintiff suffered an acute myocardial infarction and was transferred to the hospital where he had bypass surgery. Plaintiff filed a claim in 2001, contending that his shoulder condition was misdiagnosed and that his 1996 symptoms were caused by a cardiac problem. The workers compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's allegation that his heart condition was misdiagnosed following the 1996 incident, and that his 2001 notice of claim was untimely. The compensation review board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board properly concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the medical care exception to the applicable one year statute of limitations applied to toll the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff failed to prove a connection between the 1996 incident and his heart disease. View "Carter v. Town of Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harry Kraiza filed an application with the planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland seeking approval of a proposed subdivision on his property. The commission denied Plaintiff's application, finding it was in violation of the subdivision regulations because the proposed dead-end street that provided the only access to the subdivided lots on Plaintiff's property constituted an extension of an existing loop road on adjacent property and the combined length of the two road exceeded the permissible length for a permanent dead-end street. The superior court and appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission incorrectly interpreted the Hartland zoning and subdivision regulations in this case, and the appellate court incorrectly determined that the commission properly denied Plaintiff's application to subdivide his property. Remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining Plaintiff's appeal. View "Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Sheri Paige, then an attorney, was convicted of nine charges relating to the theft of assets from an elderly client, including one count of perjury. With respect to the perjury instruction, although Defendant had submitted a request to charge the jury that it must decide whether a particular statement at issue was material and the State had conceded that it was improper for the trial court to have instructed the jury that the State had proven this element as a matter of law, the appellate court determined that Defendant had waived her right to challenge the instruction that was given. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, holding that the appellate court erred in determining that Defendant had waived her right to challenge the instruction. Remanded for a new trial on the charge of perjury. View "State v. Paige" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant John Jackson was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in denying (1) Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence seized by the police without a search warrant, as Defendant had abandoned his expectation of privacy with respect to the seized items; (2) Defendant's motion to preclude certain evidence that the state had disclosed in an untimely manner, as Defendant established neither that there were exceptional circumstances requiring preclusion nor that he would have been prejudiced by the late disclosure; (3) Defendant's motion to suppress certain statements that he gave to the police, as Defendant was not in custody when he made the statements and the statements were voluntary; and (4) denying Defendant's request to give a jury instruction on third party culpability, as the evidence did not support the instruction. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The State filed an application for an arrest warrant for Defendant, alleging a charge of kidnapping in the first degree for the purpose of committing a sexual assault. The trial court ordered that the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant, which recounted statements of the victim and other individuals regarding the incident, be sealed for fourteen days. The victim requested that the affidavit remain sealed indefinitely, citing her right to be treated with fairness and respect throughout the criminal justice process under the state's victims rights amendment. The trial court denied the victim's motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the victim's appeal without reaching its merits, holding that the victim lacked standing to pursue the appeal, as nothing in the victims rights amendment itself or in subsequently enacted legislation explicitly makes victims parties to criminal prosecutions or otherwise affords them rights to appeal. View "State v. Gault" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case. View "Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

Midland Funding obtained judgments against Plaintiff Susan Ballou in two cases. The small claims court entered installment payment orders pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-356d. Defendant, the Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., which represented Midland in small claims court, did not apply for an order of postjudgment interest in either of the two cases, and the small claims court did not issue an order of postjudgment interest in either case. Defendant thereafter sought a bank execution against Plaintiff for the judgment amounts and directed the state marshal to add postjudgment interest of ten percent to the amount of the judgments. Plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. district court disputing the amount of the debts. At issue before the court was whether postjudgment interest accrues automatically on any unpaid balance under a judgment for which the court has entered an installment payment order. The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted certification to answer this question and held that section 52-356d(e) does not provide for the automatic accrual of postjudgment interest on all judgments in which an installment payment order has been entered by the court. View "Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C." on Justia Law