Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a vehicle Defendant Tricia Coccomo was driving collided with another vehicle, killing all three occupants, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle and misconduct with a motor vehicle, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value as proof of consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence that Defendant had transferred, after the collision, certain property for less than its fair value to her mother to prove consciousness of guilt; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test that, according to the Defendant, was performed on someone else's blood. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Coccomo" on Justia Law

After Employee received numerous elevated blood pressure readings and was prescribed hypertension medication, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits. The workers' compensation commissioner (1) found that a physician informed Employee more than one year prior to filing his claim that he had hypertension, and (2) concluded that, because Employee's claim was filed more than one year after that date, his claim was untimely under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a). The compensation review board affirmed. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, in which it held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims for hypertension benefits does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. At issue on appeal was whether the time limitation period was triggered only after Employee's physician prescribed medication for his condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Employee was, in fact, diagnosed with hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim, the board properly upheld the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim for benefits. View "Roohr v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

After Employee was diagnosed with hypertension, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a). The workers' compensation commissioner dismissed Employee's claim as untimely under the one year limitation period of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a), finding that Employee had notice of his hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim for benefits. The compensation review board affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether advice from a medical professional to Employee that he had an elevated blood pressure triggered the one year limitation period. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, which held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims brought pursuant to section 7-433c does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the board applied an incorrect legal standard in upholding the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim. View "Brymer v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that certain medical malpractice claims that they had asserted in an action against a medical association were covered under an insurance policy issued to the facility by Insurer. Due to Insurer's insolvency during the pendency of the action, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association assumed liability for Insurer's obligations to the extent that claims were covered under the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Act. The Association filed a counterclaim, contending that the claims against the medical association were not covered because they were subject to a policy provision that excluded them from corporate coverage liability. The trial rendered rendered judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the policy exclusion was inapplicable to the medical association's coverage for claims brought against it predicated solely on liability that it may have occurred through the acts of one of its nurse practitioners. View "Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Defendant landowner applied for a zoning change to designate its parcel as a business and commercial zone and for a special exception permit for approval of the site plan of its shopping center project. The Town's Planning and Zoning Commission denied the zone change application and denied as moot Defendant's application for a special exception permit. Defendants appealed, and the trial court judge, Judge Owens, approved Defendant's application for a zone change. During the pendency of Defendant's zone change appeal and upon receipt of Judge Owens's decision, the Commission approved the special exception permit but took no official action regarding the zone change application. Plaintiffs, several individuals, appealed, arguing that the commission acted improperly when it approved Defendant's special exception permit. The superior court sustained the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly revisited the prior judgment of Judge Owens and too narrowly construed the effect of Owens's decision as well as the actions taken by the Commission in reviewing and approving Defendant's application for the special exception permit. Remanded. View "Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n " on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were two sisters who held interests in a vacant lot as tenants in common. Plaintiff brought a quiet title action, claiming full ownership of the lot through adverse possession. The trial court quieted title to the real property in favor of Plaintiff, holding that Plaintiff had disseized Defendant of her interest in the property. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court improperly determined that Plaintiff had (1) overcome the presumption that possession by a tenant in common is not adverse to another cotenant, and (2) proven by clear and convincing evidence the elements of an adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for Plaintiff on her adverse possession claim because there was not unequivocal evidence that Plaintiff expressly notified or conveyed a clear and unmistakable intent to disseize Defendant of her interest in the lot. View "O'Connor v. Larocque" on Justia Law

After a criminal trial, a jury found Defendant William McElveen to be a persistent larceny offender. Defendant was sentenced accordingly. Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence and later appealed. The appellate court (1) determined that the trial court's grant of Defendant's motion and its vacation of Defendant's sentence enhancement for being a persistent larceny offender, while Defendant's appeal was pending, rendered the appeal moot; and (2) concluded that the jury's finding that Defendant was a persistent larceny offender was not a conviction but rather an enhanced sentence, and that vacating the sentence enhancement eliminated the only legal consequence of the larceny offender finding. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to decide whether the sole appropriate relief in the present case was the elimination of the sentence enhancement or whether, as Defendant argued, the case was not moot under the collateral consequences doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, determining that the certification was improvidently granted. View "State v. McElveen" on Justia Law

This medical malpractice case arose out of the claimed failure of Defendant, Mandell and Blau, M.D.'s, P.C., properly and promptly to diagnose Plaintiff, Brenda Sawicki, with breast cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed the trial court, determining that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by jurors' predeliberation discussions. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that there was ample evidence of repeated, egregious misconduct and that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated prejudice. View "Sawicki v. New Britain Gen. Hosp." on Justia Law

Defendant in this case issued health care insurance policies to provide coverage for medical services and entered into contracts with practitioners of the healing arts to provide those services. Plaintiffs, three individual podiatrists and the Connecticut Podiatric Medical Association, brought an action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's practice of reimbursing individual podiatrists at a lower rate than medical doctors for the same service constituted unfair discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUIPA, by prohibiting unfair discrimination, bars the denial of reimbursement on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts, but does not preclude setting different reimbursement rates on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts. View "Conn. Podiatric Med. Ass'n v. Health Net of Conn., Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, American Diamond Exchange, brought an action against Defendant, Jurgita Karobikaite, and her husband, Scott Alpert, after Alpert, who was working as an estate buyer for Plaintiff, diverted Plaintiff's customers so that he could personally purchase their jewelry. Defendant shared in the profits. A judgment of default was entered against Alpert. The court found Defendant liable for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy and civil conspiracy and awarded Plaintiff $118,000 in damages. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to damages and remanded for a recalculation of damages based on the existing record. On remand, the trial court awarded $103,355 in damages to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which its lost profits could be determined with reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to raise it in her direct appeal or because the appellate court decided the claim against her in the first appeal; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support an award of damages. View "Am. Diamond Exch., Inc. v. Alpert" on Justia Law