Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs served as the general contractor and the project developer for construction of a student housing complex at the University of Connecticut (UConn). UConn procured a commercial general liability (CGL) policy for the project, which insured Plaintiffs and their work. Defendant, American Motorists Insurance Company (AMICO), was the issuing insurer's successor in interest. UConn alleged that Plaintiffs breached the agreement with UConn, and Plaintiffs demanded that AMICO defend against UConn's claims. AMICO denied coverage. Plaintiffs settled their claims with UConn and then brought this action against Defendant for breach of contract and bad faith. The U.S. district court certified three questions of law for the Connecticut Supreme Court's consideration. The Court answered (1) allegations of unintended defective construction work by a subcontractor that damages nondefective property may trigger coverage under a CGL policy; (2) under the plain language of the insurance policy in this case, there is no cause of action based on AMICO's failure to conduct a discretionary investigation of claims for coverage; and (3) in global settlements encompassing multiple claims, the insured has the burden of proving that a pre-suit settlement is reasonable in proportion to claims that the insurer has a duty to defend. View "Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-two years incarceration and lifetime sex offender registration. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the appellate court erred in finding that Defendant's objection to the admission of expert testimony was unpreserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court correctly found that defense counsel's objection was not preserved; and (2) therefore, the Court declined to review Defendant's claim that the State's expert improperly expressed an opinion on the ultimate issue. View "State v. Jorge P." on Justia Law

Wyatt Energy unilaterally terminated an agreement with Motiva Enterprises granting Motiva exclusive use of logistical and storage services provided by a gasoline distribution terminal owned by Wyatt after Motiva purchased a competing terminal owned by Cargill. Wyatt subsequently sold its terminal to Williams Energy without requiring Williams to assume Wyatt's obligations under the agreement with Motiva. Wyatt then brought this breach of contract action against Motiva. Motiva counterclaimed for breach of contract. Wyatt asserted a special defense of illegality premised on purported antitrust violations arising out of Motiva's purchase of the Cargill terminal. The trial court held in favor of Motiva, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Wyatt's appeal, holding that Wyatt's claim that the trial court incorrectly defined the relevant product and geographic markets was moot because, even if Wyatt's proposed market definitions were assumed to be correct, Wyatt could not be afforded any practical relief. View "Wyatt Energy, Inc. v. Motiva Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent hired David Poirot as an associate in his law office. After Decedent died, Poirot left Decedent's law office to open his open practice. Poirot and Gordon Johnson (collectively, Defendants) subsequently litigated two traumatic brain injury cases that had originated in Decedent's law office. Plaintiff, Decedent's wife, filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence of damages resulting from her claimed CUTPA violations. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to produce an itemization of her claimed damages was fatal to her CUTPA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) a litigant need not produce "an itemization" of her claimed CUTPA damages in order to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment; but (2) the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff had failed to identify any evidence of ascertainable loss. View "Marinos v. Poirot" on Justia Law

On a conditional plea of nolo contendere, Defendant was convicted of child pornography in the first degree. During the course of the proceedings, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress numerous photographic and video recorded images depicting child pornography, which the police discovered in computer equipment that had been seized from Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant appealed, claiming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was improper because the warrant authorizing the search of his residence was not supported by probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly determined the affidavit in support of the search warrant application contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found at Defendant's residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded probable cause existed to support the issuance of the warrant. View "State v. Shields" on Justia Law

Pursuant to plea agreements in five different cases, the trial court rendered judgments adjudicating five juveniles (Respondents) delinquent for various offenses and ordered that they be committed to the department of children and families (department) for periods of less than eighteen months. At issue in this consolidated appeal was whether Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-141(a)(1)(A) permitted the superior court judge to order the commitment of Respondents to the custody of the department for a period of time less than eighteen months. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the trial court in all five cases, holding (1) section 46b-141(a)(1)(A) requires a judge to commit the delinquent child to an indeterminate commitment of eighteen months subject to any subsequent modification as provided by statute; and (2) the trial court in these cases improperly sentenced Respondents to commitment for an indeterminate time up to a maximum period of less than eighteen months. Remanded. View "In re Jusstice W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court's instruction regarding Defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial in relation to the jury's credibility assessment of his testimony deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial improprieties that deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (2) the trial court's instruction to the trial did not affect the fairness of the trial or prejudice Defendant. However, the Court directed trial courts in the future to refrain from instructing jurors, when a defendant testifies, that they may specifically consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Medrano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Spouse divorced in 1979. In postdissolution proceedings during which Plaintiff sought modification of the alimony award, Spouse was represented by several different attorneys (Defendants). All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Spouse. In 2008, the trial court ruled that information concerning Spouse's inheritance had been concealed from Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The appellate court affirmed, determining that the claims were precluded by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that attorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud for their conduct during judicial proceedings; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was derivative of his claim of fraud, was also properly rejected. View "Simms v. Seaman" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request an increase in bond on two prior charges so that Petitioner could be credited for presentence confinement credit on those charges. The habeas court granted relief, concluding that Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel for a matter pertaining to presentence confinement. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of its conclusion in Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, decided this same day, holding (1) the habeas court properly determined that Petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing and sentencing; and (2) the failure of Petitioner's counsel to request an increase in the bond on his first arrest constituted deficient performance and such performance prejudiced Petitioner by exposing him to an additional seventeen days in jail for which he received no credit. View "Huertas v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was arrested three times for three different offenses and later pleaded guilty to violation of a protective order and threatening in the second degree. Petitioner subsequently filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to request that the court credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit for one of his first two arrests. The habeas court found that Petitioner met his burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient and ordered the Commissioner of Correction to credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel at his arraignment; and (2) Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly ruled that (1) the Sixth Amendment confers a right to the effective assistance of counsel in matters pertaining to credit for presentence confinement; and (2) Petitioner showed deficient performance and prejudice within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington. View "Gonzalez v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law