Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner entered guilty pleas, pursuant to the Alford doctrine, to three counts of burglary and one count of larceny and admitted a violation of probation. Petitioner subsequently filed a revised amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court granted the petition in part, concluding (1) counsel did not act in a constitutionally defective manner in her representation of Petitioner; but (2) counsel had an actual conflict of interest. The appellate court reversed, ruling (1) the habeas court misapplied the Rules of Professional Conduct in determining that counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the court improperly determined that a breach of the Rules alone was sufficient to establish a violation of the right to ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court's curtailment defense counsel's cross-examination of a jailhouse informant regarding the maximum sentence the informant faced on pending felony charges at the time he incriminated Defendant was harmless; (2) any error in the trial court's decision to allow testimony from the informant that his parole officer supported his application for a sentence modification was harmless; (3) the trial court properly admitted into evidence testimony regarding Defendant's gang membership; and (4) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial impropriety during his cross-examination of Defendant's expert witness and during closing argument, but the improprieties did not deny Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs installed a gabion seawall on their property to mitigate the effects of erosion. Plaintiffs did not seek approval from the town or the department of environmental protection (department) before constructing the seawall. The town subsequently issued a cease and desist order to Plaintiffs, and the department issued a notice of violation to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted a permit application to the department attempting to obtain permission to retain the seawall. The department denied the application and ordered Plaintiffs to remove the seawall. Plaintiffs challenged the removal order. A department hearing officer determined that the department properly exercised jurisdiction and that the department had the authority to order the wall to be removed. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the department properly asserted jurisdiction over the seawall; (2) the department properly asserted jurisdiction under the Coastal Management Act; (3) substantial evidence supported the department's findings and conclusions; and (4) the hearing officer's decision to order the removal of the entire seawall was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sams v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Decedent commenced an action (first action) against Defendants, a hospital and two individuals, alleging that Defendants were negligent in failing to treat him for a lesion in his lung. Decedent died of cancer while the first action was pending. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to strike for failure to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a. Six weeks later, Plaintiff, Decedent's surviving spouse, commenced the present action alleging the same causes of action alleged against Defendants in the first action and seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reversed based on res judicata, concluding that the first action was decided on its merits because a motion to strike is a judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court incorrectly concluded the trial court should have granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata; but (2) the present action was time barred and was not saved by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute. View "Santorso v. Bristol Hosp." on Justia Law

Defendant contracted with Plaintiffs to purchase their oil recycling business. The parties carried out the purchase using three contracts. All but one of these contracts, the equipment contract, contained provisions entitling Defendant to attorney's fees in the event Plaintiffs breached the agreements. Plaintiffs later commenced this action seeking damages for Defendant's alleged breach of the contracts and for unjust enrichment. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim but awarded damages only with respect to Plaintiffs' breach of the equipment contract. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed with respect to attorney's fees. On remand, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine under these circumstances and improperly rejected Defendant's motion for attorney's fees without reaching the merits of that claim; and (2) when certain claims provide for a party's recovery of contractual attorney's fees but others do not, a party is nevertheless entitled to reasonable attorneys fees if an apportionment is impracticable because the claims arise from a common factual nucleus and are intertwined. Remanded. View "Total Recycling Servs. of Conn., Inc. v. Conn. Oil Recycling Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a variance from the zoning board of appeals (board) to construct a single-family house on their lakefront property. Plaintiffs then applied for and received a zoning permit and building permit from the town of Lebanon (town) to construct the house. After construction was completed, Plaintiffs constructed a deck. Plaintiffs did not receive the required building permits for the deck, nor did they notify the town of the deck's construction. Several years later, the zoning enforcement officer discovered the deck violated the town's zoning regulations and issued a notice of violation and cease and desist order to Plaintiffs requiring them to abate the setback violation. The board denied Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court reversed, concluding that the deck at issue was a "building" as that term is used in Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-13a(a) and, therefore, Defendants' enforcement action was untimely under the three year statute of limitations set forth in section 8-13a(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deck was not a "building" under the statute. Remanded. View "Tine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

After a court trial, Defendant was convicted in two separate cases of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, five counts of risk of injury to a child, and one count of promoting a minor in an obscene performance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) correctly found sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction for promoting a minor; (2) did not plainly err by admitting into evidence expert opinion evidence as to the fact that Defendant had physically, psychologically, and sexually abused the victim; and (3) did not err in permitting the state to present certain evidence of uncharged misconduct. View "State v. George A." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifty-five years for felony murder, twenty years for first degree robbery, and five years for carrying a pistol without a permit, each to run concurrently. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that felony murder was an unclassified felony subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's sentence was proper because felony murder is not an unclassified felony but, rather, a felony classified as murder and, as such, is punishable by a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years to life. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-278 and possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-277. Because Defendant's convictions were for greater and lesser included offenses arising out of the same transaction, the appellate court held that Defendant's section 21a-277 conviction must be merged with his section 21a-278 conviction and that the sentence for the former, lesser included offense must be vacated. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, when a defendant has been convicted of greater and lesser included offenses, the trial court must vacate the conviction for the lesser offense rather than merging the convictions pursuant to State v. Chicano. Remanded. View "State v. Polanco" on Justia Law

Husband brought this dissolution action in which he sought a dissolution of his marriage to Wife. Following a trial, the judge dissolved the parties' marriage, adopting the parties' agreed parenting plan and setting forth its financial orders. Wife appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly awarding her an insufficient amount of child support. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the financial orders and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by failing to articulate its reasons for deviating from the child support guidelines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded child support without mentioning or applying the guidelines or making a specific finding on the record as to why it was deviating from the guidelines; and (2) because the trial court did not make any findings as to the particular facts or circumstances of the S corporation of which Wife was a shareholder, remand was appropriate for a determination of what portion of Wife's income was available income for purposes of fashioning alimony and child support orders. View "Tuckman v. Tuckman" on Justia Law