Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed to the superior court from the decision of the planning and zoning commission of the town of Clinton (Defendant), granting, subject to certain conditions, its applications for a special permit and for coastal site plan review. Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a complaint, but the complaint was not accompanied by a citation or a summons. The trial court dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction because the service of process did not conform to the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-8(f)(2). Plaintiff appealed, claiming that, although the service of process was defective, it should have been allowed to add the citation and serve the corrected process pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-72. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's failure to attach a summons or citations to the complaint was a substantive defect in the service of process and, thus, was not the type of technical defect that was amendable pursuant to section 52-72. View "New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured at the University of Connecticut Health Center during the course of her employment as a driver for Hartford Elderly Services. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from Hartford Elderly, and the State provided Plaintiff with financial assistance for medical treatment. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action for negligence against the State and the Health Center. The trial court rendered judgment for Plaintiff on the complaint and in part for the State on its counterclaim seeking a setoff. The State appealed, claiming that the court improperly concluded that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-94(a), the State's recovery on its claim for a setoff of the entire amount of general assistance benefits it paid to Plaintiff was limited to fifty percent of specified proceeds of the action. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to the award of damages, holding that trial court improperly applied section 17b-94(a) to limit the State's recovery on its setoff. View "Cordero v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance policy, which was issued to Plaintiff's tenant (Tenant) by Defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company (Travelers). Plaintiff sought to invoke Travelers' duty to defend under the policy after Sarah Middeleer was injured in a fall on Plaintiff's property and brought the underlying action against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's insurer, the Netherlands Insurance Company (Netherlands), provided a defense to Plaintiff after Travelers denied any duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. Plaintiff then brought the present action claiming Travelers had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action and Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for the defense costs it had expended. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly construed the governing policy language and properly concluded that Travelers did not have a duty to defend Plaintiff. View "Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Claimant brought a claim before the Claims Commissioner seeking damages from the State as the coadministrator of the estate of her deceased daughter, who had died while confined in a correctional institution. In the course of Claimant's case, the Commissioner issued subpoenas to the Charlotte Hungerford Hospital requesting information about the decedent's treatment there. The Hospital refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Commissioner had no authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties. The trial court enforced the Commissioner's subpoena, and the appellate court affirmed. Subsequently to the Supreme Court's certification of the Hospital's appeal, Claimant settled underlying case, and consequently, the State no longer sought to enforce the subpoenas. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospital's appeal as moot and vacated the judgments of the lower courts, as the Court could no longer grant relief. View "State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp." on Justia Law

After the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, Wife filed a motion for clarification asking the court to reconfirm its previous order requiring that Husband equally split his pension accounts with Wife. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Husband to divide his pension accounts equally with Wife. The appellate court reversed, determining that the trial court's judgment granting the motion constituted an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment rather than impermissibly modified or altered the substantive terms of the judgment. Remanded. View "Bauer v. Bauer" on Justia Law

This case concerned the valuation of property owned by Plaintiff on which Plaintiff built a continuing care retirement community. In 2007, the assessor determined that Plaintiff's property had a fair market value of $117,621,000 and an assessment value of $82,334,600. Plaintiff challenged the valuation. The board of assessment appeals upheld the assessor's valuation. Plaintiff appealed, alleging it was aggrieved by the actions of the board because the assessor's valuation of the property exceeded seventy percent of its true and actual value on the assessment date. The trial court denied the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Plaintiff failed to establish aggrievement under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a was not clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving the town's assessment of the property was manifestly excessive under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-119. View "Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the appellate court erred in concluding that the trial court's failure to give a Ledbetter instruction, sua sponte, did not present the type of extraordinary circumstance that warranted reversal under the plain error doctrine. Under State v. Ledbetter, trial courts are required to provide a jury instruction regarding the increased risk of misidentification when an eyewitness is not advised that the perpetrator of a crime may or may not be present in the identification procedure in cases in which the identification procedure administrator had failed to provide such a warning. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded the failure to give a Ledbetter instruction in this case was not plain error. View "State v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-278a(b). Defendant appealed, arguing that criminal liability under section 21a-278a(b) did not attach in his case because the drug transaction began within 1500 feet of a school but culminated elsewhere. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction because section 21a-278a(b) required the state to prove that Defendant had effected a delivery of drugs within 1500 of the school, and the state had failed to prove that the physical transfer occurred within that 1500 foot zone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court construed the statutory definition of sale of a controlled substance under Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-240(50) too narrowly, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction in this case; and (2) Defendant waived his claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the intent element of the offense. View "State v. Webster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminally possessing a firearm and several drug-related crimes. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed. After noting that the appellate court properly resolved the issues Defendant brought up on appeal with a concise and well reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) properly concluded that Defendant's right to due process under the Connecticut constitution was not violated by the state's inability to produce audio recordings of certain drug transactions; and (2) properly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and attempt to commit assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's request that the jury be instructed on the theory that Defendant was acting in defense of another. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the defense of others was improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support Defendant's request to have the jury instructed on the defense of others, and therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury as requested. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Bryan" on Justia Law