Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that statements he made to the court during a pretrial hearing and at sentencing indicating dissatisfaction with the performance of his appointed counsel resulted in a clear and unequivocal request invoking the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that Defendant's statements to the court did not develop into a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to self-representation during the criminal proceedings.View "State v. Pires" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to several felony offenses. The appellate court affirmed. Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner's appellate counsel, who also served as his trial counsel, failed to file a petition for certification with the Supreme Court challenging the propriety of the appellate court's judgment. The habeas court granted the petition in part and ordered that Petitioner's right to file a petition for certification to appeal to the Supreme Court be restored. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner failed to introduce evidence that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's habeas action was not justiciable because it was not ripe for adjudication. Remanded with direction to dismiss the habeas petition.View "Janulawicz v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who worked for Defendant as a plumber, brought this action seeking payment of overtime wages for, among other things, his daily commute between his home and the job sites. The trial court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to overtime compensation for his travel time between home and work because the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted the relevant Connecticut laws and regulations governing overtime and travel time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 31-60-10 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, as applied to the facts of this case, confers lesser benefits on employees than those afforded under the FLSA, federal preemption applies, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his commuting time. View "Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled nolo contendere to possession of narcotics with intent to sell to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress with respect to the narcotics and handgun found in a plastic bag inside the trunk of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search of bags inside the trunk of his vehicle could not be conducted within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Connecticut constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state constitution does not prohibit the warrantless search of a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle conducted during an otherwise constitutional warrantless search of a vehicle. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Upon following up on complaints from Defendant’s neighbor relating to Defendant’s keeping of animals in his residence, a police officer concluded that a “welfare check” was necessary and made a warrantless entry into Defendant’s home. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of cruelty to animals. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress on the ground that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the evidence did not permit a finding that the police reasonably believed that a warrantless entry was necessary to help a person inside the dwelling who was in immediate need of assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances present in this case, a police officer reasonably would have believed that an emergency existed inside Defendant’s home. View "State v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action against defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court had authority to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale and related supplemental judgments after title had passed to the purchaser when a series of errors by the court and the parties caused the purchaser to buy a property that, unbeknownst to him but actually known by the second mortgagee, was in fact subject to a first mortgage that was to be foreclosed shortly thereafter. The court concluded that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the purchaser lacked standing under the circumstances of the present case; defendants inadequately briefed the issue of 17 Ridge Road, LLC's standing to intervene as a defendant and, therefore, the issue was deemed abandoned; and the appellate court correctly determined that the passing of title divested the trial court of jurisdiction to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court insofar as that court concluded that the trial court lacked authority to open the supplemental judgments. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland" on Justia Law

This case arose from disputes between the Department of Information Technology and Defendant, a computer equipment supplier, over two contracts between the parties. The Department filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and fraud claims. Defendant filed an amended counterclaim, alleging takings and due process violations. The Department moved to dismiss the takings and due process claims based on the State's sovereign immunity. The trial court determined that the Department had waived the State's sovereign immunity regarding Defendant's counterclaims by bringing this cause of action against Defendant. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Defendant damages on its procedural due process counterclaim. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant on the procedural due process counterclaim, holding that the Department did not waive the state's sovereign immunity by initiating the present litigation, and therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant's counterclaims; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Chief Info. Officer v. Computers Plus Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree. After Defendant was released from prison he was found to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation by engaging in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. Defendant appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he had violated his probation. Before oral argument, however, Defendant pleaded guilty to the criminal charges upon which the finding rested. The appellate court subsequently dismissed as moot Defendant's appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that his habeas corpus action collaterally attacking his criminal conviction revived the controversy such that mootness was averted. During the pendency of Defendant's appeal, the habeas court dismissed Defendant's habeas corpus action. The Supreme Court dismissed as moot Defendant's appeal, holding that dismissal of the habeas corpus action extinguished any claim to a live controversy in this appeal. View "State v. Milner" on Justia Law

In 1991, Plaintiff commenced an action to recover on a promissory note. In 1992, Defendant, a guarantor of the note, moved from Connecticut to South Carolina. In 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor. In 2007, Plaintiff commenced an action in Connecticut against Defendant to enforce the judgment. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Defendant's contact with Connecticut was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of either the long arm statute or due process. In 2009, the Legislature enacted Conn. Stat. 52-598(c), a mechanism whereby a judgment creditor can "revive" an unsatisfied judgment for money damages before the period for enforcement expires. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to revive the 1994 judgment. The trial granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that (1) Defendant's challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction on appeal was barred as an improper collateral attack on the original judgment; and (2) section 52-598(c) applies retroactively and provides a proper basis for the trial court's jurisdiction over Defendant for purposes of adjudicating the motion to revive. View "Inv. Assocs. v. Summit Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were twelve beer and soft drink manufacturers doing business in Connecticut. In 2009, the Legislature provided that all unclaimed beverage container deposits, which previously had been retained by Plaintiffs, henceforth must be paid to the State. The legislation was signed into law on January 15, 2009 and made applicable for a four-month period prior to its effective date. Plaintiffs brought this action against the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, claiming that application of the provision to the four month period prior to the effective date was an unconstitutional taking because Plaintiffs had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits attributable to the four month period in question, and therefore, the provision in the act that all unclaimed deposits accruing during that period must be paid to the State did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiffs' property. View "A. Gallo & Co. v. Comm'r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law