Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This litigation was the latest chapter in the efforts of Plaintiffs, including the commissioner of environmental protection, to close and remediate an area known as the "tire pond," a solid waste disposal area on land owned by Defendants, an individual and various corporate entities he owned or controlled. The nonparty plaintiff in error, Corporation, which conducted its business on land leased from an industrial park that contained a portion of the tire pond, brought this writ of error from the judgment of the trial court ordering it to vacate that land in order to effectuate the environmental remediation that the trial court had ordered in the action underlying this writ of error. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the trial court properly ordered Corporation to vacate where (1) the trial court had the authority to enforce the injunctions ordered in the underlying action against Corporation; (2) such an order was necessary to effectuate the remediation; and (3) the trial court's enforcement of the injunctive orders rendered in the underlying action against Corporation did not violate Corporation's due process rights. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. Farricielli" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aiding and abetting murder, felony murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree. Defendant elected a trial to a three judge court. The panel found Defendant guilty on all of the charges. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and abetting murder and that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part with respect to Defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting murder, as the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant on that count; and (2) concluded that Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial was valid. Remanded. View "State v. Bennett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, capital felony, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising three claims relating to testimony and demonstrative evidence of his flight from police after the commission of the crimes, which were admitted as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the prejudicial impact of the admission of the evidence of flight did not outweigh its probative value; and (2) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly failed to give the jury a limiting instruction on uncharged misconduct evidence, and Defendant was not entitled to relief on this claim under the plain error doctrine or under the Court's supervisory authority. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

Pictometry International Corporation was engaged in the business in selling specialized aerial photographic services. Pictometry contracted with the department of information technology to license the department of environmental protection (DEP) to use certain aerial photographic images and associated data that were owned and copyrighted by Pictometry. Stephen Whitaker requested that the DEP provide him with the images and data. The DEP indicated that it would provide copies of the images for a fee provided for in the licensing agreement. Whitaker filed a complaint against the DEP with the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission determined that, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), the DEP was required to provide Whitaker with the images at minimum cost but was not required to provide the associated data. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk; and (2) if the commission determined on remand that Whitaker is entitled to copies of the images, Whitaker was required to pay a $25 per image fee. View "Pictometry Int'l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Juvenile entered a plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree. The superior court found Juvenile to be delinquent and ordered him to be committed to the custody of the department of children and families (department) in an out-of-state facility. The department subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the matter, arguing that the court's orders exceeded the court's placement authority pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-140. The court denied the motion to intervene. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that section 46b-140 does not give the superior court the authority to place a juvenile in an out-of-state facility. While this appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the trial court modified Juvenile's probation to permit him to return to Connecticut from his placement out-of-state. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal as moot and not capable of repetition, yet evading review, as the legislature's most recent amendment to section 46b-140 firmly establishes that the statute does not authorize the superior court to order the direct placement of a child committed to the department in an out-of-state residential facility. View "In re Jeffrey M." on Justia Law

The vehicle Plaintiff was driving collided with a parked fire truck that was responding to an accident, and Plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the Town and others, alleging that the Town was negligent in that the fire truck and lane closures were inadequately marked and the positioning of the fire truck constituted a nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike the negligence counts of the basis of governmental immunity. The court also granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiffs' nuisance counts on the basis of Himmelstein v. Windsor and entered judgment in favor of the Town. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that its decision in Himmelstein did not bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. The appellate court drew a distinction between the present case and Himmelstein, noting that the nuisance claim in Himmelstein was barred by the exclusivity provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' nuisance claims here were clearly distinguishable from those asserted in Himmelstein, as in the instant case, Plaintiffs' nuisance counts did not fall within the scope of section 13a-149. View "Kumah v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of larceny in the second degree by embezzlement from a person who is sixty years of age or older. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the ownership of funds in a jointly held account is a factual issue for the jury to resolve. Defendant argued that the instruction was improper because a joint holder of an account, as a matter of law, jointly owns the funds in the account and, consequently, cannot be charged with stealing those funds. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court's jury instruction was legally correct, where the ownership of a joint account, as between its coholders, is not controlled by statute, but, rather, is a question of fact dependent on the intent of the joint account holders and all of the circumstances surrounding the joint account's creation and maintenance. View "State v. Lavigne" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant entered the plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his recreational vehicle, which was parked on the property of Edward Jevarjian, and of Jevarjian's home and garage. The plea was conditioned on Defendant's right to appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the contested search was not unlawfully premature; and (2) the appellate court properly determined that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of Jevarjian's home and garage. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant's plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home and of a recreational vehicle not belonging to him, which was parked on Defendant's property at the time of the search. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction, determining that Defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the appellate court properly determined that the judge issuing the search warrant made a scrivener's error as to the time of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the issue of whether Defendant had standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle was not before the Court, the resolution of the certified issue could yield no practical relief, and therefore, Defendant's appeal was moot. View "State v. Jevarjian" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the findings and order of the trial court, which committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of mental health and addiction services and required Defendant to submit to periodic competency examinations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined (1) Conn. Pub. Acts 98-88, 2, which amended Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-56d(m) by authorizing a court to order periodic competency examinations in certain circumstances, applied retroactively; (2) the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over Defendant when it conceded that Defendant had no notice of the proceeding that resulted in an arrest warrant for failure to appear; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering periodic competency examinations when there was not a substantial probability that Defendant would regain competence. View "State v. Custodio" on Justia Law