Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Oles Baptiste was convicted of assault of a peace officer and interfering with an officer. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court's jury instructions on the charges deprived him of his right to a fair trial and to present a defense. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant waived any constitutional or plain error claim by not raising an objection in the lower court proceedings. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the appellate court erred in concluding that he waived his claim of instructional error under State v. Kitchens, asserting that he did not have a meaningful opportunity for review of the jury instructions because the trial court held only a brief charging conference and Defendant did not receive a written copy of the instructions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that because Defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to review the charges, Defendant's claim was not implicitly waived under Kitchens. Remanded. View "State v. Baptiste" on Justia Law

After a police officer received frantic telephone calls by a concerned parent about his missing teenage son and the parent suggested that his son might be at the home of defendant Gary Ryder, the officer conducted a warrantless search of Ryder's home. During the search, the officer found a large reptile in Ryder's tub. Ryder was charged with risk of injury to a child and illegal possession of a reptile. The State entered a nolle prosequi with regard to the first charge, and Ryder entered a plea of nolo contendere to the possession of a reptile charge, later paying a fine. Ryder appealed from the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress and to dismiss the charges. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed, concluding that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement justified the officer's entry into Ryder's home. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the warrantless search of Ryder's curtilage and the subsequent warrantless search of Ryder's home. Remanded. View "State v. Ryder" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Lenarz was charged with risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Before trial, the prosecutor came into possession of and read certain written materials belonging to Defendant that contained trial strategy and were subject to the attorney-client privilege. Upon learning this fact, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, the trial court convicted Defendant of one count of risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the case was irreversibly tainted by the prosecutor's intrusion into the privileged communications, the only available appropriate remedy was dismissal of the charge of which he was convicted. The Court concluded that when a prosecutor has intruded into privileged communications containing a defendant's trial strategy and the state has failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, the court, sua sponte, must immediately provide appropriate relief to prevent prejudice to the defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Lenarz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Ham was charged with six crimes, including murder. Shortly before trial, the state offered Ham a plea bargain. Ham's counsel informed Ham that, if he accepted the plea offer, he would be eligible for parole after serving eighty-five percent of his sentence. When counsel advised Ham, his advice was consistent with the parole board's interpretation of the law. Ham rejected the offer. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all six charges, and the court sentenced Ham to a total effective term of fifty years imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Subsequently, in Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, the Supreme Court clarified the law at issue, making it clear that if Ham had accepted the plea offer, he would have been eligible for parole after serving fifty percent of his sentence, rather than eighty-five percent. Ham subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and arguing that but for counsel's error in advising him about the law, he would have accepted the plea offer. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient. View "Ham v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Long was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease of assault in the second degree. The state later petitioned to continue the defendant's commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c), which the defendant challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees different from those afforded to civilly committed inmates. Following remand, the trial court granted the state's petition. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly construed the Supreme Court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his current equal protection challenge and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than the Court had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that its decision in the previous appeal precluded the defendant's present claims. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

In 2000, the manager of the Goodspeed Airport cut down trees and woody vegetation on property owned by a land trust. A total of six actions were filed as a result of the clear-cutting. In addition to instituting two of three consolidated actions, the airport brought two federal actions, and the district court found in favor of the land trust in both actions. In state court three other actions were consolidated. The trial court concluded that (1) the airport parties' claims for substantive and procedural due process were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) the airport parties' claims claims for first amendment retaliation and abuse of process were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that either the issues were actually litigated in the federal actions and thus are barred by collateral estoppel, or the claims could have been raised in the federal actions and thus are barred by res judicata. View "Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child arising out of defendant's sexual abuse of his wife's son. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the results of the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test administered to defendant were not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence and, in light of the circumstances, defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the test. Because the evidence that defense counsel proffered provided no basis on which the jury reasonably could have concluded either that the son had visited pornographic websites on his own or that he had viewed images of conduct similar to the conduct attributed to defendant, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's attorney to adduce testimony from an expert on the reporting of sexual abuse by child victims where defense counsel opened the door to redirect examination. The court further held that the comments the state attorney made were based on the evidence and were neither inflammatory nor inaccurate and therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety must fail. Finally, the state conceded that the sentence that the trial court imposed did not comply with General Statutes 53a-70(b)(3) because it included a period of probation rather than a period of special parole. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing and the judgment was affirmed in all other aspects. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State v. David N.J." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed directly from the judgment of conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court, in fashioning his sentence, improperly considered his trial testimony relative to his drug dealing and thus burdened defendant's right to testify in his own defense. The court held that the question of the trial court's consideration of that testimony was irrelevant because that court clearly relied on other independent sources for the fact of defendant's drug dealing, meaning that it could not possibly have penalized defendant for testifying at trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's claim lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.