Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of sexual assault in a cohabiting relationship, holding that alleged improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument and cross-examination did not warrant reversal of Defendant's conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor made an impermissible "generic tailoring" argument by commenting in closing argument that the jury should discredit Defendant's trial testimony and that this comment violated his confrontation rights under the Connecticut Constitution. Defendant further argued that the prosecutor engaged in impermissible conduct in violation of his due process right to a fair trial pursuant to State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226 (Conn. 2002). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's tailoring comment constituted a specific, rather than a generic, tailoring argument; and (2) assuming that Singh was violated, Defendant was not deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. View "State v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

The Supreme dismissed the writ of error filed by Appellant, who was suspended from the practice of law before the appellate court for a six-month period, holding that an additional order issued by the appellate court in 2018 clarifying the previous order did not violate the ex post facto clause in violation of the United States Constitution.In 2014, the appellate court issued its order suspending Appellant from practice and barring her from representing any client before the appellate court until she filed a motion for reinstatement and that motion had been granted. In 2018, the appellate issued issued an additional order clarifying that the 2014 order precluded Appellant from providing "legal services of any kind in connection with any" appellate court matter until she filed a motion for reinstatement and that motion had been granted. Appellant filed a writ of error, arguing, among other things, that the 2018 order was an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it retroactively prohibited her from engaging in certain conduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the 2018 did not violate the ex post facto clause or Appellant's due process rights and that Appellant's claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory and retaliatory treatment were not reviewable by the Court. View "Cimmino v. Marcoccia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction.At issue in this appeal was what parameters should be used by the trier of fact to assess whether a defendant has inflicted serious physical injury in the form of serious disfigurement to be found guilty of assault in the first degree. Defendant argued that a forearm scar sustained by one victim was insufficient for the jury to find the serious physical injury necessary to support the charge of assault in the first degree. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the victim's disfigurement was not of a magnitude that could be found to substantially detract from the victim's appearance, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to meet the threshold for serious disfigurement; and (2) the State was not entitled to have Defendant's conviction modified. View "State v. Petion" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant was arrested for drug offenses and the murder of the victim. Five days after Defendant's rent was due for a second month the police searched his apartment without a warrant. The police discovered the victim's cell phone hidden in a bathroom wall. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment at the time of the search because the lease had expired and Defendant had failed to make rent payments and to secure his belongings in the apartment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the facts of this case, Defendant established that the apartment was his home and neither his incarceration or his failure to pay rent five days after it was due divested him of his subjective expectation of privacy in his apartment; and (2) because the State did not argue that any error was harmless, the case is remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jacques" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment convicting Defendant of one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, holding that the admission of certain hearsay evidence was erroneous, but the error was not of constitutional dimension and was not harmful.The hearsay statements at issue were used to establish that Defendant was the de facto owner of a vehicle registered to a third party. Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle when police officers discovered bricks of heroin and a large sum of cash. On appeal, Defendant argued that the admission of the hearsay statements, which were based on vehicle inspection records, violated his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statements regarding the inspection were testimonial but that improper admission of the hearsay evidence was not harmful. View "State v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court determining that the prosecutor did not abuse her discretion in a manner clearly contrary to manifest public interest when she entered a nolle prosequi on the basis that the State's material witness had become disabled for purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-56b, holding that, given the prosecutor's representations, the trial court properly deferred to the prosecutor's exercise of her discretion and allowed the nolle to enter.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's basis for entering the nolle, i.e., that the State's key witness was "disabled" because her fear prevented her from being able to testify, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the witness was disabled for purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-56b. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the prosecutor represented to the court that the witness was disabled to her compromised mental state and that her statements demonstrated that compromised mental state; and (2) the trial court did not make a finding that the witness was or was not disabled but, rather, properly grounded its ruling on its finding that, in entering the nolle, the prosecutor had not abused her discretion in a manner clearly contrary to manifest public interest. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that inmates charged in criminal cases, some of whose telephone calls and noncontact visits have been recorded and reviewed by the Department of Corrections, are not entitled, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), to a review of all calls and visits even though the Department has limited its review to only some of the recorded conversations.While the Department automatically records all calls and visits of all inmates, when a Department, acting as an investigative arm of the State, reviews some of those calls and visits as part of the investigation into an inmate's particular criminal case, the calls and visits reviewed are subject to Brady's disclosure requirements. Defendant issued a subpoena to the Department seeking the production of more than 1500 audio recordings of calls and visits of Defendant's four codefendants. The trial court granted in part the motions to quashed filed by the State and the Department, concluding that Defendant must first make a showing that the recordings contained exculpatory information. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the recordings at issue were not part of the investigation of the State's case against Defendant, Defendant was not entitled to review the recorded conversations. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of one count of murder, holding that the trial court should have dismissed rather than denied Defendant's motion for a new trial.After the jury returned its verdict but prior to the sentencing date, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The sentencing hearing went forward, and the court sentenced Defendant. Defendant subsequently sought to have his motion for a new trial heard. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the motion was correctly denied because the trial court lost jurisdiction once Defendant's sentence was executed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded with direction to dismiss Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding (1) given that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's motion for a new trial, the court should have dismissed Defendant's motion; and (2) the trial court's failure to rule on Defendant's motion for a new trial prior to sentencing did not constitute plain error. View "State v. Guerrera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner established good cause for failing to raise his claim at trial or on direct appeal that he was deprived of his right to counsel.Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of sexual assault and risk of injury. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had wrongfully been denied counsel at his criminal trial. Petitioner failed to raise a claim related to that deprivation either at trial or on direct appeal. The State filed a return asserting an affirmative defense of procedural default. The habeas court granted the petition, concluding that a claim of public defender error was not procedurally defaulted. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for purposes of determining whether a habeas claim is barred by procedural default, prejudice is presumed when the petitioner is completely denied his right to counsel. View "Newland v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant's statements during interrogation did not meet the standard set forth in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1994), so as to require suppression but that a more protective prophylactic rule set forth in this opinion is required under the Connecticut constitution to adequately safeguard the right against self-incrimination.Defendant was convicted of three counts of risk of injury to a child. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress certain statements he made during interrogation, arguing that the statements had been elicited after he invoked his right to have counsel present. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's references to counsel would not have been understood by a reasonable police officer as an expression of a present desire to consult with counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant's statements during the interrogation did not constitute an invocation of his right to counsel under Davis; (2) however, the state Constitution requires that police officers clarify an ambiguous request for counsel before they can continue the interrogation; and (3) because no such clarification was elicited in this case, and the failure to do so was harmful, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Purcell" on Justia Law