Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a registered sex offender when he was admitted to the state rental assistance program. Thereafter, the legislature promulgated section 17b-812-13(9) of the Regulations of Connecticut States Agencies, which makes sex offender registration a ground for termination or denial of rental program assistance. The Commissioner of Housing (Commissioner) subsequently terminated Plaintiff’s rental program benefits. Plaintiff took an administrative appeal of the Commissioner’s decision to the trial court, which concluded that the Commissioner’s application of section 17b-812-13(9) was not retroactive and therefore did not exceed the authority granted to the Commissioner by the legislature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner applied section 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations retroactively in this case by imposing a new obligation on Plaintiff’s sex offender status that terminated his rental program assistance; and (2) such retroactive application of the regulation was not statutorily authorized, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. View "Shannon v. Comm’r of Housing" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital felony and other crimes. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising several challenges to his death sentence. The habeas court denied the petition. After Petitioner filed his appeal, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner permission to file a supplemental brief on the question of whether the legislature’s enactment of P.A. 12-5 rendered the death penalty, as applied to him and other similarly situated defendants, unconstitutional. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided State v. Santiago, which held that the imposition of the death penalty on defendants sentenced to death for capital crimes committed before the effective date of the legislation was unconstitutional under the state constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition, holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner. View "Webb v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the third degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to the police; (2) the trial court properly admitted evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct pursuant to State v. DeJesus; and (3) the trial court’s application of the Supreme Court’s decision in DeJesus and the relevant revision of section 4-5(b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence did not violate Defendant’s equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. View "State v. Arias" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, the former mayor of the city of Hartford, was convicted of bribe receiving, fabricating evidence, and larceny by extortion. The State had charged Defendant with the offenses in two separate informations. Before trial, however, the trial court granted the State’s motion to consolidate the charges, and the cases were tried together for purposes of judicial economy. Defendant filed two motions to sever, arguing that consolidation improperly compromised his right to choose whether to testify on his own behalf in one case but to remain silent in the other case. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the cases to be retried in two separate proceedings, concluding that the trial court’s refusal to sever the cases had compromised Defendant’s ability to testify in one case, causing him substantial prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever the cases because Defendant made a timely and compelling showing that he had important testimony to give in one case and a strong need to refrain from testifying in the other. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to one count each of manufacturing a bomb and possession of child pornography in the first degree. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered after the execution of an administrative search warrant at his apartment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the administrative search warrant was invalid and improperly executed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the administrative search warrant was valid because (1) the superior court judge who issued the administrative search warrant had the authority to issue the warrant; (2) the warrant was supported by the requisite probable cause; and (3) there was no error in the issuance of the warrant during an ex parte proceeding. Further, the search was lawful because excessive force was not used during its execution. View "State v. Saturno" on Justia Law

Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102 authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to collect DNA samples from incarcerated felons in order to maintain a DNA data bank to assist in criminal investigations. In 2005, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. In 2009, the Department of Correction directed Defendant to submit to the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102g, but Defendant refused to comply. The State filed a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to collect the DNA sample from Defendant. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted of refusing to submit to the taking of a sample for DNA analysis in violation of section 54-102g(g). The Appellate Court upheld both Defendant’s conviction and the grant of the State’s motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain the sample, concluding (1) section 54-102g is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature, and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion; and (2) application of the statute to Defendant did not violate his constitutional guarantee of due process or the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly resolved both of Defendant’s claims. View "State v. Drakes" on Justia Law

Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102 authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to collect DNA samples from incarcerated felons in order to maintain a DNA data bank to assist in criminal investigations. In 1997, Defendant was convicted of robbery and other offenses. More than a decade later, the Department of Correction instructed Defendant to submit to the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102g, but Defendant refused to comply. The State filed a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to collect the DNA sample from Defendant. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted with refusing to submit to the taking of a sample for DNA analysis in violation of section 54-102g(g). The Appellate Court upheld both Defendant’s conviction and the grant of the State’s motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain the sample, concluding (1) section 54-102g is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature, and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion; and (2) application of the statute to Defendant did not violate his due process rights or contravene the ex post facto clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly resolved both of Defendant’s claims. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Petitioner was convicted of ten charges arising from a murder and robbery. The Appellate Court affirmed. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and failing adequately to present a defense at trial. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be set aside, concluding that counsel’s failure to obtain information regarding a stolen cell phone before trial was deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel’s failure to investigate the issue of the stolen cell phone evidence was not prejudicial under Stickland v. Washington. View "Horn v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Lopez-Gay, with Sabato and others, was at a Danbury nightclub, when her cell phone was stolen. She used an application on her computer to track its location to the Danbury Mall. Danbury police were unable to find it. That day, Sabato asked Mason to drive him to the mall and sold Mason the cell phone. Because the phone was password-protected, Mason was unable to use it. Mason took the phone to a friend, in Newtown, who worked servicing cell phones. Meanwhile, Lopez-Gay again used the tracking application and called the Newtown Police. Mason relinquished the phone when confronted, then sent Sabato a text message telling him that he was at the police station. Sabato replied, telling Mason not to write a statement. After discovering that Mason had made a statement, Sabato sent Mason threatening Facebook messages. Sabato was convicted of attempt to interfere with an officer G.S. 53a-167a (a)1; 53a- 49 (a) (2), and intimidating a witness, G.S. 53a-151a (a) (1). The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the intimidation conviction, but reversed the conviction of attempt to interfere with an officer. Fighting words are the only form of speech proscribed by Section 53a-167a, and Sabatot’s text message contained no such language. The state was precluded from arguing that it constituted a true threat, having never pursued such a theory at trial. Merely asking Mason not to give a statement was constitutionally protected and outside the purview of the statute. View "State v. Sabato" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by a three-judge​ panel and sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer in December, 1992. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2003 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial and appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise or sufficiently present several claims. The habeas court rejected each claim. On appeal, the petitioner raised 13 separate issues, most concerning his death sentence, and a few related to his capital felony conviction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed his death sentence, citing its decisions in State v. Santiago (2015) and State v. Peeler (2016). The court rejected claims that the criminal trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the state used a short-form information to charge him; that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to testimony by an individual who was with petitioner at the time of the murder and who, he alleged, was treated with leniency; and that international law precluded his conviction for a capital felony. View "Reynolds v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law