Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102 authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to collect DNA samples from incarcerated felons in order to maintain a DNA data bank to assist in criminal investigations. In 1997, Defendant was convicted of robbery and other offenses. More than a decade later, the Department of Correction instructed Defendant to submit to the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102g, but Defendant refused to comply. The State filed a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to collect the DNA sample from Defendant. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted with refusing to submit to the taking of a sample for DNA analysis in violation of section 54-102g(g). The Appellate Court upheld both Defendant’s conviction and the grant of the State’s motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain the sample, concluding (1) section 54-102g is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature, and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion; and (2) application of the statute to Defendant did not violate his due process rights or contravene the ex post facto clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly resolved both of Defendant’s claims. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Petitioner was convicted of ten charges arising from a murder and robbery. The Appellate Court affirmed. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and failing adequately to present a defense at trial. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be set aside, concluding that counsel’s failure to obtain information regarding a stolen cell phone before trial was deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel’s failure to investigate the issue of the stolen cell phone evidence was not prejudicial under Stickland v. Washington. View "Horn v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Lopez-Gay, with Sabato and others, was at a Danbury nightclub, when her cell phone was stolen. She used an application on her computer to track its location to the Danbury Mall. Danbury police were unable to find it. That day, Sabato asked Mason to drive him to the mall and sold Mason the cell phone. Because the phone was password-protected, Mason was unable to use it. Mason took the phone to a friend, in Newtown, who worked servicing cell phones. Meanwhile, Lopez-Gay again used the tracking application and called the Newtown Police. Mason relinquished the phone when confronted, then sent Sabato a text message telling him that he was at the police station. Sabato replied, telling Mason not to write a statement. After discovering that Mason had made a statement, Sabato sent Mason threatening Facebook messages. Sabato was convicted of attempt to interfere with an officer G.S. 53a-167a (a)1; 53a- 49 (a) (2), and intimidating a witness, G.S. 53a-151a (a) (1). The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the intimidation conviction, but reversed the conviction of attempt to interfere with an officer. Fighting words are the only form of speech proscribed by Section 53a-167a, and Sabatot’s text message contained no such language. The state was precluded from arguing that it constituted a true threat, having never pursued such a theory at trial. Merely asking Mason not to give a statement was constitutionally protected and outside the purview of the statute. View "State v. Sabato" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by a three-judge​ panel and sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer in December, 1992. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2003 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial and appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise or sufficiently present several claims. The habeas court rejected each claim. On appeal, the petitioner raised 13 separate issues, most concerning his death sentence, and a few related to his capital felony conviction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed his death sentence, citing its decisions in State v. Santiago (2015) and State v. Peeler (2016). The court rejected claims that the criminal trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the state used a short-form information to charge him; that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to testimony by an individual who was with petitioner at the time of the murder and who, he alleged, was treated with leniency; and that international law precluded his conviction for a capital felony. View "Reynolds v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a court trial, Defendant was convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree and harassment in the second degree. The Appellate Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for breach of the peace on the grounds of insufficient evidence and affirmed her harassment conviction. Both the State and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s breach of the peace conviction; (2) did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s harassment conviction; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Defendant’s constitutional claims on the ground that they were inadequately briefed. View "State v. Buhl" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from his sexual assault of his three biological children, a daughter and two sons. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the three cases to be tried jointly and by allowing a dog to be present with the daughter during her testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion (1) in permitting the three cases to be tried together because the evidence in each case was cross admissible; and (2) in permitting a dog to sit near the daughter during her testimony to provide comfort and support. View "State v. Devon D." on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the Appellate Court's conclusion that he is not entitled to a new trial even though the record provides no support for the ruling of the trial court requiring that he remain shackled during his criminal trial. The court agreed with defendant that he should not have been shackled throughout the trial, but the court concluded that defendant has failed to establish that he was harmed by the shackling because, so far as the record reveals, the jury never saw the restraints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Brawley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a number of crimes in connection with the abduction of his former wife. The trial judge found Defendant competent to represent himself at trial and permitted Defendant to represent himself. A jury subsequently convicted Defendant of all but one of the charges against him. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to reconsider Defendant’s competency to represent himself in light of a new standard that the Court adopted in Defendant’s direct appeal. On remand, the trial judge concluded that Defendant had been competent to represent himself at the time of his trial. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court’s remand hearing was procedurally flawed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court’s decision to resolve the appeal sua sponte on the basis that the remand hearing was procedurally flawed violated Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc. Remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to consider the issue raised in Defendant’s appeal. View "State v. Connor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police made during his booking violated his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings at the crime scene. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the public safety exception to Miranda, as articulated in New York v. Quarles, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the circumstances of this case, the public safety exception applied. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both intentional and reckless assault in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the convictions were legally inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Defendant’s convictions for intentional and reckless assault were legally inconsistent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions were not legally inconsistent under the State’s argument that the assault occurred in two reckless and intentional phases, respectively; and (2) Defendant had sufficient notice that he could be convicted of both reckless and intentional assault, and therefore, the manner in which Defendant was convicted satisfied the requirements of due process. View "State v. King" on Justia Law