Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of twelve years for his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree, followed by probation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Conn. Gen. Laws 53a-70(b)(3) because the sentence did not include a period of special parole. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was proper because section 53a-70(b)(3) does not require that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; rather, it provides that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, then the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must constitute a total sentence of not less than ten years. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s statements to her husband were not protected by the marital communications privilege pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-84b. Specifically, the court determined that Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection” of the marital relationship, and therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection, confidence, loyalty, and integrity of the marital relationship,” as required by section 54-84b(a), Defendant’s communications fell outside the marital communications privilege. View "State v. Davaloo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that that Defendant was entitled to a new trial due to certain alleged improprieties that the prosecutor committed during his cross-examination of Defendant and in closing argument. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Defendant was substantially prejudiced by the improprieties at issue in this case; (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury on the initial aggressor exception to self-defense; and (3) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the knife that Defendant used during the assault. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell and conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the prosecutor violated a court order concerning the permissible boundaries of argument and referred to facts outside the record, thus rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. The State appealed, claiming that the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that one of the prosecutor’s arguments was improper, but this improper argument did not deprive Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial because there was no reasonable likelihood that the prosecutor’s comments affected the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, claiming that his exclusion from an in chambers discussion regarding defense counsel’s possible conflict of interest violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the prosecution. The claim was unpreserved and so Defendant sought review pursuant to State v. Golding. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, determining that the record was inadequate to review the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record, as it presently stood, was not adequate for appellate review. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a minor, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-70c(a)(1) and (6), and other offenses. Defendant sought review pursuant to State v. Golding, claiming that his convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a minor violate his right to be free of double jeopardy because they constitute multiple punishments for the same offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because subdivisions (1) and (6) of section 53a-70c(a) each require proof of a fact that the other does not, and because nothing in either the statutory text or legislative history of the statute reveals a contrary legislative intent, multiple convictions under section 53a-70c for the same transaction do not run afoul of the double jeopardy clause. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child for sexually abusing a four-year-old girl. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present expert testimony regarding the suggestibility of young children and the reliability of a child’s recollection of sexual abuse. The habeas court reversed, concluding that Petitioner established that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure of Petitioner’s trial counsel to present the expert testimony was objectively reasonable because there was a legitimate, strategic reason for not presenting such testimony. View "Michael T. v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The plea agreement stated that Petitioner would receive a total sentence of between twenty and twenty-five years’ imprisonment and that defense counsel had a right to argue for a sentence beneath the twenty-five year cap. At sentencing, defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s recommendation that the trial court should impose the maximum sentence under the agreement. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years imprisonment. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court denied relief, determining that Petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the habeas court properly determined that Petitioner failed to prove actual prejudice under Strickland. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the habeas court improperly applied Strickland to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because a complete breakdown in the adversarial process occurred, and therefore, Petitioner’s claim was instead controlled by United States v. Cronic, under which prejudice should be presumed. View "Davis v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of larceny in the third degree. The State sought to have Defendant’s sentence enhanced under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-40b because Defendant had committed the larceny while he was released on bond. Prior to the hearing on the sentence enhancement, the records for Defendant’s previous arrests had been erased in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-142a. The trial court allowed the State to introduce those records into evidence and, relying solely on those records, found that Defendant had committed the larceny while he was on release. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court had improperly allowed the State to introduce the erased records and that the State could not seek to prove the basis for the sentence enhancement at a new hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court improperly permitted the State to introduce the erased records to prove the basis for the sentence enhancement under section 53a-40b; but (2) on remand, the State is not foreclosed from seeking to establish the basis for Defendant’s sentence enhancement by use of evidence other than the erased records. View "State v. Apt" on Justia Law

Defendant was found not guilty of certain offenses by reason of mental disease or defect and transferred to a maximum security psychiatric facility. Defendant was charged with new, violent crimes while housed at the facility. The trial court set a monetary bond as a condition of release. Because Defendant was unable to post that bond, he was transferred to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction at a prison while awaiting trial on the new charges. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s imposition of a monetary bond and, after Defendant was unable to post that bond, Defendant’s transfer to the custody of the Commissioner, did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights to (1) bail, pursuant to the Connecticut Constitution; and (2) procedural due process, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law