Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-73a(a)(2). The United States Department of Homeland Security subsequently commenced removal proceedings against Plaintiff on the ground that he was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The immigration judge determined that section 53a-73a(a)(2) is not a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute does not require that the actor know that his actions were not consented to by the victim. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that resolving the issue of what mens rea was required for the lack of consent element of the statute was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding section 53a-73a(a)(2). The Supreme Court answered (1) section 53a-73a(a)(2) is not a strict liability offense with respect to the lack of consent element; and (2) the mens rea applicable to the element of consent in section 53a-73a(a)(2) is criminal negligence. View "Efstathiadis v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly forced him to choose between his constitutional right to counsel and his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf after defense counsel stated that he would be self-represented if he testified against their advice. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant waived his right to counsel when he elected to testify at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not represented by counsel during his testimony; and (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial because he did not voluntarily relinquish his right to counsel. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Francis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-134(a)(3). Defendant appealed, arguing that the State was required to prove as an element of the crime of robbery in the first degree that he did not own the property that he had been convicted of attempting to take from the complainant and that the State did not do so. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the State had the burden of disproving that Defendant owned the property and that it had failed to meet this burden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly held that the State was required to prove that Defendant did not own the property that he attempted to take from another as an element of the crime of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempt to commit murder in violation of the attendant circumstances subdivision, rather than substantial step subdivision. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-49(a)(1) and (2). Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had attempted the commit the murder under the attendant circumstances division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of attempt to commit murder in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-54a(1) and the attendant circumstances subdivision of section 53a-49(a)(1). View "State v. Moreno-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to felony murder and related crimes. Petitioner was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total effective prison term of fifty years with no possibility of parole. After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the statutory authority under which his fifty year prison term with no possibility of parole was imposed violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to him. The habeas court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Miller did not apply to Petitioner’s sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Miller applies retroactively under Connecticut law to cases arising on collateral review; and (2) Miller applies to the imposition of a fifty year sentence on a juvenile offender. Remanded. View "Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to suppress (1) certain oral statements made to police officers after his apprehension on the ground that the statements were the result of a custodial interrogation without his having been read his Miranda warnings, and (2) a statement he made after being given his Miranda warnings on the ground that it was the product of coercion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, as (1) Defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation before receiving the Miranda warnings; and (2) Defendant’s confession was made voluntarily. View "State v. Ramos" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit, having a weapon in a motor vehicle with a permit, and possession of an assault weapon. The Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the trial court properly rejected Defendant’s claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-1c that he was entitled to the suppression of his written confession that he had given to the police following his arrest because he was not presented to the first session of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 54-1c did not bar the State’s use of Defendant’s written statement because section 54-1c is inapplicable when, as in this case, the statement is elicited prior to the expiration of the first session of court, when the defendant’s presentment still would have been timely; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant had carried a pistol in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-35(a). View "State v. Crespo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit. The Appellate Court affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner collaterally attacked his conviction by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court denied the habeas petition. On appeal, Petitioner raised for the first time a new theory as to why his attorney had rendered ineffective assistance. The Appellate Court declined to review Petitioner’s claim on the grounds that that review under State v. Golding is not available for unpreserved claims of error raised for the first time in a habeas appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Golding review was unavailable for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because that claim did not arise out of the actions or omissions of the habeas court itself. View "Moye v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, intentional assault in the first degree and reckless assault in the first degree. The intentional and reckless assault in the first degree convictions were based on the same conduct. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions for intentional and reckless assault in the first degree were not legally inconsistent because the two mental states required to commit the offenses related to different results; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of intentional assault in the first degree. View "State v. Nash" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project and other narcotics and firearm charges. The Appellate Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the possession charge; and (2) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to sell narcotics within 1500 feet of a public housing project. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to sell narcotics at a particular location within 1500 feet of a public housing project. View "State v. Stovall" on Justia Law