Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Appellate Court determined that Defendant’s convictions of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess narcotics and the greater offense of conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause. The court vacated Defendant’s conviction for the lesser included offense. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence for the greater offense and remanded for resentencing on that charge in accordance with the aggregate package theory. The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court, holding that, although the trial court had the discretion to resentence Defendant, it was improper under the circumstances of this case for the Appellate Court to order the trial court to hold a resentencing hearing, as Defendant’s total effective sentence was not altered by the Appellate Court’s decision. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right not to testify during her closing argument at trial. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prosecutor did not engage in any impropriety and that her comments were within the constitutional limits prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. View "State v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. In 2011, during his probation period, Defendant was again charged with possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. Later that year, the legislature enacted No. 11-71 of the 2011 Public Acts (P.A. 11-71), which changed the penalty for possessing less than one-half ounce of marijuana from a potential term of imprisonment and/or a large fine to a small fine. Defendant subsequently petitioned for the destruction of the records of his two 2009 convictions pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-142d, which allows for the erasure and destruction of records pertaining to a conviction that has later been decriminalized. The trial court denied relief. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that, after the passage of P.A.11-71, the possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana was not “decriminalized” within the meaning of section 54-142d. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that P.A. 11-71 decriminalized the possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana for purposes of section 54-142d. View "State v. Menditto" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even though Defendant was only fourteen and fifteen years old when he committed the crimes, the trial court did not err in imposing the mandatory minimum sentences for the first degree sexual assault conviction and the risk of injury conviction, as the mandatory minimum requirements left the trial court with broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence that accounted for Defendant’s youth and immaturity when he committed the crimes; (2) the state’s expert witness did not improperly vouch for the credibility of the victim; and (3) Defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of sexual misconduct committed by Defendant when he was thirteen years old on propensity grounds was unpreserved for appeal. View "State v. Taylor G." on Justia Law

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) excusing a juror for injecting extraneous matters into deliberations and for refusing to deliberate; (2) excusing a second juror who was absent for one day without inquiring how long she would be unavailable; and (3) admitting into evidence testimony and a video recording relating to Defendant's refusal to cooperate with the police as they were taking a buccal swab from him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) excusing the two jurors from the jury; (2) denying Defendant’s motions for a mistrial after the court excused the two jurors; and (3) admitting, as consciousness of guilt evidence, the testimony and video record of Defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the police. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the first degree as an accessory and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The jury further found that a firearm had been used in the commission of the robbery, and therefore, the trial court concluded that Defendant was subject to a sentence enhancement under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202k, which provides for a mandatory term of imprisonment when a person uses, or is armed with and threatens to use, a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant was unarmed when the robbery occurred. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that she was not subject to sentence enhancement under section 53-202k because that provision should be construed to apply only to persons who either use a firearm in the commission of the offense or intend that another participant in the offense do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) in light of the Court’s decision in State v. Flemke, decided today, Defendant was subject to sentence enhancement under section 53-202k; and (3) the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the state’s burden of proof. View "State v. Danforth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the first degree as an accessory and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The jury further found that a firearm had been used in the commission of the robbery. Although only Defendant’s accomplice was armed during the commission of the robbery, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an enhanced sentence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202k, which provides for a mandatory prison term when a person uses, or is armed with and threatens to use, a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court should either overrule its holding in State v. Davis that section 53-202k applies to unarmed accomplices or limit the applicability of section 53-202k to unarmed accomplices who intend that a firearm be used in the commission of the underlying offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) there are several reasons to decline Defendant’s invitation to overrule or otherwise limit Davis; and (2) in light of Davis, the state was not required to also prove that Defendant intended that a firearm would be used during the robbery. View "State v. Flemke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-48(a). Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, to find Defendant guilty of the conspiracy charge, it must find that he had specifically intended that the planned robbery would involve the display or threatened use of what was represented to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. The Appellate Court agreed with Defendant and reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, to be convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, a defendant must specifically intend that there would be the display or threatened use of what was represented as a deadly weapon or dangerous object during the robbery or immediate flight therefrom. View "State v. Pond" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate at McDougall Correctional Institution, was found guilty of possession of contraband. After a hearing at which Petitioner was permitted to present witnesses and to testify on his own behalf, the Inmate Classification Administrator, ordered that Petitioner be placed in administrative segregation at Northern Correctional Institution, the state’s maximum security prison. Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas petition, which the habeas corpus denied. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the habeas court abused its discretion because it did not address his contention that his placement in administrative segregation violated his right to due process. The Appellate Court rejected Petitioner’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly indicated that Connecticut prisoners can never establish a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation; (2) the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the habeas court acted within its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court because the habeas court’s reason for denying that petition was unsupportable; but (3) even if Petitioner had a liberty interest in avoiding his transfer to Northern, he received all of the process he was due prior to that transfer. View "Vandever v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law