Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content. Defendant was also convicted of speeding. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress breath test reports, as the state experts who testified regarding certain breath tests fulfilled the requirements of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts; and (2) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his arrest, as the constable who made the arrest in the present case was a duly qualified special constable with the power to make the arrest. View "State v. Buckland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on a conditional plea of nolo contendere of possession of narcotics with intent to sell. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that the police discovered after stopping Defendant incident to the detention of another individual, who was wanted for a violation of probation, while Defendant and the individual were walking together on a sidewalk. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officers had seized him in violation of Terry v. Ohio because they lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that it is permissible for the police to briefly detain the companion of a suspect, incident to the lawful stop of the suspect, even though the police lack reasonable suspicion to believe the companion has engaged in or is engaging in criminal behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police were authorized to stop and briefly detain Defendant, as a reasonable safety measure, in connection with the lawful detention of the individual he was accompanying because the police reasonable believed that the other individual was armed and dangerous. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Respondent was charged as a juvenile with several firearms-related offenses. The State filed a motion seeking a discretionary transfer of Respondent’s case to the regular criminal docket of the superior court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-127(b)(1). The trial court granted the State’s motion. Respondent appealed. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the a transfer order made pursuant to the discretionary transfer provision in section 46b-127(b)(1) is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, as the clear intent of the Legislature is to prohibit interlocutory appeals from discretionary transfer orders. View "In re Tyriq T." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, two counts of kidnapping in the second degree, and assault in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in joining his two cases for trial and that the evidence was insufficient was support his conviction of both counts of kidnapping in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in joining the two cases; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment of conviction of one count of second degree kidnapping and the assault conviction; but (3) the jury could not reasonably have found that two separate instances of kidnapping occurred. Remanded with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on one count of kidnapping in the second degree. View "State v. Crenshaw" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that he had been deprived of a fair trial because of improper statements made by the prosecutor during trial and in closing argument. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that only certain statements by the prosecutor were improper, and Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial as a result. Defendant and the State separately appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s appeal must be dismissed because the State was not aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court; and (2) Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. View "State v. Albino" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses in connection with the shooting of Johnnie Jones. On appeal, Defendant argued that the victim’s conduct in identifying Defendant as the perpetrator was unduly suggestive in violation of his due process rights. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the due process clauses of the Connecticut constitution provide protection against allegedly unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedures undertaken by a private actor, even in the absence of any improper state action. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) any eyewitness identifications that are not tainted by any unduly suggestive state action do not implicate due process principles unless the identification was so unreliable that its admission deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial; and (2) because Defendant’s claim in this case that the victim’s identification of him as the perpetrator should be suppressed on the ground that it was unduly suggestive did not implicate the state constitution, and because Defendant did not raise the claim at trial, it was not reviewable. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the victim’s attorney to testify about an immunity agreement the attorney had negotiated with the State on behalf of the victim. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, even if the trial court erred in permitting the victim’s attorney to testify, the admission of the testimony was harmless, and therefore, Defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a new trial.View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and interfering with an officer. The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the appellate court abused its discretion by refusing to adopt the buyer-seller exception applied by federal courts in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy to sell narcotics. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the considerations embodied in the buyer-seller exception are already reflected in the laws of the state; and (2) the evidence demonstrated more than a mere buyer-seller relationship with Defendant’s coconspirator on a single occasion, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Allan" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant was convicted of several offenses. Defendant also pleaded guilty to being a persistent dangerous felony offender and to being a persistent serious felony offender. Judge Espinosa sentenced Defendant to an enhanced sentence. In 2008, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that he was constitutionally entitled to have a jury determine whether extended incarceration would be in the public interest. The trial court dismissed the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that Judge Espinosa had failed to make the required finding that an enhanced sentence would best serve the public interest. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that Judge Espinosa made the necessary finding that imposing an enhanced sentence on Defendant would best serve the public interest. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Under the apparent authority doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court, a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not have such authority. The trial court in this case denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement’s warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment based on the apparent authority doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. On appeal, Defendant contended that although the apparent authority doctrine is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement under the federal constitution, it is inconsistent with Conn. Const. art. I, 7. The Appellate Court concluded that application of the doctrine does not offend the right of Connecticut citizens to be free from unreasonable searches under article first, section 7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court’s opinion was a proper statement of the applicable law on this issue. View "State v. Buie" on Justia Law