Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Patrick Lenarz was charged with risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Before trial, the prosecutor came into possession of and read certain written materials belonging to Defendant that contained trial strategy and were subject to the attorney-client privilege. Upon learning this fact, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, the trial court convicted Defendant of one count of risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the case was irreversibly tainted by the prosecutor's intrusion into the privileged communications, the only available appropriate remedy was dismissal of the charge of which he was convicted. The Court concluded that when a prosecutor has intruded into privileged communications containing a defendant's trial strategy and the state has failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, the court, sua sponte, must immediately provide appropriate relief to prevent prejudice to the defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Lenarz" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Polanco was convicted of sale of narcotics in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-277(a) and sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of Ohio Gen. Stat. 21a-278a(b). The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison suspended after four years for violating Section 21a-277(a) and three years for violating Section 21a-278a(b), for a total effective sentence of thirteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after seven years, with three years of probation. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that the trial court illegally sentenced him by (1) suspending the execution of his sentence for violating Section 21a-277(a) without imposing a period of probation; (2) imposing a period of probation without suspending any portion of the term of imprisonment for violating Section 21a-278a(b); and (3) adding the mandatory three year term of imprisonment for violating Section 21a-277(a) to his ten year total sentence for violating Section 21a-277(a). The second trial court denied Defendant's motion to correct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court imposed a valid sentence on Defendant and that the second trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendant's motion. View "State v. Polanco" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Ham was charged with six crimes, including murder. Shortly before trial, the state offered Ham a plea bargain. Ham's counsel informed Ham that, if he accepted the plea offer, he would be eligible for parole after serving eighty-five percent of his sentence. When counsel advised Ham, his advice was consistent with the parole board's interpretation of the law. Ham rejected the offer. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all six charges, and the court sentenced Ham to a total effective term of fifty years imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Subsequently, in Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, the Supreme Court clarified the law at issue, making it clear that if Ham had accepted the plea offer, he would have been eligible for parole after serving fifty percent of his sentence, rather than eighty-five percent. Ham subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and arguing that but for counsel's error in advising him about the law, he would have accepted the plea offer. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient. View "Ham v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Wallace Brabham was convicted of burglary in the third degree and attempt to commit larceny in the first degree. Before sentencing, Defendant posted bond and fled to England. As a result, Defendant failed to appear for sentencing. Defendant was rearrested and returned to Connecticut. Defendant once again posted bond and fled to England and again did not appear for sentencing. Defendant was rearrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The state contended that the entire appeal should be dismissed under the common-law fugitive felon disentitlement doctrine, which allows an appellate court to dismiss the appeal of a party who flees subsequent to the felony conviction from which he appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant's claims were barred by the rule of fugitive disentitlement. View "State v. Brabham" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Long was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease of assault in the second degree. The state later petitioned to continue the defendant's commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c), which the defendant challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees different from those afforded to civilly committed inmates. Following remand, the trial court granted the state's petition. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly construed the Supreme Court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his current equal protection challenge and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than the Court had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that its decision in the previous appeal precluded the defendant's present claims. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child arising out of defendant's sexual abuse of his wife's son. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the results of the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test administered to defendant were not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence and, in light of the circumstances, defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the test. Because the evidence that defense counsel proffered provided no basis on which the jury reasonably could have concluded either that the son had visited pornographic websites on his own or that he had viewed images of conduct similar to the conduct attributed to defendant, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's attorney to adduce testimony from an expert on the reporting of sexual abuse by child victims where defense counsel opened the door to redirect examination. The court further held that the comments the state attorney made were based on the evidence and were neither inflammatory nor inaccurate and therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety must fail. Finally, the state conceded that the sentence that the trial court imposed did not comply with General Statutes 53a-70(b)(3) because it included a period of probation rather than a period of special parole. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing and the judgment was affirmed in all other aspects. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State v. David N.J." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed directly from the judgment of conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court, in fashioning his sentence, improperly considered his trial testimony relative to his drug dealing and thus burdened defendant's right to testify in his own defense. The court held that the question of the trial court's consideration of that testimony was irrelevant because that court clearly relied on other independent sources for the fact of defendant's drug dealing, meaning that it could not possibly have penalized defendant for testifying at trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's claim lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, then age sixteen, was arrested and charged with ten offenses and arraigned as a youthful offender under General Statutes 54-76c et seq. Following the arraignment, the state filed a motion to transfer defendant's case to the regular criminal docket. At issue was whether the Appellate Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed for lack of a final judgment the interlocutory appeal of defendant from an order of the trial court transferring his case from the youthful offender docket of the Superior Court to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to sections 54-76c(b)(1). The court held that the trial court's order was not an appealable order under State v. Curcio where it did not conclude the rights of defendant regarding his status as a youth offender. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant appealed from the decision of the trial court granting the state's motion to transfer defendant's case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes 54-57c(b)(1). At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to transfer without first holding a hearing on the motion in violation of defendant's right to due process under the federal constitution. The court held that section 54-76c(b) required a hearing on the adult docket prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket, that this statutory requirement satisfied due process, and that neither section 54-76c(b)(1) nor due process entitled defendant to a hearing before the court on the youthful offender docket.