Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Family Law
In re Teagan K.-O.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Father's motion to dismiss a petition to adjudicate a newborn child neglected on the basis of "predictive neglect" when the parents relocated to another state before the child's birth, holding that the Connecticut trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.After the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a petition seeking to terminate Respondents' parental rights, Respondents drove to Florida and signed a one-year lease for an apartment. Two days after the child's birth, the Florida Department of Children and Families took custody of the child. The Connecticut trial court then filed a petition seeking to adjudicate the child neglected. The motion was denied on the ground that the child was not in Connecticut. Thereafter, the Florida department filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut trial court, which the magistrate granted. Thereafter, Father filed a motion to dismiss the pending neglect petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Connecticut trial court denied Father's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Connecticut trial court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition because any neglect of the child would never occur in Connecticut. View "In re Teagan K.-O." on Justia Law
Foisie v. Foisie
The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court denying Plaintiff's motion to substitute the coexecutors of the estate of Defendant, her former husband, in his place, holding that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to substitute as defendants the coexecutors of Defendant's estate.At issue was whether, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-599, a party to a dissolution of marriage action may substitute the executor of the estate of a deceased party in the place of the decedent when the pending civil proceeding seeks to open a judgment of dissolution on the basis of financial fraud. The trial court in this case determined that granting Plaintiff's motion to open would reinstate the parties' marriage and the reinstated marriage automatically would be dissolved due to Defendant's death, and therefore, the opened action for dissolution would abate, thereby prohibiting substitution under section 52-599(b). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because Plaintiff sought the opening of the dissolution judgment for the limited purpose of reconsidering the financial orders only, the granting of the motion would not have reinstated the parties' marriage, and Defendant's death did not defeat and render useless the underlying civil proceeding. View "Foisie v. Foisie" on Justia Law
Hall v. Hall
In this dissolution of marriage action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of civil contempt rendered against Plaintiff, holding that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court properly found Plaintiff in contempt of court and properly denied the parties' joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. One year after Plaintiff commenced a dissolution action Defendant filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Plaintiff committed a willful violation of a court order when he withdrew approximately $70,000 from the parties' joint account and placed it into a separate, personal account. The court granted the motion after a hearing. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision, which the trial court denied. Later, the parties filed a joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt in part. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiff in contempt and failing to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law
Zhou v. Zhang
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dissolving Plaintiff's marriage to Defendant, holding that the trial court did not err.After a dissolution trial, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000 per year and awarded Plaintiff $1,326,849, which represented one-third of the parties' aggregate net worth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) correctly concluded that the parties’ purported agreement to revoke the postnuptial agreement was unenforceable and that the parties' postnuptial agreement was enforceable; and (2) correctly awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their minor children with the defendant having final decision-making authority. View "Zhou v. Zhang" on Justia Law
Puff v. Puff
In this postdissolution matter the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the decision of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for sanctions and for contempt, holding that there was no basis to support the award of attorney's fees and costs.This matter stemmed from the parties' oral stipulation following a motion for modification of alimony and the trial court's adoption of that stipulation as a court order. Subsequent litigation efforts saw Defendant attempting to carry the order into effect and Plaintiff challenging the order. At issue was the court's decision to grant Defendant's postjudgment motion for sanctions and for contempt and awarding Defendant the litigation expenses he had incurred following the entry of the order adopting the stipulation. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment of contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed and further concluded that the sanction for litigation misconduct must be reversed, holding that, insofar as the award was based on contempt, it could not stand on any of the grounds articulated by the trial court, and insofar as the award was based on litigation misconduct, it lacked the requisite findings. View "Puff v. Puff" on Justia Law
In re Tresin J.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his child, holding that Father's parental rights were properly terminated for lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship.Father was incarcerated when the child was two years old. At the time of the termination trial, the child, who was six years old, had no knowledge or memory of Father. On appeal, Father argued that the virtual infancy and interference exceptions to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship ground for the termination of parental rights was applicable because the child was only two years old when Father's incarceration separated them, and the circumstances of this case rendered contact impossible during his incarceration. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the interference and virtual infancy exceptions were inapplicable as a matter of law, and therefore, the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re Tresin J." on Justia Law
Bilbao v. Goodwin
In this case concerning how pre-embryos created through in vitro fertilization should be distributed upon the divorce of their progenitors the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as the court determined that a storage agreement with the fertility clinic was not enforceable, holding that the parties in this case had an enforceable agreement.Plaintiff and Defendant underwent in vitro fertilization during their marriage, and several pre-embryos resulting from that treatment were stored for implantation at a later date. As part of the storage agreement, the parties stated that they wanted the pre-embryos discarded if they divorced. The parties later divorced, and Plaintiff sought to have the pre-embryos discarded. Defendant, however, wanted the pre-embryos preserved or donated, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable. The trial court determined that the agreement was unenforceable and awarded the pre-embryos to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly determined that the storage agreement was unenforceable. View "Bilbao v. Goodwin" on Justia Law
In re Taijha H.-B.
The Supreme Court held that in case a case involving the termination of parental rights where an indigent parent has a constitutional right to appellate counsel, appointed counsel may not be permitted to withdraw without first demonstrating that the record has been thoroughly reviewed for potential meritorious issues and taking steps to facilitate review of the case for the purpose of determining whether the attorney accurately concluded that any appeal would be meritless.After Mother's parental rights were terminated, counsel was appointed for Mother, who was indigent, to review the matter for a possible appeal. Counsel filed motions to withdraw his appearances for lack of any nonfrivolous issue on which to proceed. The trial court granted counsel's motion to withdraw without requiring the filing of an Anders brief or conducting its own independent review to determine whether any appeal would be frivolous. The Appellate Court then dismissed the appeal, finding that the procedure set forth in Anders is not applicable to the withdrawal of an appellate review attorney in child protection proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the precise procedures discussed in Anders are not constitutionally mandated, but minimal procedural protections are required; and (2) the minimal procedural protections set forth in this opinion were not afforded to Mother. View "In re Taijha H.-B." on Justia Law
Lederle v. Spivey
In this dissolution of marriage action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the decision of the trial court awarding appellate attorney's fees to Plaintiff under the bad faith exception to the American rule, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the fees.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court did not accord the proper level of deference in concluding that the trial court's findings lacked sufficient specificity. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the appellate court with direction to affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding Plaintiff $30,000 in attorney's fees. View "Lederle v. Spivey" on Justia Law
Boisvert v. Gavis
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Father's postjudgment motion for a no contact order between his minor child and the child's maternal aunt, holding that Father failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a violation of his fundamental parental right to make decisions regarding his child's associations.Father was granted custody of the child after Mother's death. Plaintiffs, the maternal grandparents, were involved in the child's life until Father terminated their contact. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' petition for visitation. Father filed a postjudgment motion for order asking the trial court to enter an order requiring Plaintiffs to allow no contact between the child and the child's maternal aunt. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Father failed to produce evidence to show the child's contact with the aunt was inappropriate or put the child in danger. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to direct Plaintiffs to abide by his parental decisions regarding the child's care violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-59 and the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Father was not entitled to relief because he failed, as a threshold matter, to articulate a reason in support of the requested condition. View "Boisvert v. Gavis" on Justia Law