Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband brought this dissolution action in which he sought a dissolution of his marriage to Wife. Following a trial, the judge dissolved the parties' marriage, adopting the parties' agreed parenting plan and setting forth its financial orders. Wife appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly awarding her an insufficient amount of child support. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the financial orders and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by failing to articulate its reasons for deviating from the child support guidelines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded child support without mentioning or applying the guidelines or making a specific finding on the record as to why it was deviating from the guidelines; and (2) because the trial court did not make any findings as to the particular facts or circumstances of the S corporation of which Wife was a shareholder, remand was appropriate for a determination of what portion of Wife's income was available income for purposes of fashioning alimony and child support orders. View "Tuckman v. Tuckman" on Justia Law

After the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, Wife filed a motion for clarification asking the court to reconfirm its previous order requiring that Husband equally split his pension accounts with Wife. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Husband to divide his pension accounts equally with Wife. The appellate court reversed, determining that the trial court's judgment granting the motion constituted an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment rather than impermissibly modified or altered the substantive terms of the judgment. Remanded. View "Bauer v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Daniel King, the substitute defendant and administrator of the estate of David Berzins (administrator), appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, Mary Berzins. The administrator appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on Ramin v. Ramin to grant the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. Ramin held that a court has discretion to award attorney's fees to party who incurs those fees due to the other party's egregious litigation misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney's fees did not fall within the scope of Ramin, as the phrase "egregious litigation misconduct" was limited to discovery misconduct; and (2) the court did not act within its inherent authority in awarding attorney's fees for filing frivolous and duplicative postjudgment motions because it failed to make a finding that the administrator had acted in bad faith as defined in Maris v. McGrath. View "Berzins v. Berzins" on Justia Law

This certified appeal arose from the termination of the parental rights of the respondent Mother to her two minor children. The appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of Petitioner, the commissioner of children and families. On appeal, Mother asserted that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof on the issue of personal rehabilitation to Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Respondent. View "In re Jason R." on Justia Law

The trial court found Mother in contempt for refusing to allow Father to visit their son in accordance with a previously established visitation schedule. The trial court's contempt order required Mother to place the child in a supervised visitation program with Father and to pay for all expenses associated therewith. The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal, concluding that the absence of a final judgment deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother contended on appeal that the trial court's contempt order was a final judgment and, thus, immediately appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a civil contempt order requiring the contemnor to incur a cost or take specific action - such as paying for supervised visitation - constitutes an appealable final judgment; and (2) accordingly, the appellate court improperly dismissed Mother's appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Khan v. Hillyer" on Justia Law

This case addressed whether, during proceedings to commit a minor child who has been adjudicated neglected to the custody of the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), a respondent parent is entitled to a competency evaluation on the basis of her counsel's stated belief that such an evaluation is warranted. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court committing Kaleb H., a minor child, to the custody of the commissioner, after concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request by counsel for Kaleb's mother, the respondent, that the mother's competency be evaluated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record in this case was insufficient to trigger the trial court's purported obligation to conduct a competency evaluation. View "In re Kaleb H." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-175, applies to the placement of children with an out-of-state noncustodial parent. Respondent father and his minor children appealed to the appellate court from the ruling of the trial court that the compact applied to the placement of the children with Respondent, even though he was the children's noncustodial parent. Thereafter, the trial court awarded physical custody of the children to Respondent. The appellate court concluded the appeals were moot and dismissed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly dismissed the appeal, as Respondent's appeal was moot but fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court further concluded that the appellate court improperly determined that section 17a-175 applies to out-of-state, noncustodial parents. View "In re Emoni W." on Justia Law

Respondents Mother and Father were the parents of two children. After finding that the children were neglected, the trial court rendered judgments terminating Respondents' parental rights with respect to both children. The appellate court reversed and remanded he cases for further proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. On remand, the trial court again found that both children were neglected under the doctrine of predictive neglect and committed them to the custody of the commission of children and families. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in predictive neglect proceedings, the trial court must find that it is more likely than not that, if the child remained in the current situation, the child would be denied proper care and attention or would be permitting to live under conditions injurious to the well-being of the child; (2) the petitioner is required to meet this standard with respect to each parent who has contested the neglect petition and who has expressed a desire to care for the child independently of the other parent; and (3) in this case, the trial court applied an improper standard of proof. Remanded for new neglect proceedings. View "In re Joseph W." on Justia Law

The principal issue in this appeal was whether a trial court could modify unallocated alimony and child support payments following a change in the primary physical custody of the minor children from the party receiving the unallocated payments to the party making the payments, when the dissolution judgment incorporated a provision in the separation agreement providing that such payments were nonmodifiable. The trial court granted Defendant father's motion to modify the order that he make unallocated alimony and child support payments to Plaintiff mother following the parties' decision to transfer primary physical custody of the children to Defendant two years after the judgment dissolving their marriage was rendered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the particular circumstances of the present case, the trial court had the authority to modify Defendant's child support obligation. View "Tomlinson v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a dissolution of marriage action from Defendant. Defendant, however, was never served process. The commissioner of social services, meanwhile, filed a support petition against Defendant that was assigned the same docket number as the dissolution action. Defendant was served process for the support action, and Defendant's counsel filed an appearance in the support action. The trial court relied on Defendant's failure to file a motion to dismiss the dissolution action within thirty days of filing the appearance in the support action in concluding that Defendant had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction in the dissolution action. The appellate court vacated the trial court on basis that there was no personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court erred in giving retroactive effect to Practice Book 25a-3(f), which provides that all appearances entered on behalf of parties for matters involving Title IV-D child support matters shall be for those matters only; and (2) the trial court properly relied on Practice Book 3-3(2) in concluding that Defendant filed an appearance in the dissolution action. Remanded. View "Narayan v. Narayan" on Justia Law