Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The principal issue in this appeal was whether a trial court could modify unallocated alimony and child support payments following a change in the primary physical custody of the minor children from the party receiving the unallocated payments to the party making the payments, when the dissolution judgment incorporated a provision in the separation agreement providing that such payments were nonmodifiable. The trial court granted Defendant father's motion to modify the order that he make unallocated alimony and child support payments to Plaintiff mother following the parties' decision to transfer primary physical custody of the children to Defendant two years after the judgment dissolving their marriage was rendered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the particular circumstances of the present case, the trial court had the authority to modify Defendant's child support obligation. View "Tomlinson v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a dissolution of marriage action from Defendant. Defendant, however, was never served process. The commissioner of social services, meanwhile, filed a support petition against Defendant that was assigned the same docket number as the dissolution action. Defendant was served process for the support action, and Defendant's counsel filed an appearance in the support action. The trial court relied on Defendant's failure to file a motion to dismiss the dissolution action within thirty days of filing the appearance in the support action in concluding that Defendant had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction in the dissolution action. The appellate court vacated the trial court on basis that there was no personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court erred in giving retroactive effect to Practice Book 25a-3(f), which provides that all appearances entered on behalf of parties for matters involving Title IV-D child support matters shall be for those matters only; and (2) the trial court properly relied on Practice Book 3-3(2) in concluding that Defendant filed an appearance in the dissolution action. Remanded. View "Narayan v. Narayan" on Justia Law

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act. View "Canty v. Otto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case. View "Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

In the involuntary conservatorship action underlying this case, Daniel Gross was placed in the locked ward of Grove Manor Nursing Home. Jonathan Newman was appointed by the probate court to represent Gross in the action, and Kathleen Donovan was appointed as conservator. The superior court granted Gross's petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that the conservatorship was void ab initio. Gross subsequently brought a complaint in U.S. District Court, asserting state and federal civil rights claims. The court dismissed it as to all defendants, finding, in relevant part, that Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor were entitled to immunity because they were serving the judicial process. On appeal, the U.S. court of appeals submitted certified questions regarding Connecticut law to the Supreme Court. The Court held (1) absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to a conservator appointed by the probate court only when the conservator is executing an order of the probate court or the conservator's actions are ratified by the probate court; (2) absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to attorneys appointed to represent respondents in conservatorship proceedings or conservatees; and (3) the function of nursing homes caring for conservatees does not entitle them to quasi-judicial immunity under any circumstances. View "Gross v. Rell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff divorced his wife (Wife) after discovering she had had an extramarital affair with Defendant and had conceived a child (Child) with him. After Plaintiff and Wife divorced, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant, seeking damages on claims of nondisclosure, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiff sought reimbursement from Defendant for the costs he had expended in raising Child from her birth until his divorce from Wife, when Child was almost fifteen years old. The trial court concluded that although Defendant was Child's biological father, the doctrine of equitable estoppel and public policy concerns precluded Plaintiff from pursuing his claims for reimbursement and denying his paternity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court improperly found that Plaintiff was equitably estopped from pursuing his claims because there was insufficient evidence of financial harm to Child, which is required to establish the element of detrimental reliance in a case involving a denial of paternity. View "Fischer v. Zollino" on Justia Law

Two days before his eighteenth birthday, Petitioner filed a petition seeking to have himself adjudicated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth. The trial court dismissed the petition as moot because, two days after Petitioner filed it, he reached his eighteenth birthday. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but on an alternate ground, holding that the trial court lacks statutory authority to adjudicate a person neglected or uncare-for pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-129(a) after the person reaches the age of eighteen years, and, therefore, the court necessarily lacks statutory authority to provide dispositional relief to such a person pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-129(j). View "In re Jose B." on Justia Law

When she was seventeen years old, Petitioner filed a petition alleging that she was a neglected and uncared for youth. The trial court dismissed the petition as moot because, two and one-half months after Petitioner filed it, she reached her eighteenth birthday. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court lacked statutory authority both to adjudicate Petitioner neglected or uncared-for after she reached the age of eighteen years and to provide her with dispositional relief; and (2) because the court lacked such statutory authority, that court properly concluded that the petition was rendered moot when Petitioner reached her eighteenth birthday. View "In re Jessica M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were former husband and wife. Following the dissolution of their marriage, Defendant was granted joint custody and visitation rights of the parties' two daughters. Defendant then reported that her eldest daughter had been sexually abused by Plaintiff. As a result of the investigation, Defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child, false reporting of an incident, false statement in the second degree, attempt to commit malicious prosecution, and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Following Defendant's guilty plea, Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly improperly applied the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff's claim was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the existence of an original duty must be established before applying the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in a nonnegligence cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Watts v. Chittenden" on Justia Law

Brady Dougan and Tomoko Dougan entered into a stipulation for judgment dissolving their marriage that contained a provision ordering Brady to pay interest if he failed to make payments to Tomoko. Both of the parties entered into the agreement with knowledge of its terms, and the trial court found the stipulation for judgment to be fair and reasonable. When Brady later failed to render a complete payment to defendant, Tomoko moved for enforcement of the stipulation and requested that the trial court order the plaintiff to pay her interest in accordance with the terms of the judgment. The trial court held that the provision for interest was invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. On Brady's appeal to the Supreme Court, Tomoko was granted special permission to raise the alternate ground that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed because the doctrine of judicial estoppel supports the enforcement of the interest provision. The Court agreed with Tomoko and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Brady from claiming the provision was unenforceable. View "Dougan v. Dougan" on Justia Law