Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a series of postjudgment motions related to the parties’ dissolution of marriage. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for an upward modification of Defendant’s child support obligation, motion for attorney’s fees, and motion for contempt. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The trial court, however, granted Defendant’s motion for modification of child support and modified Defendant’s child support obligation by decreasing his weekly obligation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on all issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) improperly relied on Dan v. Dan in determining that both alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification requirements under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-86 and improperly concluded that Plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in Defendant’s income, to justify modification of the child support award; (2) improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude Defendant’s exercised stock options and restricted stock from its calculation of his gross income during the years in question; and (3) properly upheld the trial court’s decision to omit Defendant’s alleged employment perquisites from its calculation of Defendant’s gross income. View "McKeon v. Lennon" on Justia Law

In 2002, the marriage of Beverly Studer and John Studer was dissolved in Florida. In 2003, John moved in Connecticut Superior Court to modify the amount of his child support and alimony obligations. The superior court granted the judgment. In 2010, Beverly filed two postjudgment motions for postmajority support for the parties’ child, who had autism. The trial court granted the motions and ordered John to pay child support indefinitely, concluding that Florida law controlled the duration of John’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Florida was the first state to enter a child support order in the present case, the trial court did not err in concluding that Florida law governed the duration of John’s child support obligation. View "Studer v. Studer" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the Department of Children and Families found that an alleged perpetrator was responsible for sexual abuse and emotional neglect of Plaintiff and placed the alleged perpetrator’s name on the central registry. After an administrative hearing, the hearing officer found there was insufficient evidence to support the Department’s finding of substantiation and, therefore, removed the alleged perpetrator’s name from the central registry. Plaintiff subsequently requested that the hearing officer reconsider the decision reversing the substantiation finding. The hearing officer denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, and the trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. View "Isabella D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Sharon DeNunzio and Peter DeNunzio were the parents of Douglas DeNunzio, who for many years has manifested symptoms of mental distress. Sharon and Peter divorced when Douglas was a minor. Shortly after Douglas’ twenty-first birthday, Peter filed an application in the probate court seeking to be appointed as Douglas’ conservator. The probate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Douglas needed a conservator and appointed Defendant as conservator. The trial court and appellate court affirmed the probate court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent that the probate court considered Douglas’ “best interests” in these conservatorship proceedings, in addition to the statutory factors adopted in P.A. 07-116, Sharon’s substantial rights were not prejudiced because the statutory factors were considered and supported the probate court’s selection of Defendant as conservator; and (2) Plaintiff’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the probate court’s consideration of the guardian ad litem’s report, which was not admitted into evidence. View "DeNunzio v. DeNunzio" on Justia Law

Mother’s minor child (Child) was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of The Commissioner of Children and Families. Child has been in her current foster placement since 2011. In 2013, the Commissioner petitioned for termination of parental rights on behalf of Child. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights, finding that the Commissioner had made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that Mother was unable to benefit from the reunification services. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Commissioner had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unable to benefit from reunification services. View "In re Gabriella A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an ex parte restraining order application against Defendant and requested a hearing on the application. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application and request for a hearing. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second application for a restraining order. The trial court also denied this application without a hearing. Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Appellate Court and an application for certification to appeal pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-265a. The Supreme Court granted the section 52-265a application. The trial court then held a hearing on the applications. The applications were denied after the hearing. Thereafter, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to address whether Plaintiff’s appeals were moot. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that there was no practical relief the Court could afford Plaintiff, and this case did not meet the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. View "Wendy V. v. Santiago" on Justia Law

After a trial, the trial court terminated Respondent’s parental rights to his minor child and appointed the Commissioner of Children and Families as the child’s statutory parent. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Respondent had notice of all the steps court-ordered specific steps with which he was required to comply, and the trial court did not rely on conduct not within the scope of the steps when concluding that Respondent failed to rehabilitate; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Respondent had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation to be able to parent his son within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) the trial court properly drew an adverse inference from Respondent’s refusal to submit to a drug test. View "In re Shane M." on Justia Law

Santiago G. was born to Mother in 2009 but was cared for since his birth by Maria G, a nonrelative. In 2012, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a motion for an order of temporary custody of Santiago on the basis of neglect. The trial court adjudicated Santiago neglect on the basis of abandonment by his biological parents. Santiago was subsequently placed in a foster home. Thereafter, the trial court denied the Commissioner’s motion to open and set aside the adjudication of neglect and Respondent’s motion to revoke Santiago’s commitment and disapproved the Department’s permanency plan on placing Santiago with Maria G. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the Department of Homeland Security eventually came to view its initial decisions to pursue removal and custody as unnecessary, that did not render those decisions without a factual basis, and therefore, the Commissioner’s basis for removing Santiago from Maria G.’s care and adjudicating him neglected was not based on a mistake. View "In re Santiago G." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother as to her two minor children. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court violated her right to due process when it failed to canvass her about her decision to waive her right to a full trial and to not contest the prosecution’s exhibits. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Mother’s constitutional claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding. Specifically, the Court concluded that, in order to prevail on an unpreserved claim under Golding, which requires that a party establish that an alleged constitutional violation “clearly exists,” a party must point to binding Connecticut precedent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the absence of existing Connecticut precedent does not preclude consideration of a claim under Golding; (2) the trial court’s failure to canvass Mother did not constitute a denial of her right to due process; but (3) the Court is warranted in using its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to impose a canvass rule requiring that a trial court canvass all parents who do not consent to the termination immediately before a parental rights termination trial, in order to ensure the overall fairness of the termination of parental rights process. View "In re Yasiel R." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed termination petitions with respect to Mother’s two children, alleging that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. The trial court granted both petitions. The Appellate Court reversed the judgments of the trial court for failure to make written findings required under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112(k)(4). Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court failed to comply with the statute because it failed to set forth express written findings as to the children’s emotional ties with Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings under section 17a-112(k)(4); (2) as set forth in In re Eden F.; (2) although a trial court shall consider and make written findings regarding the factors enumerated in section 17a-112(k), a trial court’s determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if the court’s determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound; and (3) the trial court’s finding as to the children’s best interest in this case was factually supported and legally sound. View "In re Naveah W." on Justia Law