Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a hearing, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother as to her two minor children. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court violated her right to due process when it failed to canvass her about her decision to waive her right to a full trial and to not contest the prosecution’s exhibits. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Mother’s constitutional claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding. Specifically, the Court concluded that, in order to prevail on an unpreserved claim under Golding, which requires that a party establish that an alleged constitutional violation “clearly exists,” a party must point to binding Connecticut precedent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the absence of existing Connecticut precedent does not preclude consideration of a claim under Golding; (2) the trial court’s failure to canvass Mother did not constitute a denial of her right to due process; but (3) the Court is warranted in using its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to impose a canvass rule requiring that a trial court canvass all parents who do not consent to the termination immediately before a parental rights termination trial, in order to ensure the overall fairness of the termination of parental rights process. View "In re Yasiel R." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed termination petitions with respect to Mother’s two children, alleging that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. The trial court granted both petitions. The Appellate Court reversed the judgments of the trial court for failure to make written findings required under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112(k)(4). Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court failed to comply with the statute because it failed to set forth express written findings as to the children’s emotional ties with Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings under section 17a-112(k)(4); (2) as set forth in In re Eden F.; (2) although a trial court shall consider and make written findings regarding the factors enumerated in section 17a-112(k), a trial court’s determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if the court’s determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound; and (3) the trial court’s finding as to the children’s best interest in this case was factually supported and legally sound. View "In re Naveah W." on Justia Law

In 2010, Nancy Powell-Ferri (Nancy) filed an action, which was still pending at the time of the present action, for dissolution of her marriage to Paul John Ferri (Paul). After Plaintiffs, the trustees of a 1983 trust created by Paul’s father for the sole benefit of Paul, transferred a substantial portion of the assets in the 1983 trust to a 2011 trust created by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs instituted this declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that they had validly exercised their authority in transferring the assets and that Nancy had no interest in the trust assets. Nancy filed a cross complaint alleging that Paul had breached his duty to preserve marital assets during the pendency of the marital dissolution action by failing to take affirmative steps to contest the decanting of certain assets from the trust. The trial court granted summary judgment for Paul, concluding that Nancy failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State does not require a party to a dissolution action to take affirmative steps to recover marital assets taken by a third party without a finding of dissipation. View "Ferri v. Powell-Ferri" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed a neglect petition seeking an order of temporary custody of Cassandra C., a minor, after medical providers reported that Cassandra and her mother were refusing to obtain appropriate medical treatment for Cassandra, who had been diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The trial court granted the order and placed Cassandra in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families, directing Respondents to cooperate with Cassandra’s medical care providers. Thereafter, Cassandra started chemotherapy but ran away before the treatment could be completed. The Commissioner moved to reopen the evidence to consider evidence regarding whether Cassandra was competent to make life-death decisions regarding her medical care. After a hearing, the trial judge ordered that Cassandra remain in the custody of the Department and authorized the Department to make all medical decisions for her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge’s finding that Cassandra was not competent to make her own medical decisions at the time of the underlying events was not clearly erroneous; (2) this was not a proper case in which to decide whether to adopt the mature minor doctrine, which allows a sufficiently mature minor to refuse medical treatment; and (3) Respondents’ constitutional rights were not violated. View "In re Cassandra C." on Justia Law

In 2007, the trial court, incorporating by reference the terms of the Wife and Husband’s separation agreement, entered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The agreement required the payment of unallocated alimony and child support until the death of either party, Wife’s remarriage, or cohabitation. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion arguing that the unallocated alimony and child support obligation had terminated four years earlier because Wife at that time was cohabitating. The trial court ordered that Husband’s support obligations were suspended during the time of Wife's cohabitation - a period of four months - but that, otherwise, Husband continued to owe her unallocated alimony and child support. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Wife’s period of cohabitation permanently terminated Husband’s support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly construed the agreement to require the permanent termination of the unallocated support obligation immediately upon Wife's cohabitation. View "Nation-Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2009, the dissolution court dissolved the marriage of James and Diana Jordan. The court ordered that, after payment of attorneys fees and other obligations, the balance of the parties’ account at Northwestern Mutual (account) be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff, Diana’s father, brought this action against James to collect the outstanding balance on James’s promissory note to him. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. James then filed a claim for a determination of interests in the account. Defendants, the attorney and firm that represented James in the dissolution action, also sought a determination of interests in the account, claiming that they had a claim prior in right to Plaintiff’s claim by virtue of the charging lien arising by operation of law in the dissolution action. The trial court concluded that Defendants had no superior interest in the account because a charging lien in connection with a dissolution action would be prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorneys are not entitled by operation of law to equitable charging liens on marital assets for fees and expenses incurred in obtaining judgments for their clients in marital dissolution proceedings. View "Olszewski v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The underlying case here was a child protection case concerning the minor children of Mother and Father, who were parties to a pending marital dissolution proceeding. Father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the children were unconstitutionally in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. While the allegations in the habeas petition concerned matters that should have been kept confidential, the petition was temporarily made available to the public because Father filed it electronically as a civil matter rather than as a confidential juvenile matter. When reporters at a Newspaper learned about it, they contacted Mother, who requested an injunction seeking to prohibit the Newspaper from publishing information about the case. The trial court issued an injunction that prohibited the Newspaper from publishing the contents of the habeas petition. The Newspaper appealed. Thereafter, the trial court, sua sponte, vacated the injunction, concluding that it was no longer warranted because of subsequent factual developments in the case. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal on the grounds of mootness, holding that the trial court’s vacatur order rendered the Newspaper’s appeal moot, and none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Emma F." on Justia Law

When the marriage of Kathleen and Robert Parisi was dissolved, the trial court incorporated into the judgment of dissolution a separation agreement the parties had previously entered into. Kathleen later filed a motion for contempt, order and clarification, seeking to compel Robert to satisfy, in a particular manner, a financial obligation set forth in the separation agreement. The trial court (1) refused to hold Robert in contempt, citing the lack of evidence of Robert’s noncompliance; and (2) denied Kathleen’s requests to issue an order of compliance or to clarify the agreement, concluding that the agreement was clear and concise. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the trial court (1) properly declined to hold Robert in contempt because the separation agreement was ambiguous; and (2) improperly held that the agreement was clear and concise. Remanded for clarification of the agreement and an accompanying order of compliance. View "Parisi v. Parisi" on Justia Law

In 2010, the trial court ordered the dissolution of the marriage of Cary Brody and Felicia Brody and awarded Felicia a $2.5 million lump sum alimony payment. Thereafter, the court issued a postjudgment order finding Cary in contempt for failing to turn over certain property to a third party bailee. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) properly based its alimony award on a finding that Cary committed adultery; (2) properly based its alimony award on conduct that was subject to a prior written stipulation between the parties; and (3) improperly concluded that a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof governs indirect civil contempt proceedings. Rather, findings of indirect civil contempt must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded for a new hearing with respect to the trial court’s postjudgment order. View "Brody v. Brody" on Justia Law

Approximately ten years after Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced, Plaintiff moved for modification of the stipulated alimony award on grounds that the circumstances of the case had changed substantially because Defendant’s income and Plaintiff’s medical costs had both increased significantly. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for modification and substantially increased the amount of alimony that Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly granted Plaintiff’s motion for modification solely on the basis of Defendant’s increased income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances, an increase in income, standing alone, does not justify the modification of an alimony award; and (2) because the trial court made no findings as to whether exceptional circumstances existed in the present case, the case must be remanded for a new hearing at which the trial court may apply the proper standard in making such a finding. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law