Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Catherine Whelan was appointed as the attorney for the minor children of the parties in a dissolution action and continued to represent the children during postjudgment proceedings. Whelan filed a motion seeking payment of outstanding fees and an allowance to participate in an appeal, which the trial court granted. Whelan then sought to recover the fees she owed to Arnold Rutkin, who represented her in the previous proceeding. The trial court granted the motion in part. Thereafter, Whelan filed a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees for alleged litigation abuses, which the trial court denied. Whelan sought to appeal on behalf of the minor children, without success. These two appeals and writ of error followed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whelan’s motion for permission to appeal on the minor children’s behalf after properly concluding that an appeal was not in the children’s best interests; (2) the trial court erred in awarding Rutkin’s fees; and (3) the trial court failed to apply the proper standard to Whelan’s claim of litigation misconduct. View "Perry v. Perry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former wife of Defendant, filed a postjudgment motion to open, on the basis of fraud, a 2001 judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant had failed to disclose the existence of an accrued but unvested pension either on his financial affidavits or otherwise. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Defendant had orally disclosed the existence of the pension to Plaintiff during the parties’ marriage and during settlement negotiations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that Defendant’s unvested pension, at the time of the dissolution judgment, was not distributable marital property under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-81; and (2) improperly excluded evidence of the pension’s value on the basis that the evidence was irrelevant, thus tainting the court’s findings regarding disclosure. Remanded. View "Reville v. Reville" on Justia Law

Mother, who resided in Connecticut, and Father, who resided in Florida, were divorced pursuant to a decree that awarded primary physical custody of the parties' child to Mother and ordered Father to pay alimony and child support. Father later filed a motion to modify the alimony and child support order, alleging that his relocation from Florida to Connecticut in order to be closer to his son resulted in his decreased income, which constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in deciding whether to grant a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether the moving party has established a substantial change in circumstances, and in making this determination, if a party's voluntary action gives rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances, the court must assess the motivations underlying the voluntary conduct in order to determine whether there is culpable conduct foreclosing a threshold determination of a substantial change in circumstances; and (2) the trial court in this case improperly denied Father's motion for modification solely on the basis that Father's voluntary relocation gave rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. Remanded.View "Olson v. Mohammadu" on Justia Law

Father's parental rights to his two minor children were terminated based on the trial court's determination that Father failed to rehabilitate. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly terminated his parental rights because court-ordered specific steps were statutorily required as a prerequisite to termination for failure to rehabilitate and the Commissioner of Children and Families did not provide him with such steps. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's conclusion that the prior provision of specific steps is not required in termination proceedings for failure to rehabilitate was legally incorrect; but (2) under the particular circumstances of this case, the failure to provide specific steps was harmless error.View "In re Elvin G." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two minor children and awarded permanent guardianship to the children's paternal great-aunt and her husband. Mother appealed, claiming that the trial court's application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 71a-112 violated her rights under the substantive due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions because the trial court was required to determine that termination was the least restrictive permanency plan to protect the children's best interests, and the standard was not met in this case. Specifically, Mother argued that termination was not required when permanent guardianship was sufficient to protect the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the standard was met in this case where the trial court necessarily found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was the least restrictive alternative to protect the children's best interests. View "In re Brayden E.-H." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to her son and daughter. The trial court granted the petitions pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112. Mother sought review, contending that the trial court's application of section 17a-112 to her was unconstitutional. Respondent failed to preserve her claim at trial and therefore sought to prevail under State v. Golding. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Mother's claim failed under the first prong of Golding for lack of an adequate record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that Mother's unpreserved constitutional claim was unreviewable due to an inadequate record. View "In re Azareon Y." on Justia Law

Upon their divorce, Father and Mother agreed to a parenting plan governing the care and custody of their minor child. Father subsequently sought increased visitation and parenting time. The matter was referred to the Family Relations Office (family relations), which scheduled a child custody evaluation with the parties. When family relations declined Father's request to complete the evaluation with the assistance of counsel, Father filed a motion to order family relations to allow him to proceed with the assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Father appealed, contending that the family relations policy of barring counsel from its child custody evaluations violates procedural due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that family relation's existing procedures were constitutionally sufficient. View "Barros v. Barros" on Justia Law

The family court magistrate ordered Defendant to pay $1440 in weekly child support based on Defendant's eighty-six percent proportionate share of the parties' combined net weekly income of $14,154. In determining the appropriate method for assessing child support, the magistrate noted that the guidelines schedule stops at $4000 of combined weekly net income. The magistrate then calculated Defendant's child support on the same percentage basis as that assigned to a combined net weekly income of $4000. Defendant appealed, claiming that the magistrate's order contravened the principle that as income level rises, the proportion of income dedicated to child related spending decreases. The trial court affirmed the magistrate's decision with one modification to the arrearage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the magistrate properly ordered Defendant to pay child support in an amount equivalent to his proportionate share of 11.83 percent of the parties' combined net weekly income, the same percentage under the schedule for a combined net weekly income of $4000. View "Dowling v. Szymczak" on Justia Law

Upon Plaintiff and Defendant's divorce, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant unallocated alimony and child support for fourteen years, concluding that Plaintiff had an earning capacity far Plaintiff his current income. After Plaintiff obtained employment, Father filed a motion to modify the child support order, contending that his current salary constituted a fraction of the earning capacity previously attributed to him by the trial court. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion without specifying the amount of Plaintiff's estimated earning capacity. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a trial court has based a financial award on a party's earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party's earning capacity; and (2) because the trial court in this case could not reasonably have concluded there had been no substantial change in Plaintiff's earning capacity between the time of the original financial award and the motion for modification without having determined Plaintiff's specific earning capacity, the court erred when it denied the motion for modification. Remanded for a new hearing on Plaintiff's motion for modification. View "Tanzman v. Meurer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Spouse divorced in 1979. In postdissolution proceedings during which Plaintiff sought modification of the alimony award, Spouse was represented by several different attorneys (Defendants). All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Spouse. In 2008, the trial court ruled that information concerning Spouse's inheritance had been concealed from Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The appellate court affirmed, determining that the claims were precluded by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that attorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud for their conduct during judicial proceedings; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was derivative of his claim of fraud, was also properly rejected. View "Simms v. Seaman" on Justia Law