Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an electric distribution company, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). PURA had found the plaintiff violated statutory obligations related to emergency planning and storm recovery during an August 2020 tropical storm, intending to reduce the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) by fifteen basis points. Additionally, PURA imposed over $1.2 million in fines for violating storm performance standards and $61,000 in civil penalties for late reporting of minor accidents.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeals, upholding PURA's decisions. The plaintiff then appealed to the higher court, challenging the ROE reduction, the fines for storm performance violations, and the penalties for late accident reporting. During the appeal, PURA decided not to implement the ROE reduction, rendering the issue moot. The court determined that neither the voluntary cessation nor the collateral consequences exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court directed the vacatur of the portion of PURA's order authorizing the ROE reduction and the corresponding part of the trial court's judgment.Regarding the fines for late reporting of minor accidents, the court concluded that the failure to report a minor accident did not qualify as a "continued violation" under the statute. Instead, each monthly failure to report constituted a single, distinct violation. The case was remanded to the trial court to order PURA to recalculate the penalties accordingly.The court found sufficient evidence to support PURA's findings that the plaintiff violated storm performance standards by failing to provide a dedicated make safe crew for Bridgeport and inadequately communicating with city officials. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments in all other respects. View "United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a property owner and a city regarding the validity of a lien placed on the property. The property, an apartment building, was destroyed by arson, leading to the displacement of its tenants. The city incurred costs relocating the tenants and placed a lien on the property to recover these expenses under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (URAA).The trial court ruled in favor of the property owner, determining that the lien was invalid because the displacement was caused by a third party's arson, not by the city's enforcement of its building code. The court allowed the property owner to challenge the lien using an affirmative defense provided by the URAA, which is typically available only in civil actions brought by a municipality to recover relocation expenses.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the tenants were "displaced persons" under the URAA because their displacement was a direct result of the city's enforcement of its building code, regardless of the arson being the initial cause. The court further held that the affirmative defense provided by the URAA, which allows a landlord to argue that the displacement was not due to their violation of housing codes, is only available in civil actions brought by the municipality and cannot be used to challenge a lien in an application to discharge it.The Supreme Court directed the trial court to deny the property owner's application to discharge the city's lien, thereby upholding the city's right to recover its relocation expenses through the lien. View "PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, parents of minor children, challenged a public act that eliminated the religious exemption from vaccination requirements for school enrollment. They argued that the act violated their constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and a free public education, as well as their statutory rights under Connecticut law. The defendants, state and municipal officials, moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity.The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims satisfied the substantial claim exception to sovereign immunity, and their statutory claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception. The defendants appealed this decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court must assess the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations to determine whether they have asserted a substantial claim of a constitutional violation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed as a matter of law. The act was deemed a neutral law of general applicability, rationally related to the state's interest in protecting public health. The court also found that the act did not violate the plaintiffs' right to a free public education, as it imposed a reasonable vaccination requirement.However, the court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs' statutory free exercise claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception to sovereign immunity. The court found that the scope of the waiver extended to free exercise challenges to the enforcement of legislation and that applying the statute to the public act did not violate any constitutional principles.The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing the dismissal of the constitutional claims, but affirmed the decision regarding the statutory claim, allowing it to proceed. View "Spillane v. Lamont" on Justia Law

A nonprofit association of homeowners in Woodbridge appealed a decision by the Connecticut Siting Council, which approved a telecommunications company's application to construct a cell phone tower in the town. The plaintiff intervened in the administrative proceeding, arguing that the proposed tower would unreasonably impact nearby scenic resources and vistas. During the hearings, the council stated that property values were not among the statutory criteria to be considered. The telecommunications company presented evidence that the tower would improve cell coverage, while the plaintiff's consultant argued that alternative locations would provide better coverage with less impact on residential neighborhoods.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable. The court noted that the council had considered evidence from residents about the tower's impact on property values and had sufficiently considered alternative locations but found the approved site to be the most appropriate.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff had standing to raise the claim about property values. However, the court concluded that a facility's impact on property values is not an enumerated or unenumerated significant adverse effect that the council must consider under the statute. The court also found that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including extensive testimony and documentary evidence about the coverage provided by the proposed and alternative locations. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the council's approval of the tower. View "Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

The case involves Northland Investment Corporation (N Co.), a landlord of multiunit residential buildings, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). N Co. sought a declaratory ruling from PURA that it could use ratio utility billing (RUB) to recoup utility costs from tenants in buildings without individual meters. Under RUB, N Co. would bill tenants for their proportionate share of utility usage, calculated based on factors like unit square footage and number of occupants. PURA concluded that RUB violated the statute because it prohibited charging a tenant for utilities they did not exclusively use. However, PURA suggested N Co. could use the "building in" methodology, incorporating estimated utility costs into fixed rent.PURA's decision was appealed to the trial court, which remanded the case back to PURA for further consideration of whether its decision on RUB conflicted with its conclusion on the "building in" approach. PURA reaffirmed its prior ruling, and N Co. appealed again to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. N Co. then appealed from the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing with PURA's determination that the statute prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building-wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated proportionate share of the total cost. The court concluded that the "building in" approach was acceptable as it allowed for consistent and predictable payments each month and placed the risk of higher-than-anticipated utility usage on the landlord. View "Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff who was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer prepared a report of the incident and mailed it to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), but not within the three business days required by statute. At the plaintiff's license suspension hearing, the plaintiff's attorney objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that it was not prepared and mailed within the statutory timeframe. The hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which was the only evidence submitted at the hearing.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that strict adherence to the preparation and mailing requirement was not necessary for the report to be admissible. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the preparation and mailing requirement is directory, and therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing provision of the statute in the absence of testimony from the arresting officer. The court concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement was mandatory because it promoted the accuracy and reliability of the information that would be used at a license suspension hearing. The court clarified that the statute describes substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing. View "Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In a dispute between John Drumm, Chief of Police, et al. and the Freedom of Information Commission in Connecticut, the court was tasked with interpreting a provision of the Freedom of Information Act. The provision in question exempts from disclosure records of law enforcement agencies compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of a crime, if the disclosure of such records would result in the disclosure of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action. The case arose from a request for documents related to a 2010 unsolved murder case by a filmmaker who was working on a documentary about the case. The request was denied by the police department, and the filmmaker filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission. The commission ruled in favor of the filmmaker and ordered the documents be provided. The police department appealed the decision, arguing that the commission failed to apply the correct legal standard.The court held that a "prospective law enforcement action" refers to a future law enforcement action that has at least a reasonable possibility of occurring, meaning that the occurrence is more than theoretically possible but not necessarily likely or probable. The court also clarified that under the first prong of the exception, a respondent before the commission must establish only that it is at least reasonably possible that the information contained in a requested document will be used in support of an arrest or prosecution. Because the commission had not applied this standard and had made clearly erroneous factual findings, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings before the commission. View "Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission" on Justia Law