Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff allegedly suffered heart problems and psychological injuries during the course of his employment with Defendant, FedEx. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner found that Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable and awarded him total incapacity benefits covering a period of forty-seven weeks. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board upheld the Commissioner’s findings and award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly upheld the Commissioner’s determination that both Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) the Commissioner’s award was not excessive. View "Hart v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a partnership and an LLC, were related entities with common owners. The partnership acquired a commercial office complex and later transferred ownership of the property to the LLC. In 2008, the City of Norwalk’s tax assessor set the fair market value of the partnership at approximately $49 million. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ property tax appeal and reduced the valuation of the LLC’s property by approximately $15 million. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because the LLC had not appeared in administrative proceedings before the City’s Board of Assessment Appeals and did not initiate the appeal to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the tax appeal was initially brought by a nonaggrieved party, the partnership, the appeal was also maintained by the LLC, an aggrieved party that had properly been added to the trial court proceedings by way of a promptly filed amended complaint. View "Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. P’ship v. City of Norwalk" on Justia Law

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law

An inmate was attacked by another inmate and died from his injuries. Plaintiffs, the victim’s mother and sister, applied for compensation from Defendant, the Office of Victim Services. Defendant declined to compensate Plaintiffs. After a hearing, the Victim Compensation Commissioner denied Plaintiffs’ request for review. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision. More than four years later, shortly before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Plaintiffs did not timely appeal in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-211a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of section 54-211a by properly serving a writ of summons and a complaint on Defendant within thirty days of the Commissioner’s decision. View "Cales v. Office of Victim Servs." on Justia Law

Kleen Energy Systems, LLC, an electric generating facility, entered into a contract with Connecticut Light and Power Company, an electric distribution company. A dispute subsequently arose concerning the proper interpretation of the contract’s pricing provision. At the request of Waterside Power, LLC, which had entered into a similar contract with Connecticut Light and Power, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, acting through the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (the Authority), conducted proceedings to resolve the dispute. Kleen Energy was a participant in, but not a party to, those proceedings. Waterside subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory ruling challenging the decision. The Authority issued a declaratory ruling denying Waterside relief. Kleen Energy filed an administrative appeal from the Authority’s ruling, claiming that it had a contractual right to submit the dispute to arbitration and that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute. The trial court ultimately concluded (1) the Authority had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute, (2) Kleen Energy had waived its contractual right to arbitration, and (3) the Authority had properly resolved the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Authority had jurisdiction to resolve the pricing dispute. View "Kleen Energy Sys., LLC v. Comm’r of Energy & Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Environmental Protection brought this action against Defendants, auto parts companies, alleging that Defendants had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-430(a), 22a-430b and 22a-427, which are part of the Water Pollution Control Act. As a remedy, the trial court ordered Defendants to pay certain fines and to retain an environmental professional to assist Defendants in complying with the law, to conduct testing on the site at issue to determine whether a significant environmental hazard exists, and, if so, to abate the condition. The trial court rendered judgment against Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) having found that Defendants had violated the Water Pollution Control Act, the trial court was required to order Defendants to remediate the pollution in accordance with the remediation standards promulgated by the Commissioner, and the court did not have discretion to fashion a remedy that did not purport to do so; and (2) the trial court’s order also constituted an abuse of discretion because it was effectively unenforceable. Remanded for a new trial. View "Comm’r of Envtl. Prot. v. Underpass Auto Parts Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and its Freedom of Information Officer, received a request under the Freedom of Information Act from Ron Robillard for records concerning Amy Archer Gillian, who was convicted of second degree murder for the arsenic poisoning of a resident of her nursing home. Plaintiffs disclosed some, but not all, of the requested records. The Freedom of Information Commission determined that Gilligan’s medical and dental records were not exempt from disclosure. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal as to those records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the Commission; and (2) the documents at issue were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient and were, therefore, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-146e. View "Freedom of Info. Officer, Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Connecticut’s debt negotiation statutes, Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-671 through 36a-671e, which authorize the Banking Commissioner to license and regulate persons engaged in the debt negotiation. Plaintiff, a national consumer advocate law firm, petitioned the Commissioner for a declaratory ruling stating that Plaintiff qualified for exemption from the debt negotiation statutes under the attorney exception. This exception exempts only those attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Connecticut who engage or offer to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to the attorneys’ presentation of a client. The Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff did not qualify for exemption. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debt negotiation statutes impermissibly intrude on the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct and licensure and, therefore, violate the separation of powers provision contained in article II of the state Constitution. View "Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of its subdivision permit. Intervenor intervened in the appeal to the trial court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-19(a), raising claims related to the environmental impact of the proposed development. After remanding the matter back to the Commission for further fact-finding relating to Intervenor’s claims, the trial court set aside the Commission’s findings and adjudicated the factual issues itself. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Intervenor and forbade Plaintiff’s proposed subdivision from going forward because of its potential environmental impact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Environmental Protection Act does not empower a trial court to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal of a zoning decision involving an intervention under section 22a-19; and (2) the trial court could not have properly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-18(b) through (d) to remand the matter back to the Commission for consideration of Intervenor’s claims or to independently adjudicate the factual issues raised in those claims. View "Hunter Ridge, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law