Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Commissioner of Environmental Protection brought this action against Defendants, auto parts companies, alleging that Defendants had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-430(a), 22a-430b and 22a-427, which are part of the Water Pollution Control Act. As a remedy, the trial court ordered Defendants to pay certain fines and to retain an environmental professional to assist Defendants in complying with the law, to conduct testing on the site at issue to determine whether a significant environmental hazard exists, and, if so, to abate the condition. The trial court rendered judgment against Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) having found that Defendants had violated the Water Pollution Control Act, the trial court was required to order Defendants to remediate the pollution in accordance with the remediation standards promulgated by the Commissioner, and the court did not have discretion to fashion a remedy that did not purport to do so; and (2) the trial court’s order also constituted an abuse of discretion because it was effectively unenforceable. Remanded for a new trial. View "Comm’r of Envtl. Prot. v. Underpass Auto Parts Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and its Freedom of Information Officer, received a request under the Freedom of Information Act from Ron Robillard for records concerning Amy Archer Gillian, who was convicted of second degree murder for the arsenic poisoning of a resident of her nursing home. Plaintiffs disclosed some, but not all, of the requested records. The Freedom of Information Commission determined that Gilligan’s medical and dental records were not exempt from disclosure. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal as to those records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the Commission; and (2) the documents at issue were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient and were, therefore, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-146e. View "Freedom of Info. Officer, Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Connecticut’s debt negotiation statutes, Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-671 through 36a-671e, which authorize the Banking Commissioner to license and regulate persons engaged in the debt negotiation. Plaintiff, a national consumer advocate law firm, petitioned the Commissioner for a declaratory ruling stating that Plaintiff qualified for exemption from the debt negotiation statutes under the attorney exception. This exception exempts only those attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Connecticut who engage or offer to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to the attorneys’ presentation of a client. The Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff did not qualify for exemption. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debt negotiation statutes impermissibly intrude on the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct and licensure and, therefore, violate the separation of powers provision contained in article II of the state Constitution. View "Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of its subdivision permit. Intervenor intervened in the appeal to the trial court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-19(a), raising claims related to the environmental impact of the proposed development. After remanding the matter back to the Commission for further fact-finding relating to Intervenor’s claims, the trial court set aside the Commission’s findings and adjudicated the factual issues itself. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Intervenor and forbade Plaintiff’s proposed subdivision from going forward because of its potential environmental impact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Environmental Protection Act does not empower a trial court to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal of a zoning decision involving an intervention under section 22a-19; and (2) the trial court could not have properly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-18(b) through (d) to remand the matter back to the Commission for consideration of Intervenor’s claims or to independently adjudicate the factual issues raised in those claims. View "Hunter Ridge, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owned facilities used for earth materials excavation and processing, submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection five individual applications for water diversion permits. The Department requested additional information for all five of Plaintiff’s applications. Plaintiff did not fully comply with the Department’s request. Instead of submitting the requested information, Plaintiff filed a petition for a declaratory ruling to address the scope of the Department’s authority to request information for Plaintiff’s water diversion permit applications. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection deemed all of the Department’s actions authorized under the Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act (Act). The trial court endorsed in all material respects the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act does not authorize the Department’s attempts to regulate Plaintiff’s excavation activities; (2) the Act does not authorize the Department to request a wetlands mitigation plan for the alteration of wetlands that had been authorized by prior municipal wetlands permit; and (3) the Department may not delay processing Plaintiff’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit application due to a pending water diversion permit application. View "Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe approved the application of Handsome, Inc. for a special exception permit to construct an industrial building in the Town, subject to thirty-six conditions. After the permit’s expiration date passed, the Commission denied Handsome’s application for a permit extension. The trial court concluded that the Commission must approve the application for a permit extension. The Commission ultimately granted Handsome’s application to extend the permit, subject to five other “requirements” and several “clarifications” relating to the original permit approval. Handsome and its principal officers appealed, challenging the imposition of conditions they alleged had not been part of the original permit. The trial court directed the Commission to approve the special exception permit conditioned only upon the conditions as recited by the Commission in its original decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the Commission’s decision and therefore did not have standing to bring the appeal. View "Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Town of Groton, filed a tax appeal contesting the validity of a sales and use tax assessment issued by Defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services, in the amount of $240,653. The trial court dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court improperly concluded that the fees collected for refuse removal services provided to industrial, commercial, or income producing real properties were subject to the sales tax. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that consideration existed to support Defendant’s assessment of Plaintiff for sales tax in connection with its revenue neutral program for the collection of refuse generated by commercial, industrial, or income producing real properties. View "Groton v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs." on Justia Law

At the time that Claimant suffered a compensable work-related injury to his left knee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Claimant’s employer (Employer). Claimant subsequently suffered a compensable work-related injury to his right knee. At the time, Chubb & Son (Chubb) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Employer. Claimant was scheduled to have bilateral knee replacement surgery, but the two insurance carriers disagreed about who would pay for Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. After a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner required Liberty Mutual to reimburse Chubb for one half of Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board and the Appellate Court affirmed. Liberty Mutual appealed, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to order the reimbursement to Chubb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of this case, the Commissioner had the authority to order the reimbursement pursuant to the relapse statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-307b. View "Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application to the Department of Transportation (Department) for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service. The Department denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future “public convenience and necessity.” The trial court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal from the Department’s denial of his permit application, holding that the Department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-103(a). Remanded for a new hearing. View "Martorelli v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed a neglect petition seeking an order of temporary custody of Cassandra C., a minor, after medical providers reported that Cassandra and her mother were refusing to obtain appropriate medical treatment for Cassandra, who had been diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The trial court granted the order and placed Cassandra in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families, directing Respondents to cooperate with Cassandra’s medical care providers. Thereafter, Cassandra started chemotherapy but ran away before the treatment could be completed. The Commissioner moved to reopen the evidence to consider evidence regarding whether Cassandra was competent to make life-death decisions regarding her medical care. After a hearing, the trial judge ordered that Cassandra remain in the custody of the Department and authorized the Department to make all medical decisions for her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge’s finding that Cassandra was not competent to make her own medical decisions at the time of the underlying events was not clearly erroneous; (2) this was not a proper case in which to decide whether to adopt the mature minor doctrine, which allows a sufficiently mature minor to refuse medical treatment; and (3) Respondents’ constitutional rights were not violated. View "In re Cassandra C." on Justia Law