Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pictometry International Corporation was engaged in the business in selling specialized aerial photographic services. Pictometry contracted with the department of information technology to license the department of environmental protection (DEP) to use certain aerial photographic images and associated data that were owned and copyrighted by Pictometry. Stephen Whitaker requested that the DEP provide him with the images and data. The DEP indicated that it would provide copies of the images for a fee provided for in the licensing agreement. Whitaker filed a complaint against the DEP with the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission determined that, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), the DEP was required to provide Whitaker with the images at minimum cost but was not required to provide the associated data. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk; and (2) if the commission determined on remand that Whitaker is entitled to copies of the images, Whitaker was required to pay a $25 per image fee. View "Pictometry Int'l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of labor against her employer (Employer), alleging a violation of the Connecticut family and medical leave statute, which applies only to employers that employer seventy-five or more employees. Although Employer employed more than 1,000 employees nationwide, the commissioner of labor dismissed the complaint on the ground that the leave statute does not apply to Employer because it does not employ seventy-five or more employees within the state of Connecticut. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor, concluding that all employees of a business are to be counted in determining whether the business is an employer under the leave statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section Conn. Agencies Regs. 31-51qq-42, which has the force and effect of a statute, makes clear that only Connecticut employees are to be counted under the leave statute. View "Velez v. Comm'r of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property. The town's zoning compliance officer issued a cease and desist order for violation of the town's zoning regulation. Plaintiff appealed to the town zoning board of appeals, seeking a variance. Subsequently, the compliance officer withdrew the order to allow Plaintiff to remedy the violation. Plaintiff then notified the board she was withdrawing her objection to the order. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in the trial requesting a judgment declaring she had the right to use her property for the interment of her and her husband's remains. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff had failed her exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's failure to pursue her appeal and, thereby, to exhaust her administrative remedies left the trial court without jurisdiction over her action for a declaratory judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff was actually challenging the proper interpretation of the town zoning regulations, which was a function of the board, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Piquet v. Chester" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Weddle and the intervening Defendant, the conservation commission of the town of Fairfield, appealed from the trial court's decision granting the writ of quo warranto filed by Plaintiffs, certain concerned taxpayers of the town of Fairfield, and ordering Weddle's removal from the office of wetlands compliance officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural and substantive requirements for maintaining a quo warranto action. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding (1) plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient interest to establish standing to pursue the quo warranto action; and (2) the trial court properly granted Plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto on the basis that Weddle's appointment to the wetland compliance officer position violated the town charter by usurping the office of the conservation director. View "Bateson v. Weddle" on Justia Law

This appeal raised several issues regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of the department of environmental protection to regulate activity "in the tidal, coastal or navigable waters of the state waterward of the high tide line" under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-359. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his administrative appeal contesting the department's order directing Plaintiff to remove a seawall that he had constructed on his property along Long Island Sound without having obtained a permit in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-361. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence showed at least part of Plaintiff's seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, properly concluded that section 22a-359 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff's seawall, and properly denied Plaintiff's discovery request with respect to his claim of unconstitutional vagueness; but (2) in the absence of a finding by the department that the entire seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improperly determined that the department had jurisdiction under section 22a-361 to order removal of the entire seawall. View "Shanahan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Sapko sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, an employee of the state of Connecticut. The workers' compensation commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, determining that the decedent's ingestion of Oxycodone and Seroquel constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The workers' compensation review board upheld the commissioner's decision. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the board incorrectly concluded that the superceding cause doctrine applied to the present case, but (2) this impropriety was harmless because the board correctly determined that the commissioner properly decided the issue of proximate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the board correctly concluded that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts. View "Sapko v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether Plaintiff, the city of New Britain, agreed to arbitrate a dispute with certain city employees, classified as foremen, regarding an alleged violation of the city's civil service rules. The trial court denied Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award in favor of Defendant, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate the foremen's dispute in a settlement agreement between the parties. Because Plaintiff did not agree to arbitrate the dispute, it could not be compelled to submit to arbitration. Remanded with direction to grant Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award. View "City of New Britain v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186" on Justia Law

The named Plaintiff, Judy Rettig, commenced this action against Defendants, several towns and others, seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in the course of her employment as an animal control officer for the district animal control. The district animal control was established by Defendants pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-330, which permits two or more towns to form a district for the performance of any municipal function that the member towns may perform separately. The trial court granted summary judgment judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants were Plaintiff's employer and, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee of a municipal district established pursuant to section 7-330 is an employee of the towns comprising the district for purposes of the exclusivity provision of the Act, and therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. View "Rettig v. Town of Woodbridge" on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was working as a police officer when he felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder after attempting to lift a heavy person. A physician determined that Plaintiff had a labral tear, and Plainiff later underwent shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's pain continued. In 2000, Plaintiff suffered an acute myocardial infarction and was transferred to the hospital where he had bypass surgery. Plaintiff filed a claim in 2001, contending that his shoulder condition was misdiagnosed and that his 1996 symptoms were caused by a cardiac problem. The workers compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's allegation that his heart condition was misdiagnosed following the 1996 incident, and that his 2001 notice of claim was untimely. The compensation review board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board properly concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the medical care exception to the applicable one year statute of limitations applied to toll the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff failed to prove a connection between the 1996 incident and his heart disease. View "Carter v. Town of Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harry Kraiza filed an application with the planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland seeking approval of a proposed subdivision on his property. The commission denied Plaintiff's application, finding it was in violation of the subdivision regulations because the proposed dead-end street that provided the only access to the subdivided lots on Plaintiff's property constituted an extension of an existing loop road on adjacent property and the combined length of the two road exceeded the permissible length for a permanent dead-end street. The superior court and appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission incorrectly interpreted the Hartland zoning and subdivision regulations in this case, and the appellate court incorrectly determined that the commission properly denied Plaintiff's application to subdivide his property. Remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining Plaintiff's appeal. View "Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law