Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case. View "Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

Defendants, State Five Industrial Park and Jean Farricielli, appealed from a trial court judgment holding them liable, after invoking both reverse and traditional veil piercing principles, for a $3.8 million judgment rendered against Jean's husband, Joseph Farricielli, and five corporations that he owned and/or controlled, in an environmental enforcement action brought by Plaintiffs, the commissioner of environmental protection, the town of Hamden, and the town's zoning enforcement officer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the facts that were proven in this case did not warrant reverse veil piercing, and judgment on Plaintiffs' veil piercing claims should be rendered in favor of Defendants. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. State Five Indus. Park, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. sells its products to Connecticut schoolchildren by having schoolteachers submit to Plaintiff book orders the teachers have collected from students. The books are delivered to the teachers, who then distribute the books to the students. In 2006, the commissioner of revenue services imposed a sales and use tax deficiency assessment on Plaintiff for more than $3 million. Plaintiff protested the assessments. The commissioner upheld the assessments, reasoning that Plaintiff had sold its products using "in-state representatives" pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-407(a)(15)(A). The trial court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly determined that the teachers were not Plaintiff's "representatives" within the meaning of section 12-407(A)(15)(a)(iv), as the teachers serve as the exclusive channel through which Plaintiff markets, sells and delivers its products to Connecticut schoolchildren; and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that the taxes could not be imposed under the commerce clause, as the activities of the Connecticut schoolteachers who participate in Plaintiff's program provide the requisite nexus under the commerce clause to justify imposition of the taxes. View "Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs." on Justia Law

The local board of education of the City of Bridgeport passed a resolution requesting the state board of education to authorize the commissioner of education to reconstitute the local board. The state board voted to authorize the commissioner to reconstitute the local board. In three separate actions, former local board members and residents and electors of the City filed actions against the state board, local board, and others, alleging state statutory and constitutional violations. The trial court reserved the action for the advice of the Supreme Court. At issue was (1) whether the failure of the state board to require the local board to undergo and complete training, as mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-223e(h), rendered void the state board's authorization; and (2) whether the local board's resolution requesting that the state board authorize reconstitution resulted in a waiver of the state board's obligation to require training. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the state board's failure to require training rendered void its authorization of reconstitution under section 10-223e(h); and (2) the local board's resolution had no effect on the operation of the statute. View "Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The freedom of information commission ordered the University of Connecticut to disclose databases identifying persons who had paid to attend, donated to, inquired about or participated in certain educational, cultural or athletic activities of institutions within the university. The trial court sustained the university's appeal, concluding that the university could, as a matter of law, create a trade secret entitled to exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The commission appealed, contending that, in light of the public policy favoring disclosure of public records, the trial court improperly rejected the commission's determination that none of the databases at issue could be trade secrets because the university was not principally involved in a trade. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a public agency can create and maintain trade secrets that are exempt from disclosure under the Act, as long as the information meets the statutory criteria for a trade secret. View "Univ. of Conn. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former town clerk of the town of Watertown, was removed from her position after she failed to report for work. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the town and certain of its officials (1) seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Defendants to restore her salary and benefits from the time they were discontinued and to continue such payments for the duration of her term, (2) claiming Defendants had violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (3) seeking recovery of her lost salary. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on counts one and three. The court, however, rendered judgment in favor of defendants on count two of the complaint based upon the jury's finding that there had not been a constitutional violation of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on counts one and three, holding that the trial court improperly concluded that Plaintiff had a clear legal right to be paid for the balance of her elected term unless or until she was removed from office. View "Stewart v. Watertown" on Justia Law

The named plaintiff in the underlying action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judgment action against all members of the Connecticut General Assembly. Francis received a waiver of the process server's service fees, including a fee for copies, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-261(a)(2). The plaintiff in error, state marshal Lisa Stevenson (Plaintiff), effectuated service on all defendants. Francis' son had made the copies of the complaint at his expense. Plaintiff subsequently submitted an invoice claiming fees of, inter alia, $900 for copies of the complaint. The trial court disallowed the fee for copies. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 52-261(a)(2) entitles a process server to the fee for copies even if she has not personally made the copies. The Court concluded that the trial court, the defendant in error, improperly denied Plaintiff's request for fees where (1) the statute was ambiguous, and (2) clear evidence of legislative intent proved that the fee for copies under section 52-261(a)(2) was not contingent upon the process server's making the copies. View "Francis v. Fonfara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained while working for Employer. The workers' compensation commissioner awarded Plaintiff total disability benefits and reimbursement for certain prescription medication payments and mileage under the Workers' Compensation Act. The compensation review board affirmed but remanded for a determination of the specific amounts to be reimbursed to Plaintiff. Defendants, Employer and Insurer, appealed the commissioner's supplemental findings and award. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-301(a) required Defendants to appeal to the board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal because the jurisdictional requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-301(b), which governs appeals from the board to the appellate court, were fully satisfied in this case. View "O'Connor v. Med-Center Home Health Care, Inc." on Justia Law

After Employee received numerous elevated blood pressure readings and was prescribed hypertension medication, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits. The workers' compensation commissioner (1) found that a physician informed Employee more than one year prior to filing his claim that he had hypertension, and (2) concluded that, because Employee's claim was filed more than one year after that date, his claim was untimely under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a). The compensation review board affirmed. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, in which it held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims for hypertension benefits does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. At issue on appeal was whether the time limitation period was triggered only after Employee's physician prescribed medication for his condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Employee was, in fact, diagnosed with hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim, the board properly upheld the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim for benefits. View "Roohr v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

After Employee was diagnosed with hypertension, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a). The workers' compensation commissioner dismissed Employee's claim as untimely under the one year limitation period of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a), finding that Employee had notice of his hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim for benefits. The compensation review board affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether advice from a medical professional to Employee that he had an elevated blood pressure triggered the one year limitation period. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, which held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims brought pursuant to section 7-433c does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the board applied an incorrect legal standard in upholding the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim. View "Brymer v. Clinton" on Justia Law