Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The Town's building officials refused to issue permits to Plaintiff-Appellant Levine for two dwelling units Plaintiff wanted to build on his property. Plaintiff sued for permission to build but lost at trial and appealed, challenging the Town's authority to change its mind after considerable time and money was spent on development. Plaintiff also argueed that there were problems with the trial court's conclusion on his municipal estoppel claim. The Court found that the town properly enacted its land use ordinance, but the lower court improperly applied the law to Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim to allow him damages for reliance on Town's initial permission to build. Starting in 2005, Plaintiff sought permission from the Town to develop a parcel of land. In 2006, the Town amended its land use ordinance to prohibit the construction of more than one dwelling on a lot, but did not expressly provide whether the revisions would apply to projects already in development. A February, 2006 meeting of the board of selectmen passed a resolution to allow Plaintiff's project to proceed; a September, 2006 meeting rescinded the February approval, and reserved the right to enforce the Town's land use ordinances against Plaintiff's project. In November, 2006, Plaintiff sought the building permits for work already in progress, and the Town refused to issue them. The Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the Town's board had authority under state law to pass the September, 2006 resolution. However, though the Court agreed with Plaintiff that he had demonstrated significant time and money was spent in developing his land. The Court held that the standard used to decide was too strict under state law, and ordered a new trial to resolve Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim.

The Court considered an appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee Connecticut Motor Cars in which the lower court found that a licensed car dealer or repairer is not entitled to a "gate fee" when it moves a wrecked or disabled vehicle from a storage area to a place where it will be retrieved by the owner. The Plaintiff operates a repair shop that also tows and stores vehicles. When the vehicle owner comes to retrieve his car, Plaintiff charges a fee for the labor and equipment used to move the vehicle from a secured storage area to a retrieval area. Two vehicle owners objected to the "gate fee" and brought complaint before the state car dealer licensing agency. Plaintiff argued that under state law, the storage and moving of the car within its facility was an "exceptional serviceâ¦not included in the tow charge," but the hearing officer disagreed. Upholding the hearing officer's decision, the Court found that the plain language of the law includes "all the activity in the gate fee," and that "the only reasonable interpretation of the regulations is that a gate fee is not permitted."

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Burton sought an injunction against Defendant-Appellee Dominion Nuclear to halt operation of a power plant, claiming that the plant would cause unreasonable radioactive pollution to Long Island Sound and to an estuary located near her property. Plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stop Defendant from using a stretch power uprate increase unless Defendant could do so without an increase of radioactive discharge. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's case on grounds that she lacked standing under state environmental protection laws, common law nuisance principles, and federal preemption. Holding that Plaintiff's ex parte application "does not contain allegations of substantive violations giving rise to unreasonable pollution⦠in excess of that permitted under the regulatory scheme," the Court upheld the lower courts's decision to dismiss this claim for lack of standing.