Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the case, GenConn Energy, LLC, an electricity supplier, appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, arguing that the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) overstepped its authority by reducing GenConn's proposed return on capital for two of its peaking generation facilities. These facilities provide additional electricity to Connecticut consumers during times of increased demand. GenConn claimed that PURA was not allowed to lower GenConn's debt rate or to use the general rate-making principles found in a different statute when making its decision.However, the court rejected these arguments. It held that PURA acted within its statutory authority under § 16-243u when it reviewed GenConn's recovery of costs in line with the general rate-making principles of § 16-19e. The court highlighted the interrelated nature of cost recovery and rate setting, and deduced that PURA must be able to protect the interests of ratepayers if it determines that a company is overrecovering. The court also rejected GenConn's argument that PURA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support PURA's final decision and concluded that the decision did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious one. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of GenConn's appeal.The court's ruling implies that PURA has the authority to review a peaking generation facility's recoverable costs to ensure that the rates are "sufficient, but no more than sufficient," to cover the facility's operating costs. The decision also emphasizes the importance of PURA’s regulatory authority and the necessity of protecting ratepayers from bearing the financial burden of a company's overrecovery. View "GenConn Energy, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A case in Connecticut involved a couple, Aaron Lynch and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch, who sought damages for alleged medical malpractice by the state of Connecticut in relation to therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided at a state hospital. The couple were unable to conceive without medical assistance and pursued TDI services. The hospital staff failed to adhere to guidelines regarding the use of cytomegalovirus (CMV) positive donor sperm for CMV negative patients, leading to Jean-Marie being inseminated with CMV positive donor sperm. Jean-Marie later became pregnant with twins. During her pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection, however, the hospital staff failed to inform Jean-Marie or take appropriate follow-up action. One of the twins died in utero from a severe CMV infection and the other was born with severe, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state could not claim sovereign immunity as the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims, not informed consent claims. The court also held that the plaintiffs' son, who was born with severe medical conditions as a result of the state's negligence, was entitled to compensation. The court found no merit in the state's claim that the damages awarded were speculative or predicated on the concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence. The court concluded that common-law negligence principles were adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by the plaintiffs' son. This decision affirms the trial court's award of over $34 million in damages to the plaintiffs. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court determining that the State Board of Labor Relations did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it applied the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to a union's claim that the town's unilateral change to its pension plan constituted a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith, holding that there was no error.The Town of Middlebury appealed the labor board's determination that the Town violated the Municipal Employee Relations act (MERA), Mass. Gen. Stat. 7-467 et seq., by unilaterally changing the Town's practice of including extra pay duty in calculating pension benefits for members of the Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34. The appellate court concluded that the labor board did not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably, illegally, or arbitrarily when it declined to apply the "contract coverage" standard adopted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 2019. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was proper for the appellate court to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard, rather than the contract coverage standard, in determining when whether the union had waived its statutory right to bargain collective regarding the manner in which the Town calculated its members' pension benefits. View "Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court ordering the disclosure of a redacted version of a police report created by the police department at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital documenting the police department's investigation into the death of a Whiting patient after a medical event, holding that the report, with minimal redaction, must be disclosed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-200 et seq.After the trial court ordered the disclosure of a redacted version of the police report the Freedom of Information Commission appealed, arguing that the report should be released in its entirety under FOIA because it was not exempt for disclosure by the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-146d(2) and 52-146e(a), as well as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq., as implemented by the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. 160.101 et seq. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the police report was not a communication or record exempt from disclosure under FOIA; and (2) because the report included identifiable patient information, the report should be redacted in the manner described in this opinion. View "Comm'r of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction High Watch Recovery Center, Inc.'s administrative appeal challenging the decision of the Department of Public Health approving a certificate of need application submitted by Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC, holding that the appellate court erred.Birch Hill submitted a certificate of need application to the Office of Health Care Access requesting public approval to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. The Department and Birch Hill entered into an agreed settlement constituting a final order wherein the Department approved Birch Hill's application subject to certain conditions. High Watch, which operated a nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility, intervened and appealed the final order. The superior court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the Department's decision was not a final decision in a contested case and that High Watch was not aggrieved by the decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that High Watch's petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on Birch Hill's certificate of need application was not a legal sufficient request for a public hearing for the purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-639a(e). View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his minor child (Child), holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to adequate notice when it terminated Father's parental rights after the close of the evidence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17-112(j)(3)(B)(ii).At the close of the evidence in this case the Commissioner of Children and Families moved to amend the petition to allege a different ground for the termination of Father's rights. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book section 34a-1(d). Thereafter, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed an amended summary of the facts in support of its petition claiming that grounds existed for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father's parental rights on ground (B)(ii). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Father's constitutional due process right to adequate notice by allowing the Commissioner to amend the petition after the close of the evidence and terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to ground (B)(ii). View "In re Gabriel S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) establishing a regulatory framework for a certain renewable energy product, holding that the trial court correctly correctly determined that the reactions did not violate the dormant commerce clause.In 2020, PURA imposed a series of restrictions on retail electric suppliers offering Connecticut customers voluntary products, known as voluntary renewable offers (VROs), consisting of renewable energy credits (REC) bundled with electric supply. One of the restrictions at issue, the geographic restriction, prohibited VROs from containing RECs sourced outside of particular geographic regions. The other restriction, the marketing restriction, required suppliers to provide clear language informing consumers that a VRO backed by RECs is an energy product backed by RECs rather than a renewable energy itself. Plaintiffs argued that both restrictions violated the dormant commerce clause. The trial court rejected Plaintiffs' commerce clause arguments as to each restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law