Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction High Watch Recovery Center, Inc.'s administrative appeal challenging the decision of the Department of Public Health approving a certificate of need application submitted by Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC, holding that the appellate court erred.Birch Hill submitted a certificate of need application to the Office of Health Care Access requesting public approval to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. The Department and Birch Hill entered into an agreed settlement constituting a final order wherein the Department approved Birch Hill's application subject to certain conditions. High Watch, which operated a nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility, intervened and appealed the final order. The superior court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the Department's decision was not a final decision in a contested case and that High Watch was not aggrieved by the decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that High Watch's petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on Birch Hill's certificate of need application was not a legal sufficient request for a public hearing for the purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-639a(e). View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Health" on Justia Law

In this antitrust action alleging that Defendant, a quasi-public agency, engaged in a sham competitive bidding procedure and awarded a contract to a preselected entity for corrupt reasons and in violation of a competitive bidding statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant, holding that Plaintiff, a public affairs firm, lacked standing to bring the action.Defendant, an agency responsible for providing solid waste disposal and recycling services to municipalities in the state, issued a request for proposals for the provision of municipal government liaison services. Plaintiff submitted a proposal, but Defendant awarded the liaison services contract to a law firm, whose proposal was noncompliant. Plaintiff later brought this action. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike. The trial court granted the motion to strike and rendered judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the grant of the motion to strike, holding that the trial court improperly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action where it did not adequately allege an anti-trust injury. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Commissioner of Transportation (Defendant) on Plaintiff’s complaint alleging, inter alia, that Defendant negligently authorized Hallberg Contracting Company to deposit construction materials on Plaintiff’s property.With Defendant’s consent, Hallberg, a subcontractor on a highway reconstruction project, entered into an oral contract with a third party to use the property for stockpiling construction materials related to a highway reconstruction project. Hallberg deposited thirty-two truckloads of material on the property. The trial court found that Defendant negligently authorized Hallberg to dispose of the construction materials on the property but that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages. The court then awarded $29,855 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s award of damages was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages was supported by sufficient evidence in the record; and (3) the trial court properly did not award Plaintiff damages for lost profits. View "Sun Val, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation" on Justia Law

White Oak Corporation and the Department of Transportation entered into a contract for the reconstruction of a bridge and a portion of Interstate 95 in the City of Bridgeport. The project experienced significant delays such that the Department and White Oak reassigned the contract to another contractor for completion. White Oak subsequently filed a notice of claim and demand for arbitration seeking compensation for money wrongfully withheld by the Department, as liquidated damages, for delays in the project. An arbitration panel concluded that the liquidated damages clause in the parties’ contract was unenforceable, and therefore, White Oak was entitled to a return of nearly $5 million withheld by the Department. The trial court granted White Oak’s application to confirm the arbitration award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in rendering an award on White Oak’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that, in a prior action brought by the Department to enjoin the arbitration, the trial court limited the scope of the arbitrable issues in the present case to a claim of wrongful termination such that the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to decide White Oak’s liquidated damages claim. View "Dep’t of Transp. v. White Oak Corp." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law