Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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In 2005, Landmark Investment Group, LLC entered into a contract with Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC (Chung, LLC) to purchase certain property. Chung, LLC repudiated the contract after receiving a more attractive offer from CALCO Construction & Development Company (Calco) and John Senese, Calco’s president and owner (together, Defendants). Landmark successfully sued for specific performance of the contract but was unable to purchase the property after it was sold at a foreclosure auction where a company controlled by Senese was the highest bidder. Landmark then filed suit against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with its contractual relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landmark on both counts. The trial court, however, granted Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly granted Defendants’ motion for JNOV because it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict; and (2) incorrectly concluded that Landmark presented insufficient evidence to support its claims. View "Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. CALCO Constr. & Dev. Co." on Justia Law

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The decedent in this case died when the motorcycle he was operating collided with Defendant’s vehicle. Blood test results indicated that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision. Plaintiff, as the administratrix of the estate of the decedent and in her individual capacity, brought this action against Defendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, including an award of compensatory and punitive damages to the decedent’s estate and loss of consortium and punitive damages to Plaintiff in her individual capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting expert testimony pertaining to Defendant’s drug use; (2) precluding Defendant from offering evidence as to the full extent of his criminal punishment related to the accident; (3) admitting evidence of Defendant’s postaccident conduct; and (4) failing to strike Plaintiff’s testimony that she intended to fund a charitable scholarship and help her daughter. View "Fleming v. Dionisio" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant, the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, was found guilty of negligently and recklessly assigning Father Ivan Ferguson to serve as the director of Saint Marty’s Elementary School, where he sexually abused Plaintiff from 1981 through 1983. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (3) the trial court properly granted Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s laches defense; and (4) the retroactive application of certain amendments to the applicable statute of limitations to revive Plaintiff’s otherwise time barred claims did not violate Defendant’s substantive due process rights under the Connecticut Constitution. View "Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp." on Justia Law

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The decedent in this case died after being hit on the head by a log and falling backward onto the sidewalk while working for the Department of Transportation (Defendant). Plaintiff, the decedent’s wife, filed this action seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. The trial court rendered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant, holding (1) the trial court improperly determined that Defendant had assumed a greater duty of care than reflected in industry standards, and (2) Defendant’s actions were not the proximate cause of the death of the decedent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court used the wrong standard in its determination of liability and damages, but (2) the Appellate Court erred in its determinations of the conclusiveness of the industry standard, foreseeability, and proximate cause. Therefore, the matter must be returned to the trial court for a new trial in which the proper standard is applied. View "McDermott v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Plaintiffs brought this action against a hospital and a registered nurse, alleging that Defendants negligently discharged Plaintiffs’ suicidal son and that they suffered severe emotional distress when they discovered that their son had hung himself only thirty-five minutes after his discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ bystander emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs suffered severe and debilitating emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ alleged negligence. View "Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n" on Justia Law

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The decedent in this case was killed by her former boyfriend, Mark Tannenbaum, shortly after Tannenbaum was released from police custody. Plaintiff, the adminstratrix of the decedent’s estate, filed this action against the town of Watertown and three police officers. Five years later, Plaintiff withdrew her initial action and commenced the present action against the town and John Carroll, alleging that Carroll, the ranking officer at the time of Tannenbaum’s release from police custody, released him without proper conditions and restrictions. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-593 did not save this case from the statute of limitations where she failed to name Carroll as a defendant in her original action and, therefore, would have failed to obtain a judgment in that action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carroll’s absence from the original action did not entitle Plaintiff to use section 52-593 to save this case. View "Finkle v. Carroll" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed an amended revised complaint alleging that he suffered personal injury and damages that were caused by the negligence and carelessness of Defendant, the Town of Orange. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim because Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement of the municipal highway defect statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The trial court agreed with Defendant and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that because he did not assert his claim under section 13a-149, the trial court should not have found that Defendant could raise its jurisdiction argument regarding section 13a-149 in a motion to dismiss. The Appellate Court reversed on the ground that the facts in the record did not support a determination that Plaintiff’s claim fell within the ambit of section 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a factual dispute regarding jurisdiction remained unresolved at this stage of the proceedings, the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Cuozzo v. Orange" on Justia Law

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This negligence action arose when a ten-year-old boy dragged a piece of concrete up to his family’s third floor apartment and dropped it to the ground below. The boy had removed from the backyard of the apartment building that the residents shared. The concrete struck seven-year-old Adriana Ruiz on the head, causing very serious brain injuries. Adriana’s parent and Adriana filed this negligence action against Victory Properties, LLC, the owner of the apartment building, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to remove the loose concrete and other debris from the backyard of the apartment building and that this negligence was a cause of Adriana’s injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Adriana’s injuries were not foreseeable. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination of their claim that Defendant bore at least some responsibility for Adriana’s injuries. View "Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Plaintiff was injured when she fell on a patch of snow and ice on a sidewalk. The sidewalk was owned by the town of Enfield and abutted the property of Defendants, private landowners. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that town ordinances requiring landowners whose property abuts public sidewalks to clear those sidewalks of ice and snow does not impose civil liability on the property owners for injuries to third parties. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, although the ordinances did not transfer civil liability on the property owners, Defendants may be held liable under alternative negligence theories. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s alternative theories of common-law liability based on negligence failed and that liability was not shifted to the landowners in this case. View "Robinson v. Cianfarini" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Plaintiff filed, among other claims, state law claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendant, a health care provider, alleging that Defendant improperly breached the confidentiality of Plaintiff’s medical records in the course of complying with a subpoena. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence based claims, concluding that they were preempted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which lacks a private right of action and preempts contrary state laws. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HIPAA did not preempt Plaintiff’s state common-law causes of action for negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendant because (1) Connecticut’s common law provides a remedy for a health care provider’s breach of confidentiality in the course of complying with a subpoena; and (2) HIPAA and its implementing regulations may be utilized to inform the standard of care applicable to claims arising from allegations of negligence in the disclosure of patients’ medical records pursuant to a subpoena. View "Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C." on Justia Law