Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a dispute between an insurance carrier (Plaintiff) and its insured (Defendant) regarding Plaintiff’s obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration panel concluded that the issue of whether the relevant policy provisions provided coverage for the claim should be resolved under the choice of law rules governing claims sounding in tort, rather than claims sounding in insurance and contract, and therefore, that New Jersey law rather than Connecticut law governed Defendant’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The trial court vacated the arbitration award, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court, in its opinion adopting the decision of the trial court, properly applied sections 6(2), 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second), contract choice of law, to determine that Connecticut law governed the claim. View "Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as the parent and next friend of her minor son, brought this action against the City of Middletown, alleging that her son had been injured when he was pushed into the edge of a broken locker at Middletown High School. Defendant raised as a special defense that it was immune from liability. The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. The trial court, however, granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and to render judgment for Defendant on the ground of governmental immunity. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs had not pleaded the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception in its reply to Defendant’s special defense. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly determined, on the basis of the arguments the parties had originally presented on appeal, that there was sufficient evidence of imminent harm to the student. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant’s conduct had subjected an identifiable person to imminent harm; and (2) because the jury was not instructed that it was required to make this finding, a new trial was required. View "Haynes v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law

Susan and Rodney Drown filed a medical malpractice action against Associated Women’s Health Specialists, P.C. (Health Specialists) asserting vicarious liability claims arising from the acts or omissions of its physicians. During the relevant period, Health Specialists was insured through a professional liability policy issued by Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (Exchange). Health Specialists settled for the full amount of the policy and assigned to the Drowns its rights to recover against Exchange. Health Specialists was subsequently declared insolvent, and the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (Association) assumed liability for the Exchange’s obligations. The Association then commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no obligations for the Drowns’ claims. Defendants, the Drowns and Health Specialists, counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Exchange’s preinsolvency breach of its duty to defend Health Specialists did not estop the Association from challenging its liability under the policy; and (2) the policy unambiguously did not cover Health Specialists for its vicarious liability in this case. View "Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Drown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a professional negligence action against Defendant, a licensed clinical social worker, alleging that Defendant negligently failed to treat Plaintiff after Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant that he had viewed child pornography. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s failure to treat him caused him to be subjected to a police task force raid, which allegedly caused Plaintiff mental distress and other injuries due to potential criminal prosecution. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s amended complaint on the ground that it would violate public policy to allow Plaintiff to profit from his own criminal acts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would clearly violate public policy to impose a duty on Defendant to protect Plaintiff from injuries arising from his potential criminal prosecution for the illegal downloading, viewing, and/or possession of child pornography.View "Greenwald v. Van Handel" on Justia Law

From 1989 to 2006, Larry Sax, a certified public accountant, prepared federal and state income tax returns for Plaintiff on behalf of the accounting firm Cohen Burger, Schwartz & Sax, LLC. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a professional malpractice and negligence action against Sax and the accounting firm (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether Defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that, in connection with a claim of first impression regarding shifting the burden of proving fraudulent concealment in cases involving fiduciaries, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was no fiduciary duty under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to establish a fiduciary relationship with Defendants, his theory of fraudulent concealment did not serve to toll the three year statute of limitations for torts. View "Iacurci v. Sax" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a father and his son (minor plaintiff), filed a personal injury action when a horse, which was kept at a facility owned by Defendants, bit the minor plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the horse had mischievous propensities. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly concluded as a matter of law that the keeper of a domestic animal has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries that are foreseeable because the animal belongs to a class of animals that has a propensity to cause such injuries regardless of whether the animal had previously caused an injury; and (2) the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the minor plaintiff's injury was foreseeable because horses have a natural propensity to bite. Remanded.View "Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant, a law firm, to represent Plaintiff in an action against other parties. After Plaintiff settled the underlying suit, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached its duty of undivided loyalty and failed to follow Plaintiff’s instructions in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court characterized the allegations against Defendant as sounding in legal malpractice and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff’s cause of action was one for malpractice, to which a three-year statute of limitation applied, or contract, to which a six-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly characterized Plaintiff’s claim as sounding in legal malpractice.View "Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C." on Justia Law

Walter Hopkins was severely injured as a result of the second of two vehicle collisions. Hopkins was the passenger in an Infiniti, which struck the side of a vehicle driven by Matthew Vincent, a volunteer firefighter. Vincent pursued the Infiniti at high speeds in his vehicle, at which time he relayed information via cell phone regarding the Infiniti and its location to Ellen Vece, a 911 dispatcher employed by the Town of Clinton. The Infiniti eventually crashed into a tree. Hopkins required permanent care as a result of his injuries. An action was filed on Hopkins' behalf against the Town, among others. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, finding (1) the Town was liable under the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity; and (2) Vece’s failure to act was a proximate cause of Hopkins’ injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity did not apply in this case because the circumstances would not have made it apparent to Vece that her failure to instruct Vincent to stop following the Infiniti likely would have subjected Hopkins to imminent harm.View "Edgerton v. Town of Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-school opened a bank account for its operating fund with Defendant-bank. One of Plaintiff’s employees later opened a bank account with Defendant that Plaintiff had not authorized and deposited into that account several hundred checks originating from, or intended to be deposited into, Plaintiff’s bank account with Defendant. Over the course of approximately four years, the employee deposited $832,776 into this bank account and withdrew funds just short of that amount. Defendant refused Plaintiff’s demand to return the funds that the employee had funneled through this account to himself. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), negligence, and common law conversion. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on each of the counts and awarded $832,776 in total compensatory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects with the exception of the damages award, holding that some of Plaintiff’s claims under the UCC were time barred and that the trial court did not otherwise err in its judgment. Remanded with direction to reduce the award by $5,156 and to proportionately reduce prejudgment interest, . View "Saint Bernard Sch. of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of Am. " on Justia Law

As a result of Defendants’ negligence, Margaret Mueller was mistakenly diagnosed with the incorrect type of cancer. Mueller and her domestic partner of twenty-one years, Charlotte Stacy, brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants, seeking damages for Mueller’s personal injuries and Stacey’s loss of consortium. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s claims on the ground that Stacey and Mueller were not in a civil union or married before or during the dates of the negligent acts. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to state a legally sufficient claim for loss of consortium because they had not alleged that they would have married or entered into a civil union before the dates of Defendants’ negligent acts if they had not been barred from doing so under state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment on grounds distinct from those of the trial court instead of remanding the case to provide Stacey with an opportunity to amend her complaint; and (2) if, on remand, Stacey amends her complaint to allege that she and Mueller would have been married when the underlying tort occurred if they had not been barred from doing so under state law, the trial court must deny Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Tepler " on Justia Law