Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The principal issue in this certified appeal was whether Connecticut's Dram Shop Act requires a plaintiff to prove that a patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated when sold alcoholic liquor in order to prevail on a claim against the purveyor of alcoholic liquor for injuries sustained as a result of the patron's intoxication. Plaintiff in this case, administrator of the estate of Decedent, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff on the ground that the trial court improperly denied the motion of Defendants, the permittee of a restaurant and others doing business as the restaurant, for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that although the appellate court properly determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment in his favor without proving that the patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated at the time he was sold liquor, the court improperly concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "O'Dell v. Kozee" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a national fraternity and one of its local Connecticut chapters may be held liable in common-law negligence for the death of one of its members, which occurred while driving back to New Haven after a fraternity event held in New York City. On appeal, Plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of Decedent, claimed the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for Defendants, Delta Kappa Epsilon National Fraternity and its Delta Kappa Epsilon Phi Chapter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Phi Chapter voluntarily assumed a duty of care regarding Decedent's safe transportation, and therefore, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim of common-law negligence; and (2) Plaintiff raised a material question of fact regarding Delta National's control over Phi Chapter. View "Grenier v. Comm'r of Transp." on Justia Law

Physician diagnosed and treated Patient for various liver and kidney ailments but failed to warn her of the latent driving impairment associated with her condition. After leaving Physician's office, Patient blacked out while operating her motor vehicle and struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action against Physician and his employer (collectively, Defendants) for professional negligence. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, finding that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to warn Patient of the driving risks associated with her medical conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, and in so doing, declined to extend a health care provider's duty through judicial modification, holding that the trial court properly found that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to advise or warn Patient of the latent driving impairment associated with her medical condition. View "Jarmie v. Troncale" on Justia Law

The named plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought this action against defendant city (Defendant), claiming that her son incurred injuries when a fellow student pushed him into a broken locker. Defendant filed its its answer and a special defense claiming municipal immunity. Plaintiffs denied the special defense but failed to plead that any exception to the defendant's immunity applied to them. The court instructed the jury on principles of negligence but made no reference to the special defense. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiffs. The trial court then granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of governmental immunity and rendered judgment for Defendant. The appellate court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to plead the identifiable victim, imminent harm exception to municipal immunity in their reply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs did not have adequate notice of this alternative basis or sufficient opportunity to address it, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity. View "Haynes v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC (EAP) appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants a prescriptive easement over a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants had used for many years to access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed protected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a wooden walkway installed without appropriate permits. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal to ask whether the appellate court properly concluded that construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per se public nuisance could establish a prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wetlands. The Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted, concluding that the issue raised by the certified question went beyond the scope of the record below, and therefore, the issue was not properly preserved. View "Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC" on Justia Law

This case, which involved the summary suspension of the medical privileges of Plaintiff by Defendant, Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., came to the Supreme Court for the second time. In Plaintiff's appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denying Plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded punitive damages and offer of judgment interest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the federal health Care Quality Improvement Act from money damages arising from its summary suspension of Plaintiff's privileges. Remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought these premises liability actions on behalf of her minor daughter, alleging that her daughter had injured her ankle while playing soccer at Defendants' indoor soccer facility because Defendants negligently had installed a playing surface inherently dangerous for indoor soccer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate correctly concluded that Plaintiff had established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning Defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgment because Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of the hazardous condition. View "DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Sapko sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, an employee of the state of Connecticut. The workers' compensation commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, determining that the decedent's ingestion of Oxycodone and Seroquel constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The workers' compensation review board upheld the commissioner's decision. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the board incorrectly concluded that the superceding cause doctrine applied to the present case, but (2) this impropriety was harmless because the board correctly determined that the commissioner properly decided the issue of proximate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the board correctly concluded that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts. View "Sapko v. State" on Justia Law