Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the widow and presumptive dependent of Decedent. Decedent was employed as a photograph engraver and was later diagnosed with disabling pulmonary fibrosis as a result of his work exposure to toxins. Decedent filed a timely claim for benefits and subsequently died from his illness. The claim was not accepted nor were benefits paid before Decedent’s death. Just over one year after Decedent’s death, Plaintiff filed a claim for death and survivor benefits. Thereafter, Defendants accepted Decedent’s underlying claim for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was timely filed under the Workers’ Compensation Act and ordered Defendants to pay survivor benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board reversed, finding that a dependent filing for survivor’s benefits must file a separate claim for benefits within one year of the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was not required to file a separate notice of claim for survivor benefits because the timely filing of Decedent’s notice of claim for benefits under the Act satisfied the limitation period for claims under the Act. View "McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law

This case came to the Supreme Court on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Plaintiff sued his former employer in federal court, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q by subjecting him to discipline on account of Plaintiff’s exercise of his rights guaranteed by Conn. Const. art. I, sections 3, 4 or 14. The Supreme Court answered (1) the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos that when employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline does not apply to a claim that an employer violated section 31-51q by subjecting an employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such an employee of rights guaranteed by Conn. Const. art. I, sections 3, 4, or 14; and (2) under the state Constitution, employee speech pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace, and section 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in the private workplace. View "Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

Suzanne Listro, a social worker employed by the Department of Children and Families, was charged with manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child after a foster child in her care died. The Department dismissed Listro for cause due to her “serious misconduct.” Listro was later acquitted of the criminal charges. The collective bargaining unit for the Department’s social workers (the Union) filed a grievance on Listro’s behalf challenging her termination. An arbitrator denied Listro’s grievance. The superior court vacated the arbitrator’s award, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in using negligence as a standard and basis for her award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that “negligence arguably came within the purview of the [collective bargaining] agreement” and was an appropriate term of the arbitrator to use to describe Listro’s conduct, which was the basis of her dismissal for just cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement and the notice to Listro that her conduct on the evening of the child's death provided the basis for termination, the trial court improperly granted the Union’s application to vacate the arbitrator’s award. View "AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case consisted of two groups of claimants - widows of deceased City of Meriden police officers (“plaintiff widows”) or firefighters and retired Meriden police officers or firefighters who have been divorced or widowed since they retired (“plaintiff retirees”). After the City reduced Plaintiffs’ health insurance emoluments under the City’s pension plan, Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that they were entitled to greater health insurance emoluments than those being provided to them. The trial court rendered judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the City improperly reduced the health insurance emoluments of the plaintiff widows but not those of the plaintiff retirees. Remanded. View "Kiewlen v. Meriden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters for the City of Meriden, sought a writ of mandamus prohibiting the City from imposing a “cost share” requirement on them mandating that they pay a certain percentage of their health insurance, thereby reducing their health insurance emoluments. The trial court rendered judgment for the City, concluding that the City properly reduced Plaintiffs’ health insurance emoluments in 2005 according to the terms of a provision in a prior version of the Meriden City Charter and a related stipulated judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) interpreting the city charter provision and stipulated judgment as allowing the City to impose the cost share requirement on Plaintiffs; (2) excluding certain evidence regarding collective bargaining agreements that precipitated the reduction in Plaintiffs’ benefits; and (3) declining to take judicial notice of Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-450c in interpreting the terms of the City’s pension plan because Plaintiffs had not pleaded a violation of that statute in their amended agreement. View "Awdziewicz v. Meriden" on Justia Law

At the time that Claimant suffered a compensable work-related injury to his left knee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Claimant’s employer (Employer). Claimant subsequently suffered a compensable work-related injury to his right knee. At the time, Chubb & Son (Chubb) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Employer. Claimant was scheduled to have bilateral knee replacement surgery, but the two insurance carriers disagreed about who would pay for Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. After a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner required Liberty Mutual to reimburse Chubb for one half of Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board and the Appellate Court affirmed. Liberty Mutual appealed, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to order the reimbursement to Chubb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of this case, the Commissioner had the authority to order the reimbursement pursuant to the relapse statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-307b. View "Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc." on Justia Law

A skilled nursing facility (Plaintiff) terminated an employee (Employee) on the ground that she had failed to make a timely report of an allegation of resident abuse. An arbitrator agreed with Plaintiff that the Employee had improperly delayed reporting an incident of suspected abuse but ordered the Employee reinstated based upon its determination that Plaintiff had just cause to suspend Employee without pay for one month. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration award reinstating the Employee’s employment violated Connecticut’s clear public policy requiring the prompt reporting of any incident of suspected abuse of a nursing home resident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration award requiring the reinstatement of the Employee did not violate this public policy. View "Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act alleging that Defendant, her employer, had engaged in sexual harassment and disability discrimination and had unlawfully terminated her on the basis of her national origin, religion, and race. The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of Defendant. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment in the workplace and affirmed in all other respects, holding that Plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex. Remanded. View "Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Employers when they each suffered compensable injuries. Plaintiffs were treated at two different hospitals. In each case, the hospital submitted a bill for its services to Employer. Employer paid each hospital in accordance with the cost assessment of a third-party bill reviewer, which in each case was significantly less than what had been billed by the hospital. The hospitals subsequently sought to have the workers’ compensation commissioner determine Employer’s liability for the hospital costs. At issue was whether Employer’s liability for the hospital services should be assessed on the basis of the commissioner’s determination of what it “actually cost” the hospitals to render the services, as provided under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294d(d), or on the basis of the hospitals’ published rates that they are required to charge “any payer” under Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-646. The commissioner concluded that the two cases were controlled by Burge v. Stonington, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the “actually costs” language in the predecessor to section 31-294d(d) had been repealed or preempted in 1973 when the legislature first regulated hospital rates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public health scheme governing hospital rates for payers generally controlled the cases here. View "Caraballo v. Elec. Boat Corp." on Justia Law