Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Town of Westbrook's board of selectmen unanimously voted not to reappoint Ivan Kuvalanka to a successive term of office as town assessor, Kuvalanka filed a grievance asserting that the Town had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, of which Kuvalanka was a member. The arbitrators determined that the grievance was not arbitrable under the agreement. The Union filed an application in the trial court to vacate the award. The trial court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly limited the scope of its review when considering the Union's application to vacate the award; and (2) properly determined that the Union did not establish grounds to vacate the award. View "AFSCME, Council 4. Local 1303-325 v. Town of Westbrook" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment. Employee's union filed a grievance against Employer, and the parties submitted the controversy to arbitration. The arbitrator reduced the dismissal to a one year suspension without pay, finding the dismissal was without just cause. Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitral award, claiming that enforcement of the award violated public policy. The trial court granted the application and vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the award violated the public policy against workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required nothing less than Employee's termination. View "State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391" on Justia Law

Employee, who worked as a driver for Plaintiff, had his commercial driver's license suspended for one year after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Although Employee's misconduct did not occur in the course of his employment, Plaintiff discharged him because he could no longer perform his work duties. The Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board) sustained an award of unemployment benefits to Employee. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-236(a)(14), which disallows unemployment benefits to a discharged employee who has been disqualified under law from performing the work for which he was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program, did not apply to a commercial driver like Employee who, while off duty, loses his license for driving under the influence and is therefore unable to work. View "Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act" on Justia Law

Employee was injured at Employer's paper bag manufacturing facility while attempting to dislodge a bag that was jammed in a machine. Employee filed this action to recover damages for the alleged intentional misconduct by his night supervisor (Supervisor), claiming that his injuries resulted from Employer's modification of the machine and that Supervisor was Employer's alter ego for the purposes of the intentional tort exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's (Act) exclusivity provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the Act was Employee's exclusive remedy. At issue on appeal was whether Supervisor was Employer's alter ego under the exception to the exclusivity of the Act for intentional torts committed by a fellow employee identified as the alter ego of the corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee failed to establish a disputed issue of fact as to whether Supervisor was Defendant's alter ego. View "Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of labor against her employer (Employer), alleging a violation of the Connecticut family and medical leave statute, which applies only to employers that employer seventy-five or more employees. Although Employer employed more than 1,000 employees nationwide, the commissioner of labor dismissed the complaint on the ground that the leave statute does not apply to Employer because it does not employ seventy-five or more employees within the state of Connecticut. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor, concluding that all employees of a business are to be counted in determining whether the business is an employer under the leave statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section Conn. Agencies Regs. 31-51qq-42, which has the force and effect of a statute, makes clear that only Connecticut employees are to be counted under the leave statute. View "Velez v. Comm'r of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Sapko sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, an employee of the state of Connecticut. The workers' compensation commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, determining that the decedent's ingestion of Oxycodone and Seroquel constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The workers' compensation review board upheld the commissioner's decision. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the board incorrectly concluded that the superceding cause doctrine applied to the present case, but (2) this impropriety was harmless because the board correctly determined that the commissioner properly decided the issue of proximate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the board correctly concluded that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts. View "Sapko v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal and cross appeal concerned the authority of the named defendant, the city of Waterbury, under its city charter to offset the pension benefits of Plaintiffs, several individuals who had worked for the city, by the heart and hypertension benefits they received. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and directed judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims except Nicolas Russo's claim for breach of contract, and remanded the case for a new trial on that claim, holding (1) the trial court improperly concluded, with respect to all of Plaintiffs except Russo, their respective collective bargaining agreements conflicted with the Waterbury city charter, which allowed the city to offset Plaintiff's pension benefits based on their heart and hypertension benefits; and (2) although the trial court properly interpreted Russo's collective bargaining agreement to permit the city to offset his pension benefits by his heart and hypertension benefits, the court improperly failed to determine whether Russo's combined pension and heart and hypertension benefits exceeded the cap set forth in the agreement, thus permitting an offset. View "Russo v. Waterbury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Luis Patino commenced this action against Defendant, his former employer, claiming that Defendant engaged in a discriminatory employment practice when it permitted his coworkers to harass him based on his sexual orientation over a period of many years. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-81c(1) provides for hostile work environment claims where employees are subject to sexual orientation discrimination; (2) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a hostile work environment; and (3) the award of damages was supported by the evidence. View "Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff G. Berry Schumann, a twelve year employee of Defendant, Dianon Systems, brought a complaint against Defendant alleging a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and common-law wrongful termination of employment for an adverse employment action Defendant took against Plaintiff in response to speech made during the course of Plaintiff's job duties. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether the rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which states that public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not insulated from employer discipline for First Amendment purposes, is applicable in an action brought against a private employer pursuant to section 31-51q. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the rule in Garcetti applies to claims under section 31-51q grounded in the First Amendment that are brought against private employers; and (2) Plaintiff's speech was in the course of his employment duties for Defendant and, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment protection under Garcetti. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant on the claim under section 31-51q and for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's common-law wrongful termination claim. View "Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants. View "Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law