Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was Conn. Gen. Stat. 21-80a, which protects residents of mobile manufactured home parks by limiting the availability of summary process actions. Under the statute, if a resident proves that he or she engaged in one or more of the protected activities enumerated in the statute within the six months preceding the park owner's eviction proceeding, the owner may not maintain a summary process action against that resident unless the owner can show that one of the exceptions specified in the statute applies. Defendants, residents of a mobile manufactured home park owned by Plaintiff, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment of possession in favor of Plaintiff, claiming that judgment of possession should be granted in their favor because Plaintiff's summary process action was barred under section 21-80a. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants were in material noncompliance with the lease and were using the dwelling unit or the premises for a purpose which was in violation of the rental agreement; and (2) thus, the appellate court's ultimate conclusion that Defendants' violation was encompassed by 21-80a was proper. View "Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an LLC, owned and managed a commercial office building, and Defendant, an LLC, leased and occupied space in the building. A dispute arose between Plaintiff and Defendant over the scope of the lease and payment of rent. This dispute resulted in two people who had ownership interests in Plaintiff bringing the present action, in the name of Plaintiff, against Defendant to enforce the lease and to collect rent. Barbara Levine, who had fifty percent interest in Plaintiff and was the wife of a part owner of Defendant, disapproved of the lawsuit. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, since one of its member's votes should not have been excluded pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 34-187(b) on the ground that she had an interest in the outcome of the suit that was adverse to the interest of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff properly excluded Levine from voting her interest in determining whether to bring the present action because her interest in the outcome of the action was adverse to that of Plaintiff's in light of her husband's ownership interest in Defendant. View "418 Meadow St. Assocs., LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law