Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

A case in Connecticut involved a couple, Aaron Lynch and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch, who sought damages for alleged medical malpractice by the state of Connecticut in relation to therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided at a state hospital. The couple were unable to conceive without medical assistance and pursued TDI services. The hospital staff failed to adhere to guidelines regarding the use of cytomegalovirus (CMV) positive donor sperm for CMV negative patients, leading to Jean-Marie being inseminated with CMV positive donor sperm. Jean-Marie later became pregnant with twins. During her pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection, however, the hospital staff failed to inform Jean-Marie or take appropriate follow-up action. One of the twins died in utero from a severe CMV infection and the other was born with severe, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state could not claim sovereign immunity as the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims, not informed consent claims. The court also held that the plaintiffs' son, who was born with severe medical conditions as a result of the state's negligence, was entitled to compensation. The court found no merit in the state's claim that the damages awarded were speculative or predicated on the concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence. The court concluded that common-law negligence principles were adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by the plaintiffs' son. This decision affirms the trial court's award of over $34 million in damages to the plaintiffs. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint filed by Celine Escobar-Santana (Celine) and her son Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), holding that the phrase "medical malpractice claims" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(f) was broad enough to encompass Celine's claim for emotional distress damages under the circumstances of this case.Celine brought this action alleging that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to Emmett that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals (collectively, Defendants) during the birthing process. The State moved to dismiss count two of the complaint on the ground that the count did not fall within the statutory waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in section 4-160(f) because the count stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or bystander liability rather than medical malpractice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celine's allegation that she suffered a traumatic delivery followed by severe psychological distress was inextricably connected to her allegations of medical malpractice and therefore qualified as a medical malpractice claim for purposes of section 4-160(f). View "Escobar-Santana v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court in this action to recover damages for Defendants' alleged medical malpractice affirming the trial court's judgment granting Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded in Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 21 A.3d 451 (Conn. 2011), that the opinion letter requirement implicates the court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of the procedures attendant to a motion to dismiss.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court should not have considered an affidavit filed by Plaintiff to supplement a potentially defective opinion letter as an alternative to amending the operative complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the opinion letter requirement is a unique, statutory procedural device that does not implicate the superior court's jurisdiction; (2) the sufficiency of the opinion letter is to be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and on the face of the opinion letter, without resorting to a jurisdictional fact-finding process; and (3) the opinion letter at issue in this case was legally sufficient under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a. View "Carpenter v. Daar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the motion of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the basis of sovereign immunity, holding that the trial court did not err.James Caverly died while under the medical care of the employees of the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center. Plaintiff, administrator of the decedent's estate, brought a medical malpractice action against the State, doing business as UCONN Health Center/John Dempsey Hospital, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(b). The State filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing that because Plaintiff had received a settlement payment from a joint tortfeasor in connection with the decedent's death. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that section 4-160b(a) applies only to subrogated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the State's motion to dismiss. View "Caverly v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the accidental failure of suit statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, did not save the otherwise time-barred action of Plaintiff, executrix of the estate of Theresa Riccio, holding that there was no error.The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's wrongful death action was time barred because her first medical malpractice action was dismissed due to her attorney's gross negligence for failing to file with the complaint legally sufficient medical opinion letters, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(a) and two appellate court decisions interpreting section 52-190a(a). The appellate court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the omission of the experts' qualifications was egregious conduct rather than a matter of form or mistake. View "Riccio v. Bristol Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants in this action alleging that Boston Scientific Corporation's sale of its Obtryx Transobturator Mid-Urethral Sling System (Obtryx) violated the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572m et seq., holding that there was no error.The named plaintiff alleged that the Obtryx, a transvaginal mesh sling implanted in women to treat stress urinary incontinence, injured her in various ways after it was implanted in her. Plaintiffs brought claims against Boston Scientific and the named plaintiff's gynecologist and medical practice, alleging violations of the Act, negligence sounding in informed consent, and misrepresentation. The trial court granted the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial against Boston Scientific, and the jury returned a verdict in its favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment for the medical defendants on the informed consent and misrepresentation claims; and (2) properly declined to instruct the jury on the reasonable alternative design prong of the risk-utility test. View "Fajardo v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court applying the general negligence statute of limitations in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584 to Plaintiffs' claims alleging medical negligence instead of the extended limitation period set forth in section 52-577d, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiffs were minor patients of Robert Rackliffe, a pediatrician practicing in the early 1970s to the 1980s. Plaintiffs alleged that Rackliffe sexually assaulted them during their annual physical examinations and that Rackliffe's conduct constituted medical negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence and that the negligence claims were governed by the limitation period set forth in section 52-584. View "Doe v. Rackliffe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of Defendant, as executor of the estate of Robert Rackliffe, on the ground that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were time barred, holding that the extended limitation period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims for personal injuries brought against the alleged perpetrator of a sexual assault.Seven plaintiffs, each of whom were minors at the time of the alleged assaults, alleged that Rackliffe's conduct constituted both intentional sexual assault and medical negligence. Defendant sought summary judgment as to the counts sounding in negligence, arguing that those counts were time barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all of the negligence counts. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their additional claims and appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were governed by the three-year limitation period set forth in section 52-584 and that section 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. View "Doe v. Rackliffe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court granting in part Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Defendants' appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on certain medical malpractice claims and denied Defendants' motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal, holding that the Appellate Court did not err.On appeal, Defendants argued that the Appellate Court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the jury's verdict as untimely and abused its discretion in denying their motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a later appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the appeal was untimely; and (2) the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion or work injustice by determining that Defendants had failed to establish good cause for their failure to file a timely appeal. View "Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C." on Justia Law