Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, based on multiple incidents of sexual abuse against two minor victims who attended a day care operated by the defendant’s wife in their home. The abuse occurred over several years, when the victims were between three and eight years old. The state’s case relied on evidence that the defendant committed a variety of sexual acts against each child on separate occasions. Each count of sexual assault was based on multiple, distinct incidents involving a specific sexual act.The Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven conducted a jury trial. At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court provided the jury with specific unanimity instructions for each count, stating that to find the defendant guilty, all jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least one specific alleged act described in the count. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment, execution suspended after twenty-one years, followed by ten years of probation. The defendant appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the trial court did not require the jury to answer special interrogatories identifying which incident formed the basis for each conviction.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the federal constitution does not require special interrogatories on unanimity in addition to a specific unanimity instruction when a single count is based on multiple, separate acts. The Court found the trial court’s unanimity instructions sufficient to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights and affirmed the judgments. View "State v. Carlos G." on Justia Law

A fire at a call center in Davao City, Philippines, resulted in the deaths of twenty-nine individuals who were employees of a Philippine company providing services for a Connecticut-based company. The estates of the deceased and other plaintiffs, most of whom were Philippine citizens or residents, brought a wrongful death and loss of consortium action in Connecticut against the Connecticut company and two of its officers, who were also involved with the Philippine employer.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, finding the Philippines to be an adequate alternative forum. The court considered conflicting affidavits from expert witnesses regarding whether Philippine courts would accept the case, given concerns about the statute of limitations. The dismissal was conditioned on allowing the plaintiffs to reinstate the Connecticut action if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction. The Appellate Court affirmed this decision, concluding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard and meaningfully assessed the adequacy of the Philippine forum.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that the trial court correctly applied the legal standard from Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., and undertook a meaningful assessment of the adequacy of the Philippines as an alternative forum. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not rely solely on the defendants’ consent to jurisdiction but weighed competing affidavits and evidence regarding Philippine law and procedure. The conditional nature of the dismissal, allowing reinstatement in Connecticut if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction, was also deemed appropriate. Thus, the disposition by the Connecticut Supreme Court was to affirm the Appellate Court’s decision. View "DeCicco v. Dynata, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. The decedent encountered asbestos both during his employment with a state agency and the town of Manchester, as well as outside of work in various settings. After his death, his wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled multiple product liability suits against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products. The settlement allocated a percentage of damages to the estate for personal injuries and death, and a portion to the spouse for loss of consortium. Subsequently, the plaintiff also sought and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, based on findings that occupational asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease.Before the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission, the administrative law judge determined that the decedent’s employers were entitled to a statutory lien under General Statutes § 31-293 (a) on the net settlement proceeds attributable to both occupational and nonoccupational asbestos exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the portion of the settlement related to nonoccupational exposure should not be subject to the employer’s lien because this exposure was not a work-related injury under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the lower board’s ruling. The court held that, because the decedent suffered a single occupational disease—mesothelioma—that was caused in substantial part by occupational exposure, the disease was fully compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, regardless of nonoccupational contributions. Thus, the employers’ lien under § 31-293 (a) extended to the net settlement proceeds from both occupational and nonoccupational exposures. The court also rejected the argument that a tortfeasor’s lack of an employment relationship with the decedent precluded application of the lien. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos both at his workplace and at home. His wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled product liability claims against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, with the majority of the settlement proceeds attributed to nonoccupational exposure. She also filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits, which were awarded based on findings that both occupational and nonoccupational exposures were significant factors in causing his disease.An administrative law judge for the Workers’ Compensation Commission found that, because the decedent’s work-related asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma, the disease constituted a compensable occupational disease under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The judge awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the estate and the surviving spouse. The judge further concluded that the decedent’s employers—the state and the town—were entitled under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-293(a) to a lien on the net amount of the tort settlement proceeds received by the estate, including those attributable to nonoccupational exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the decisions below. It held that when a single occupational disease is caused in substantial part by both occupational and nonoccupational factors, and workers’ compensation benefits are awarded accordingly, the employer’s statutory lien on any third-party recovery extends to the entire net proceeds, including those attributable to nonoccupational causes. The court also held that the statute’s reference to a “person” liable for damages is not limited to parties with an employment relationship to the decedent. The decision of the Compensation Review Board was therefore affirmed. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was involved in a car accident with the defendant, after which he sought damages for the diminished value and loss of use of his vehicle, alleging the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence. The defendant’s insurer paid the full property damage coverage limit to the plaintiff’s insurer, based on the assertion that the plaintiff had been made whole. The plaintiff then amended his complaint to allege that his insurer was unjustly enriched for accepting the payment and exhausting the defendant’s coverage before the plaintiff was fully compensated, in violation of the make whole doctrine.The case was brought in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, which dismissed the unjust enrichment claim against the insurer, finding it was not ripe for adjudication. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim depended on the outcome of his negligence action against the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, and the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding the unjust enrichment claim would only become ripe after the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant and exhausted collection efforts, because the injury was contingent on whether and to what extent the plaintiff could recover and on the defendant’s ability to satisfy a judgment.On review, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court incorrectly affirmed the dismissal on ripeness grounds. The Supreme Court ruled that a claim based on premature subrogation in violation of the make whole doctrine is ripe for adjudication even before a judgment against the tortfeasor is obtained, because the alleged injury—violation of the plaintiff’s priority right to the defendant’s insurance coverage—had already occurred. The court also found the plaintiff had standing to assert his claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Orlando v. Liburd" on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child drowned after wandering unattended from the home where she had been placed under temporary custody by order of the Probate Court. The child’s parents had previously lost guardianship, and the court had vested temporary custody in maternal relatives. To determine whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship, the Probate Court ordered the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to investigate the home and report its findings. DCF submitted its report, recommending the placement, but before the court could hold a hearing on permanent guardianship, the child died. The child’s estate, through her father as administrator, alleged that DCF’s negligence in investigating the placement and in making recommendations to the Probate Court was a proximate cause of the child’s death, and also claimed DCF failed to fulfill independent duties to protect the child from abuse and neglect.After the estate received permission from the Claims Commissioner to sue the state, DCF moved to dismiss the action in the Superior Court, arguing that it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions integral to the judicial process, such as conducting court-ordered investigations and making recommendations. The Superior Court agreed, holding that DCF was protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when acting as an arm of the Probate Court, and that the Claims Commissioner could not waive this immunity. The court dismissed the action, finding the complaint’s allegations insufficient to overcome DCF’s immunity.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Claims Commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the relevant statute does not preclude the state from asserting absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However, the Court reversed in part, concluding that some of the estate’s allegations may fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial immunity, particularly those involving DCF’s independent statutory duties. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, are not barred by quasi-judicial immunity. View "Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, discovered through genetic testing that they are half-siblings and that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, a reproductive endocrinologist. They allege that the defendant used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures without their parents' consent, causing them mental anguish, physical injury, and compromised familial relations. Kayla Suprynowicz also claimed that the defendant's sperm carried a genetic trait causing her to contract a cerebral condition and mast cell activation disorder, reducing her earning capacity.The trial court, Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' amended complaint, determining that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which is not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims presented the paradox of alleging harm that could only have been avoided if they had never been born, a hallmark of wrongful life claims.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful life claims and could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's deception was directly responsible for their injuries and losses, and they sought compensation for these injuries rather than being restored to a state of nonbeing. The court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to strike as to those claims and for further proceedings. View "Suprynowicz v. Tohan" on Justia Law