Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with a jury verdict awarding Plaintiff damages for injuries he received from a fall on the City of Bridgeport's sidewalk, holding that the appellate court erred.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court erred in determining, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-174(b), that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence a medical record containing the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician assistant when Defendant was unable to cross-examine the physician assistant. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the appellate court incorrectly determined that Plaintiff's medical records were inadmissible under section 52-174(b). View "DeMaria v. Bridgeport" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 189 A. 599 (Conn. 1937), insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of the employee's employment, he or she is injured due to an idiopathic fall onto a level floor.The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board (Board) affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff's application for benefits filed after she suffered a syncopal episode at her workplace, which caused her to fall backward and strike her head on the ground, concluding that, under Savage, Plaintiff's injury was compensable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling the portion of Savage at issue, holding that the risk or condition must be "peculiar to the employment" for the injury to be compensable. View "Clements v. Aramark Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court applying the general negligence statute of limitations in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584 to Plaintiffs' claims alleging medical negligence instead of the extended limitation period set forth in section 52-577d, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiffs were minor patients of Robert Rackliffe, a pediatrician practicing in the early 1970s to the 1980s. Plaintiffs alleged that Rackliffe sexually assaulted them during their annual physical examinations and that Rackliffe's conduct constituted medical negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence and that the negligence claims were governed by the limitation period set forth in section 52-584. View "Doe v. Rackliffe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of Defendant, as executor of the estate of Robert Rackliffe, on the ground that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were time barred, holding that the extended limitation period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims for personal injuries brought against the alleged perpetrator of a sexual assault.Seven plaintiffs, each of whom were minors at the time of the alleged assaults, alleged that Rackliffe's conduct constituted both intentional sexual assault and medical negligence. Defendant sought summary judgment as to the counts sounding in negligence, arguing that those counts were time barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all of the negligence counts. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their additional claims and appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were governed by the three-year limitation period set forth in section 52-584 and that section 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. View "Doe v. Rackliffe" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants - the City of New Haven and one of its police officers, Nikki Curry - holding that the trial court incorrectly determined that Defendants were entitled to governmental immunity for discretionary acts pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(a)(2)(B).On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in determining that Curry's decision to drive her vehicle into oncoming traffic was a discretionary act, rather than a ministerial act, because Curry's actions violated policies imposing ministerial duties regarding the operation of police vehicles, pursuits, and roadblocks. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court improperly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on discretionary immunity grounds. View "Cole v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims stemming from a workplace asbestos exposure at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's cogeneration project in Stratford, holding that the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.The named plaintiff brought a class action complaint against Sikorsky and Carrier Corporation, alleging negligence, battery, recklessness, and strict liability for violations of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. and seeking remedies for asbestos exposure while working at the Sikorsky cogeneration project. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court declined to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring under Connecticut law that would allow recovery for an increased risk of future injury rather than a present injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if this Court were to recognize a medical monitoring claim in the absence of any physical manifestation of injury under Connecticut law, Plaintiffs nevertheless failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to certain elements of the claim. View "Dougan v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting the state's motion to dismiss this tort action, holding that a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-556 for claims arising from a state employee's negligent operation of a state-owned and -insured motor vehicle extends to litigants who are state employees.Plaintiff, a state employee, was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state and operated by another state employee, William Texidor, when another vehicle operated by Tyreke Brooks struck their vehicle. Brooks' vehicle was uninsured. Plaintiff, who applied for and received workers' compensation benefits, brought this action agains the state and Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company alleging that Texidor's operation of the vehicle was negligent. The state filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 52-556; (2) Plaintiff's action against the state was barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-284(a); and (3) therefore, the form of judgment was improper, and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the state. View "Feliciano v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding Plaintiff permanent partial disability benefits of twenty-three percent based on the function of his transplanted heart, holding that the Board correctly treated the transplanted heart as an organ rather than a prosthetic device.At issue was whether Plaintiff, who underwent a heart transplant, was entitled to a specific indemnity award for permanent partial disability under the Workers' Compensation Act for the total loss of Plaintiff's native heart or whether the award should be based, instead, on the rated function of Plaintiff's transplanted heart. Plaintiff was awarded benefits based on the function of his transplanted heart. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that his transplanted heart was akin to a prosthetic device, and therefore, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-308(b) required compensation for the 100 percent loss of his native heart. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the transplant meant that Plaintiff had not suffered a complete loss of his heart within the meaning of section 31-308(b). View "Vitti v. Milford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the Compensation Review Board finding that the City of Bridgeport was liable for the payment of Plaintiff's workers compensation benefits as his principal employer, holding that the City was in the "trade or business" of maintaining and repairing municipal buildings and facilities.The City hired Contractor do repair work on the roof of the City's transfer facility, and Contractor hired Subcontractor. Plaintiff, an employee of Subcontractor, was injured in the course and scope of his employment and sought workers' compensation benefits from the City, Contractor, and Subcontractor. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner concluded that, because Howie's Roofing was uninsured, the Second Injury Fund was required to pay Plaintiff benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-355. The Fund contested liability, arguing that the City was required to pay the benefits owed to Plaintiff as his principal employer. The Commissioner determined that the City was Plaintiff's principal employer and ordered the City to pay workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that roof repair was a part or process in the City's trade or business under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-291. View "Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic" on Justia Law

In this public interest appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court sanctioning Defendants after finding that Defendants had violated numerous discovery orders and engaged in harassing and intimidating behavior directed at Plaintiffs' counsel, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiffs, a first responder and family members of those killed in the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, brought these actions against Alex Jones and his affiliate corporate entities claiming that statements made on Jones' radio show were tortious. At issue were orders of the trial court sanctioning Defendants by revoking their opportunity to pursue the special motions to dismiss provided by the anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Defendants for discovery violations and for Jones' conduct; and (2) Defendants were afforded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before the trial court imposed sanctions. View "Lafferty v. Jones" on Justia Law